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Abstract 
 
This work attempts to make a breakthrough in the empirical research of market 
inefficiency by introducing a new approach, the value frontier method, to estimate 
the magnitude of stock bubbles, which has been an interesting topic that has attracted 
a lot of research attention in the past. The theoretical framework stems from the basic 
argument of Blanchard & Watson’s (1982) rational expectation of asset value that 
should be equal to the fundamental value of the stock, and the argument of 
Scheinkman & Xiong (2003) and Hong, Scheinkman & Xiong (2006) that bubbles 
are formed by heterogeneous beliefs which can be refined as the optimism effect and 
the resale option effect. The applications of the value frontier methodology are 
demonstrated in this work at the market level and the firm level respectively. The 
estimated bubbles at the market level enable us to analyse bubble changes over time 
among 37 countries across the world, which helps further examine the relationship 
between economic factors (e.g. inflation) and bubbles.  Firm-level bubbles are 
estimated in two developed markets, the US and the UK, as well as one emerging 
market, China. We found that the market-average bubble is less volatile than 
industry-level bubbles. This finding provides a compelling explanation to the failure 
of many existing studies in testing the existence of bubbles at the whole market level. 
In addition, the significant decreasing trend of Chinese bubbles and their co-moving 
tendency with the UK and the US markets offer us evidence in support of our 
argument that even in an immature market, investors can improve their investment 
perceptions towards rationality by learning not only from previous experience but 
also from other opened markets.  
 
Furthermore, following the arguments of “sustainable bubbles” from Binswanger 
(1999) and Scheinkman & Xiong (2003), we reinforce their claims at the end that a 
market with bubbles can also be labelled efficient; in particular, it has three forms of 
efficiency. First, a market without bubbles is completely efficient from the 
perspective of investors’ responsiveness to given information; secondly, a market 
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with “sustainable bubbles” (bubbles that co-move with the economy), which results 
from rational responses to  economic conditions, is in the strong form of 
information-responsive efficiency; thirdly, a market with “non-sustainable bubbles”, 
i.e. the bubble changes are not linked closely with economic foundations, is in the 
weak form of information-responsive efficiency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 7 - 
List of Tables 
 
Table 4.1 Test of Bubbles: Co-integration Test in Time Series .......................... 135 
Table 4.2 Estimation of Market-Level Bubbles ................................................ 141 
Table 4.3 Worldwide Average Values of the Estimated Bubble ......................... 142 
Table 4.4 Long-term Relationships between BI and PI, PE, PD ....................... 142 
Table 4.5 Short-term Relations between BI and PI, PE, PD .............................. 146 
Table 4.6 Worldwide Average Market Values, Dividends, Estimated Bubbles and 
Economic Growth ................................................................................................ 148 
Table 4.7 Economic Growth and Stock Bubbles (Mean) .................................. 148 
Table 4.8 Economic Growth and Stock Bubbles (Variance) ............................. 148 
Table 5.1 Estimation of Production Efficiency ................................................. 192 
Table 5.2 Stock Market and Economy: Model I-A, II-A and III-A ................... 193 
Table 5.3 Stock Market and Economy: Model I-B, II-B and III-B .................... 194 
Table 5.4 Stock Market and Economy: Model I-C, II-C and III-C .................... 195 
Table 5.5 Stock Price and Economy: Model IV-A and B .................................. 196 
Table 6.1 Firm-level Estimation of Bubbles: the U.K. Market .......................... 230 
Table 6.2 Firm-level Estimation of Bubbles: the U.S. Market .......................... 232 
Table 6.3 Market Average Values of Stock Prices, Fundamental Values and 
Bubbles: the UK and the US Markets ................................................................... 234 
Table 7.1 Average Return On Equity (ROE) of Sample Firms .......................... 275 
Table 7.2 Statistics of the Chinese Stock Market (1996-2003) ......................... 275 
Table 7.3 the First Stage Estimation of Bubbles in the Chinese Market ............ 276 
Table 7.4 the Second Stage Estimation of Bubbles in the Chinese Market ........ 276 
Table 7.5 Integration of Bubbles in Three Sectors between US and China ....... 278 
 
 
 
 - 8 - 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 4.1 Values of the Bubble Index Estimated from Four Models ................. 149 
Figure 4.2 Bubbles of Each Individual Country and the Sample Mean .............. 155 
Figure 4.2-1  Comparison of Bubbles between A-Share Group and B&H-Share Group 
(the Chinese Stock Markets) ................................................................................. 159 
Figure 4.3 Bubbles in High-Income and Middle-Income Countries ................... 160 
Figure 4.4 Comparisons of Bubbles among Three Regions ................................ 160 
Figure 6.1 Comparisions among Three Models in the Firm-level Estimation:  
Market Average Values of Bubbles ....................................................................... 235 
Figure 6.2 Comparisons between Bubble Index and PE, PD .............................. 236 
Figure 6.3 Estimated Market Level Bubbles ...................................................... 236 
Figure 6.4 Comparisons among Three Models in the Firm Level Estimation:  
Average Values of Bubbles in A Sector ................................................................. 236 
Figure 6.5 Stock Prices, Fundamental Values and Bubbles: Average Values in A 
Sector………. ...................................................................................................... 240 
Figure 6.6 Bubbles in A Sector and Their Market Average Value: the UK and the US 
Markets…… ........................................................................................................ 243 
Figure 7.1 Comparison of Adjusted and Unadjusted Bubbles ............................ 278 
Figure 7.2 Comparisons of Bubbles among Estimation I-A, I-B and I-C ........... 278 
Figure 7.3 Stock Prices, Fundamental Values and Bubbles: Market Average Values  
(From Estimation II-A) ......................................................................................... 279 
Figure 7.4 Comparisons of Bubbles among Three Markets ................................ 279 
Figure 7.5 Bubbles in A Sector: Domestic and International Comparisons ......... 279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 9 - 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. 3 
Abstract ...... ............................................................................................................ 5 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... 7 
List of Figures ......................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 1  Introduction ...................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Research Background and Aims ................................................................................ 12 
1.1.1 The Development of Academic Views on Stock Bubbles ............................. 13 
1.1.2 The Real-World Image: Historical Events ..................................................... 16 
1.1.3 Research Motivation and Aims ...................................................................... 19 
1.2 Theoretical Contributions: The Value Frontier Framework ....................................... 20 
1.3 Empirical Contributions: The Estimated Bubble (or Bubble Index) ......................... 22 
1.3.1 Estimation of Bubbles in Macro Research..................................................... 23 
1.3.2 Estimation of Bubbles in Micro Research ..................................................... 24 
1.4 Research Outline........................................................................................................ 25 
Appendix 1.1 Historical Events of Bubbles ....................................................................... 28 
Chapter 2  Literature Review of Current Studies in Stock Bubbles ................. 29 
2.1 The General Review of Research on Stock Market Bubbles ..................................... 29 
2.1.1 Defining Rational Bubbles From A Theoretical Perspective ......................... 30 
2.1.2 Empirical Studies in Rational Bubbles .......................................................... 33 
2.1.3 Behavioural Finance and Bubbles ................................................................. 39 
2.1.4 Summary ........................................................................................................ 41 
2.2 Share Price-Inflation Puzzle ...................................................................................... 42 
2.2.1 Early Evidence of the Positive Relationship .................................................. 42 
2.2.2 Micro Explanations to the Negative Relationship ......................................... 43 
2.2.3 Macro Explanations to the Negative Relationship ......................................... 45 
2.2.4 Summary ........................................................................................................ 49 
2.3 Share Valuation - Determination of Companies’ Fundamental Values ...................... 49 
2.3.1 Research on the Fundamental Valuation in the Early Time ........................... 50 
2.3.2 Recent Studies on the Fundamental Valuation ............................................... 52 
2.3.3 Summary ........................................................................................................ 55 
Chapter 3  Bubbles: Theories and Development of the New Estimation 
Methodology...... ................................................................................................... 56 
3.1 Bubble Behaves: Current Theories ............................................................................ 56 
3.1.1 Bubbles in Normative Models ....................................................................... 57 
3.1.2 Bubbles in Behavioural Studies ..................................................................... 62 
3.1.3 Summary ........................................................................................................ 69 
3.2 Theoretical Basis of Value Frontier Framework ........................................................ 70 
3.2.1 Information Revealing Efficiency and Responding Inefficiency ................... 73 
3.2.2 The Determination of Fundamental Values ................................................... 74 
3.2.3 The Forming Process of Bubbles ................................................................... 76 
 - 10 - 
3.2.4 Value Frontier Framework ............................................................................. 82 
3.2.5 Summary ........................................................................................................ 85 
3.3 Stochastic Frontier Estimation and Its Application to the Value Frontier Framework
 ....................................................................................................................................86 
3.3.1 Critical Review of Stochastic Frontier Estimation ........................................ 86 
3.3.2 Application of Stochastic Frontier Estimation to the Value Frontier 
Framework ..................................................................................................................... 91 
3.3.3 Summary ........................................................................................................ 94 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion .......................................................................................... 94 
Chapter 4  Application of the Value Frontier Methodology I: Estimation of 
Market-level Bubbles Around the World ............................................................ 97 
4.1 Bubble Estimation for 37 Countries Around the World ............................................. 97 
4.1.1 Models ........................................................................................................... 97 
4.1.2 Data .............................................................................................................. 101 
4.1.3 Empirical Estimation and Results ................................................................ 102 
4.2 Examinations of Estimated Bubbles ........................................................................ 109 
4.2.1 Interpretation of the Average Movement of Estimated Bubbles .................. 109 
4.2.2 Bubble Movements in 37 Countries ............................................................ 111 
4.2.3 Bubbles and Economic Conditions .............................................................. 112 
4.3 Bubbles and the Expectation of Economic Conditions: Case Study of Some 
Countries.............................................................................................................................. 115 
4.3.1 “Bull” of the 1990s in the United States ...................................................... 116 
4.3.2 Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia ............................................................... 117 
4.4 Summary and Conclusions ...................................................................................... 121 
Appendices .......................................................................................................................... 123 
Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................... 135 
Chapter 5  Bubbles and the “Share Price-Inflation Puzzle” ........................... 161 
5.1 Current Influential Theoretical Explanations to the “Share Price-Inflation Puzzle”161 
5.1.1 Proxy Effect (Fama, 1981) ........................................................................... 163 
5.1.2 The Combined Effect of Demand and Supply Shocks (Hess and Lee,1999)
 ......................................................................................................................164 
5.1.3 Money Illusion: M-C Hypothesis (Modigliani and Cohn, 1979) ................. 165 
5.1.4 The Question of Causality ........................................................................... 166 
5.2 Refining the “Share Price-Inflation Relation” in the Account of Bubbles: A 
Theoretical Discussion ........................................................................................................ 168 
5.3 Empirical Estimation ............................................................................................... 175 
5.3.1 Models ......................................................................................................... 176 
5.3.2 Data and Variables ....................................................................................... 181 
5.3.3 Estimation and Interpretation ...................................................................... 182 
5.4 Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................................ 184 
Appendices .......................................................................................................................... 186 
Tables ................................................................................................................................... 192 
Chapter 6  Application of the Value Frontier Methodology II: Estimation of 
Firm-level Bubbles in Developed Markets ........................................................ 197 
6.1 Modelling Value Frontier in the Firm level Approach ............................................. 198 
6.1.1 A Critical Review of Residual Income Valuation Model: Feltham-Ohlson 
 - 11 - 
Framework (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995) (F-O Framework) ................ 198 
6.1.2 Application of the F-O Framework to the Value Frontier Model ................ 202 
6.2 Estimation of Firm Level Bubbles for the United States and the United Kingdom 205 
6.2.1 Models ......................................................................................................... 205 
6.2.2 Data .............................................................................................................. 207 
6.2.3 A Two-Stage Estimation .............................................................................. 209 
6.2.4 Results of Estimation ................................................................................... 210 
6.3 Interpretation of the Bubble Movement in the U.S. and the U.K. Markets ............. 213 
6.3.1 The U.K. Market .......................................................................................... 213 
6.3.2 The U.S. Market .......................................................................................... 216 
6.3.3 Summary ...................................................................................................... 219 
6.4 Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................................ 220 
Appendices .......................................................................................................................... 221 
Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................... 230 
Chapter 7  Application of the Value Frontier Methodology III: Estimation of 
Firm Level Bubbles in an Emerging Market (China) ....................................... 248 
7.1 Background of the Chinese Stock Market ............................................................... 250 
7.1.1 Characteristics of the Chinese Stock Market - A Closed Emerging Market 250 
7.1.2 Performances of the Chinese Stock Market ................................................. 254 
7.2 Estimation of Firm Level Bubbles in the Chinese Stock Market ............................ 257 
7.2.1 Models ......................................................................................................... 257 
7.2.2 Data and Estimations ................................................................................... 260 
7.3 Results and Interpretations ...................................................................................... 262 
7.3.1 A Descending Path of Bubbles in the Chinese Stock Market ...................... 264 
7.3.2 Immature Market and Mature Investors ...................................................... 266 
7.3.3 Chinese Stock Performances at the Industry Level: the Domestic and the 
International Analysis .................................................................................................. 269 
7.4 Summary and Conclusion ........................................................................................ 271 
Appendices .......................................................................................................................... 274 
Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................... 275 
Chapter 8  Conclusions and Further Research ............................................... 282 
8.1 The Advantages of the Value Frontier Methodology ............................................... 282 
8.2 The Relevance of the Estimated Bubbles ................................................................ 284 
8.2.1 The Further Relevance of the Estimated Bubbles in Academia ................... 284 
8.2.2 The Relevance of the Estimated Bubbles in the Real World ....................... 286 
8.3 Is the Market Efficient? ........................................................................................... 287 
8.4 Discrepancies and Further Research ........................................................................ 289 
8.5 Summary .................................................................................................................. 291 
References ..............................................................................................................293 
 
 
 
  
 - 12 - 
Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background and Aims 
 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) had been a central proposition of the 
academic finance before the 1980s. Shleifer (2000) emphasised that the field of 
finance in general and security analysis in particular was created on the basis of 
EMH. Jensen (1978), one of the pioneering researchers of the EMH, declared that 
“there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence 
supporting it than the Efficient Markets Hypothesis”. However, after more than thirty 
years’ pondering, the initial perception of EMH is significantly diminished by the 
perplexing look of the real-world stock market. The challenge to the EMH is initially 
raised by more and more frequent bubble events of the real-world and the testing 
failure of EMH. To cope with the weakness of EMH in explaining the real-world 
events, the idea of rational bubbles was advanced as a compromised replacement in 
the early 1980s. However, the school of rational bubbles merely concentrates its 
research on verifying stock bubbles, which leaves the argument of market 
inefficiency at a primary stage of discussion. Thus, in the past decade, as an opposite 
school of EMH, a new discipline of the stock market theory, behavioural finance, 
which challenges the theory of efficient markets and is delicated to explaining the 
inefficiency of a stock market, stands out.  
 
Although the school of rational bubbles and behavioural researchers have been trying 
to formulate a framework containing stock bubbles to explain the real-world 
phenomena in recent years, all these attempts hardly give a coherently convincing 
answer due to the limit of methodology. Furthermore, the ongoing studies in stock 
markets have a fatal problem. Summers (1985) stated that traditional finance is not 
interested in the determination of stock values, but in the price movement itself. In 
other words, traditional finance is more interested in testing if there is price 
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difference between two 8 oz bottles of ketchup and one 16 oz bottle of ketchup, than 
in understanding what determines the actual price of ketchup. Despite considerable 
progress in behavioural finance, however, as addressed by Shleifer (2000), the 
knowledge of determination of security prices still remains limited. Being aware of 
the academic discrepancy in studying stock market inefficiency, we aim to ease this 
discrepancy by changing the course of the bubble research from testing the market 
inefficiency and modelling investors’ behaviours to measuring the level of market 
inefficiency (i.e. measuring the magnitude of bubbles). In the case of Summers 
(1985), our work aims to calculate the mispricing level of two 8 oz bottles of ketchup 
if the price of one 16 oz bottle of ketchup is right and treated as a benchmark. 
Certainly, the measurement of the mispricing level will in turn facilitate the study in 
understanding the determination of the actual price of ketchup. Shleifer (2000), one 
of the creators of behavioural finance, believes that “what we know now is quite a bit 
different from what we thought we knew in 1978”. It is believed that the success of 
bubble measurement will help us substantially to further update what we think we 
know already.  
 
The line of thought above about the research background and aims will be portrayed 
in details below.      
 
1.1.1 The Development of Academic Views on Stock Bubbles 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which is the central part of efficient market 
theory, is known generally as a foundation of modern financial economics. Under 
EMH, the stock prices incorporate and reflect all the relevant information, i.e. no 
investors can beat the market by buying securities at bargain prices. However, this 
hypothesis seems over-idealistic in front of the real world where we witness winners 
and losers everyday. With the development of capital markets, EMH has been 
gradually losing its unique power, since its theoretical foundation is heavily 
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challenged by the controversial reality. As summarised by Shleifer (2000), there are 
three weaker assumptions in EMH: first, investors are assumed to value securities 
rationally; second, even though some investors are irrational, their random trading 
will cancel each other out without affecting prices; third, the rational arbitrageurs 
will eliminate the irrational influence on prices, even if the irrational behaviours fail 
to offset each other. Many real-world stock market crashes and empirical results have 
appeared to show the existence of irrationality. Furthermore, some experts, such as 
Blanchard and Watson (1982), Flood and Garber (1980) and Diba and Grossman 
(1987) pointed out that the rational market may also contain the expectation 
distortion which is defined as rational bubbles. From then on, the enormous topic of 
EMH has been standing in a hot position strongly challenged by the bubble school.  
 
The idea that bubbles in stock markets might exist is often traced to John Maynard 
Keynes’s (1936) description of an equity market as an environment in which 
speculators anticipate “what average opinion expects average opinion to be,” rather 
than focusing on things fundamental to the market. He describes the forecasting of 
stock prices as conjectures about the winner of a beauty contest. The candidate’s 
beauty is not the basis of prediction. What is crucial is how one thinks the other 
judges’ perceptions of beauty will be reflected in their voting patterns. Keynes’s 
analogy seems striking and interesting; however his picturesque account appears 
embarrassing for the absence of proof.  
 
With the development of the real world economy, the intuition that bubbles may exist 
is progressively stronger. More and more economists stand on the hypothesis of the 
existence of rational bubbles. Rational bubbles arose with the development of an 
explanation for the movement of stock prices. The simple present-value model based 
on constant discount rates and rational expectation bears a low power to explain the 
capricious behaviours in stock markets and was rejected by some pioneering 
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financial economists in the 1980s.1 Shiller (1981) proposed and verified that stock 
prices are too volatile to be justified by changes of dividends. While some 
researchers attributed the failure of explanation to the irrational behaviours, rational 
bubbles were viewed as a more theoretically reasonable and parsimonious alternative. 
From then on, economists have paid widespread professional attentions to bubble 
issues. However, this research is stuck in the hypothesis test which suffers from 
many unreasonable assumptions and statistical biases. Therefore, with the aid of 
psychology, the effort goes further to model individual behaviours, which are the 
major source forming prices.  
 
After nearly two decades’ investigation, the knowledge of investors’ behaviours and 
capital markets constitutes a new area of research - behavioural finance, which was 
eventually created as the opposite of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). In broad 
terms, behavioural finance argues that models containing irrationality can explain 
some financial phenomena better (Thaler, 2005). In order to show the irrationality, 
this new school of research draws the attention from the normative economic model 
to the psychological findings which precisely demonstrates that investors do not 
deviate from rationality randomly, but rather most deviate in the same way. 
Undoubtedly, this theoretical breakthrough eventually pulls down the foundation of 
EMH. Thaler (2005) attributes the success of behavioural finance to its two building 
blocks: theories of “limits to arbitrage” and psychology. However, the theoretical 
success is overshadowed by the lack of evidence for the assumption of the 
behavioural model in explaining the reality (i.e. lack of evidence that agents actually 
behave the way that a model claims they do.). Thaler (2005) raised two empirical 
weaknesses on the behavioural model. First, he mentioned that the massive 
psychological descriptions about people’s cognitive biases offer behavioural 
                                                       
1
 Stephen LeRoy and Richard Porter(1981); Robert Shiller (1981); Marjorie Flavin (1983); Robert Pindyck 
(1984); James Poterba and Lawrence Summers (1986); N. Gregory Mankiw et al. (1985); Allan Kleidon (1986); 
Terry Marsh and Robert Merton (1986); Robert Flood et al. (1986); John Campbell and Shiller (1987); Kenneth 
West (1987,1988a), Froot (1987); John Cochrane (1989).  
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modelers so many degrees of freedom that anything can be explained. Second, the 
empirical evidence in behavioural finance is not ample enough to verify the 
assumption of the behavioural model. In other words, it is argued that behavioural 
modelers can always model a specific form of irrationality to explain the reality but 
lack the evidence to prove their behavioural assumptions. To emphasise this 
weakness in behavioural finance, he concluded: “we should be skeptical of theories 
based on behavior that is undocumented empirically. Since behavioral theories claim 
to be grounded in realistic assumptions about behavior, we hope behavioral finance 
researchers will continue to give their assumptions empirical scrutiny.”(Thaler, 2005)  
 
It is worth mentioning a recent article which tries to describe the principles of 
bubbles. Kevin Hasset (2002) published a new science of stock market, so called 
bubbleology. Based on the analysis of the existing efficient market and the bubble 
theories, he supports the idea of existence of irrationality and bubbles in the stock 
market and proclaims that if investors believe they can sell the stocks with higher 
prices, the present stock prices could contain bubbles.  
 
Obviously, the academic studies are full of arguments but lack concrete evidence, 
which waits for a breakthrough idea to lead to new development of empirical studies. 
No doubt, this impregnable opinion should also fully reflect the real-world image. 
 
1.1.2 The Real-World Image: Historical Events 
 
In the financial area, the early bubble events normally cited by stock market experts 
are the “Tulip Bulb Mania” in the 1630s, the “South Sea Bubble” and the 
“Mississippi Bubble” in the 1710s.  
 
The “Tulip Bulb Mania” in Holland was stimulated by a non-harmful plant virus 
called mosaic which gives tulip petals beautiful “flames” of colour. The effect of this 
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mosaic highly increased the value of tulip bulbs, which were already rare and 
exclusive status symbols and novelties for the rich and famous. The rapidly rising 
price quickly attracted speculators who traded in their land, livestock, farms and life 
savings to acquire one single tulip bulb. In 1636, tulips were trading on the 
Amsterdam stock exchange as well as on exchanges in Rotterdam, Harlem, 
Levytown, and other exchanges in other nearby European countries. Moreover, 
option contracts were offered to speculators which further activated the speculation 
and increased risk. With the regulation developed by the Dutch government to help 
control the tulip mania, people started realising that tulips were not worth the prices 
they were paying. In less than six weeks, tulip prices crashed by over 90%. The price 
of tulips at the height of the mania was $76,000 and was less than $1 after the crash. 
The financial devastation that followed this crash lasted for decades.  
 
Another terrible historical bubble was the “South Sea Bubble” that started in 1711 in 
Britain. In order to finance the debt caused by a war, the British government gave 
exclusive trading rights in the South Sea to a financial institution, the South Sea 
Company, which planned on developing a monopoly in the slave trade. Share prices 
were quickly boosted by the perception of investors who perceived the value of the 
South Sea Company in the monopoly of the South Sea. However, the South Sea 
Company didn’t operate well due to the widespread corruption that occurred among 
directors, company officials and their political friends. Eventually, after 1718 when 
Britain and Spain went to war again, company directors realised that this company 
wasn’t generating any profit from its operations and sold out completely. A panic 
started when investors became aware that the company was profitless. To recover 
from this crash, the issuing of shares was outlawed for nearly one century.  
 
At the same time as the “South Sea Bubble”, the “Mississippi Bubble” occurred in 
France. In order to stabilise the economy, the “Banque Generate” was established, 
which took deposits of gold and silver and issued paper money in return. The 
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“Banque Generate” was merged in the Mississippi Company. The shares of this 
company could be bought and paid for with bank notes or with government debt. 
When this company expanded to monopolise all French trade outside Europe, its 
share price rapidly increased to around 190% in a year. However, hyperinflation 
caused by the massively increased amount of bank notes devaluated the bank notes 
which were no longer backed by previous metals. Shares collapsed 90% in half a 
year. The collapse of the “Mississippi Bubble” gave France and Europe a severe 
economic depression.   
 
The three crashes detailed above rang the red alert to the people who never carried 
the conception of bubbles before. Although these events ended up with terrible losses 
for investors, the miserable memories were not imprinted in their minds, as those 
bubbles were merely considered as contingencies not likely to be repeated often. 
Until the extensive crash of 1929 in the American stock market, people had started to 
believe that stock markets not only carry fortune but also contain the dangerous 
element of bubbles. In the 1920s, the American economy benefited from the 
increased industrialisation and new technologies. Influenced by the exuberant 
economy, the stock market also soared and bubbles were inflated. From 1921 to 1929, 
the Dow Jones went up more than 600% from 60 to 400. However, in 1929, the Fed 
raised the interest rate to cool the overheated stock market, which caused a panic of 
selling among investors who realised the stock boom had been an over-inflated 
bubble. In three days, the New York Stock Exchange erased over 5 billion dollars. 
The depression was gone over 26 years. 
 
After more than half a century’s tranquility, when the stock market was generally 
believed to be efficient, three bursts happened in succession. The disclosure of illegal 
insider trading exploded the inflated bubbles of the 1980s in the American stock 
market. Unlike the bubble events of 1929, the crash of 1987 recovered quickly due to 
the relatively strong foundation of the economy and the stimulation of the bull in the 
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Japanese stock market. However, soon after, at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Japanese stock market finally crashed after a thirty-five-year-long amazing boom. 
The crash was stimulated by the raised interest rate and was worsened by realising 
the stocks were over-valued. Meanwhile, new bubbles blew up again stealthily in 
Nasdaq due to an economic recovery and greatly increased output caused by 
computer usage and internet technology, which once again raised the mania in the 
American stock market during the late nineties. However, the over-output reduced 
the profit margin of companies, and finally gave rise to the burst in Nasdaq at the 
beginning of the new era of the twenty-first century.  
 
If the historical bubbles before the 1980s were considered as the abnormal 
phenomena of stock markets, the recent evidences of bursts are ample enough to 
reveal the persistent existence of bubbles. In essence, the market value generally 
deviates from and is most likely above the fundamental value. Bubbles are not 
remarkably perceived by the market simply because they are always imperceptible 
until the sudden burst (the above historical events are summarised in Appendix 1.1).        
 
1.1.3 Research Motivation and Aims 
 
With more and more frequent crashes in stock markets, research attention on the 
topic of bubbles has been gradually increasing. However, what have we learnt from 
the studies of bubbles since the first bubble of the “Tulipmania” in the 1630s? The 
answer is not clear-cut, since the results of bubble investigations are not satisfactorily 
convincing in offering a good explanation of the phenomena; for example, the 
rational bubble tests are weakened by excessive assumptions as well as statistical 
biases, and the behavioural models are hardly verified empirically.  
 
Furthermore, the confusion of the stock market theory raises questions in other 
financial economic research, since most of the conventional contributions stand on 
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the ground of EMH which is commonly doubted at present, and they are hardly 
updated without a fresh practical stock market theory taking the place of EMH.  
 
In order to solve the above problems plaguing the academia, an idea to study the 
magnitude of the stock market inefficiency is procured. The initial inspiration comes 
from a comparison between the stock market and the goods market. If stocks are 
deemed as the “products” in stock markets, the study of inefficiency on the goods 
market may give the reference to the examination on the inefficiency of the stock 
market. Turning to the economic theories, the efficiency is discussed as the technical 
efficiency and the allocative efficiency respectively. The allocative efficiency exists 
when the economy is doing the best job possible of satisfying unlimited wants and 
needs with limited resources - that is, of addressing the problem of scarcity, and the 
technical efficiency is achieved when producers minimise the wastage of resources 
for a given output in the production process. Our ideas come from looking for the 
inefficiency generated in the stock price forming process, i.e. the inefficiency of a 
stock market is eased by minimising the stock price for a given fundamental value, 
which is concerned to be similar with the argument of technical efficiency in 
economics.  
 
The success of this fresh idea will undoubtedly bring the new approach to the 
research of financial economics, in that it will not only bridges a link between the 
normative models and the behaviour study, but also provides a new practical 
foundation for the common financial economic research on the topic of the 
inefficient market. The major contributions in this work are illustrated in the sections 
below. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Contributions: The Value Frontier Framework 
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The foundation of the new framework is a belief that stock bubbles persist in markets. 
This belief is adherent with Binswanger (1999) and supported by the recent real 
events in stock markets.  
 
Returning to the pioneering bubble research, the attempt to detect bubbles started 
from the comparison between the actual performance of companies, fundamental 
values, and stock prices. Shiller (1981) examined the stock market inefficiency by 
jointly considering the stock price volatility and the changes in the actual cash flow. 
Also, Diba and Grossman (1987) verified that stock prices tie up with the dividend 
income. Meanwhile, the rational bubble school went further trying to verify the 
existence of bubbles. After that, behavioural studies such as Hong, Scheikman and 
Xiong (2006) argued that heterogeneous beliefs and psychological properties of 
humans are causes of bubbles. Stemming from these antecedent viewpoints and 
inspired by the development of research on production inefficiency, a new approach 
to measure the stock market inefficiency/bubbles is introduced by this study. It is 
concerned with the fact that the stock market may be efficient in revealing the 
information but not in responding to the information. If the opinion that bubbles 
commonly exist is accepted, the stock market inefficiency/bubbles can be measured 
by setting up a value frontier which empirically is the least-inflated price for given 
fundamental values. If it is assumed that at least one stock fully reflects fundamental 
values and undervaluation is not possible in the long run due to the short-sales 
constraint, this frontier in theory equals the fundamental value of a stock which is 
defined as the fundamental valuation of investors with a neutral expectation. Thus, 
the belief of market responding inefficiency, the determination of fundamental value 
under a condition of heterogenerity among investors, and the descriptive explanation 
on the causes of bubbles jointly form the theoretical foundation of the value frontier 
framework to support our empirical measurement.  
 
It is worth noting that the value frontier framework does not completely conflict with 
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the efficient market theory. The efficient market is considered as an ideal situation or 
equilibrium under which stock prices equal fundamental values. However, this 
equilibrium is just a theoretical expectation which can be very difficult to observe 
from the real-world stock market. As Hasset (2002) mentioned, the efficiency can be 
achieved only if the financial market strictly follows all the preconditions of the 
efficient market, which almost never happens in reality. Shleifer (2000) also puts 
forward the same argument that market efficiency only emerges as a special case, 
and is unlikely to hold under plausible circumstances. In addition, the value frontier 
framework combines the normative and behavioural studies together to accomplish 
the measurement of bubbles. In theory, it integrates some behavioural theories on the 
fundamental valuation and bubbles so as to set up the theoretical basis; in practice, it 
borrows some mathematical techniques from normative studies to formulate the 
fundamental value and estimate bubbles. In brief, the full content of the value 
frontier framework is to provide us with both theoretical and empirical foundation to 
measure the stock market inefficiency/bubbles, which will change the course of 
bubble researches. 
 
Crucially for the above argument, the value frontier represents the fundamental value 
in theory, though empirically it is not exactly equivalent to the theoretically expected 
fundamental value, since the frontier of sample data may be higher than, or standing 
on, the equilibrium point. So the frontier is the best proxy of the fundamental value 
in an empirical context, since it represents the least-inflated price of a stock for its 
given fundamentals.  
 
1.3 Empirical Contributions: The Estimated Bubble (or Bubble Index) 
 
Obviously, the stock market inefficiency is affiliated with bubbles. If the fundamental 
value is uncertain, the magnitude of bubbles seems never to be obtained. However, 
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the relative levels of bubbles can be detected based on the “value frontier” concept, 
which is our major contribution to empirical studies. 
 
The measurement is based on the vast amount of historical data. After choosing the 
fundamental variables based on the pervious studies of rational bubbles (Shiller, 
1981; Blanchard and Watson, 1982; Diba and Grossman, 1987 etc.) and fundamental 
valuation (Feltham and Ohlson, 1995 etc.), the estimated bubble can be measured by 
applying the cost frontier estimation technique. Among the sample observations, 
given a certain fundamental performance, the least-inflated price obtained is picked 
up as the value frontier, which is then used as a benchmark to measure the deviation 
of stock prices relative to the value frontier, i.e. a bubble index (or the estimated 
bubble), by comparing the value frontier with the prices of other stocks.  
 
The empirical modelling of value-frontier is very flexible, in that the structure of 
fundamental variables can be adjusted in accordance with any particularities. 
Therefore, this methodology of bubble measurement can be applied in both macro 
and micro horizons.   
 
1.3.1 Estimation of Bubbles in Macro Research  
 
Normally, investigation starts with the most general case. Thus, the market level 
estimation without involving risks is firstly conducted using aggregate data in a panel. 
The market-level model starts from the basic model of fundamental valuation (for 
example, the model by West [1987]) with only one variable, dividends, as its 
fundamental variable. The magnitudes of the bubbles of 37 markets in our sample are 
clearly shown for the first time. This group of numbers are further proved different 
from variables, such as price-earning ratio and price-dividend ratio, which implies 
that our estimated bubbles embed different information from the price-earning ratio 
and price-dividend ratio. Furthermore, our study goes further to primarily examine 
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the relationship between bubbles and the expectation of real economic activities by 
reviewing two bubble events in the 1990s: the “dot-com fad” and the “Southeast 
Asian financial crisis”.  
 
Moreover, the relationship between stock markets and the real economy is further 
discussed by regressing the stock prices, the estimated bubbles and the proxy of 
fundamental values with some real economic factors respectively. In this study, an 
“economic enigma”- the “share price-inflation puzzle” - is re-examined by taking 
bubbles into account. The findings are remarkable in that, in theory, instead of EMH 
by default, an account of bubbles is embedded into stock prices to derive the 
relationship between stock prices and some economic factors, particularly inflation. 
Empirically, the market-level bubbles make the empirical work feasible and interplay 
with the theoretical deduction. The “economic enigma” is eventually clarified 
theoretically and empirically on the basis of a bubble framework.  
  
1.3.2 Estimation of Bubbles in Micro Research 
 
Further effort is made in the micro firm-level estimation for three markets: the U.S., 
U.K. and China. Based on some antecedent ideas in the research area of the capital 
market in accounting, especially the residual income model of Feltham-Ohlson (1995) 
(F-O Model), a more delicate pattern is devised in the firm-level value frontier model. 
The accounting numbers, such as earnings and the book value of equity, are 
employed to pick up the fundamental value. In addition, the risk is also considered in 
the model. The bubble comparisons at firm and industrial levels reveal a tendency for 
bubble converging among the U.S., the U.K. and the Chinese stock markets. 
Meanwhile, for the Chinese stock market, the figures of the estimated bubbles also 
imply that, as an emerging market that is still struggling to pave a shortcut to catch 
up with the developed markets, investors in this market have become more rational, 
i.e. bubbles formulated by investors’ thoughts in the Chinese stock market are not 
 - 25 - 
more absurd than the ones in mature markets.   
 
Moreover, it is argued that the estimated firm-level bubbles bear more information 
than the market-level bubbles. The market average level of bubbles appears to be 
more stable over time than the bubble movement of each individual stock, which 
implies that the risk-adjusted investment strategy plays a significant role. 
  
1.4 Research Outline 
 
After several decades’ investigation, the theories and reality both explicitly reveal 
that the intuition about the inefficient stock market is not just a fanciful thought. 
However, it is not easy to prove EMH inappropriate and to accept the idea of 
persistent bubbles. The investigation is therefore needed for the evidence collection. 
Our idea in this work is triggered by the pioneering thoughts which are fully 
reviewed in Chapter 2, where three areas of research are surveyed.  
 
The first area is the general bubble research. The attention in this part is drawn on the 
efforts to verify bubbles, and the behavioural finance. Although standing alongside 
the rational bubble school and the behavioural finance to provoke the market 
inefficiency, to some extent, the goal of our investigation is not identical to them 
since the theories of behavioural finance care more about the behaviours causing 
bubbles than the level of bubbles, and the school of rational bubbles is only 
interested in the statistical test on the existence of bubbles. The second area touched 
on in this work is “stock price-inflation relation” which is regarded as an “economic 
enigma” unsolved until now. Some of the contributions of the ongoing work are still 
accepted in our new research pattern, which will also be surveyed in this chapter. The 
third area of the capital market research in accounting gives rise to the inspiration for 
the firm-level value frontier modelling. The residual income valuation model is given 
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particular attention. 
 
After reviewing the antecedent work, in Chapter 3 we go further to study the current 
bubble theories and research methodology. With understanding of the limitations in 
the current research, the value frontier framework and its assumptions are then 
discussed in details. Some concepts in the current stock market research, such as 
mistaken beliefs, optimism effect, resale option effect, speculation, noise trading, 
rationality (and irrationality) and market friction are reconsidered and jointly 
analyzed in this chapter. 
 
The endeavor does not stop at the theoretical side. An empirical study integrated with 
the theory is also attempted. Chapter 4 is devoted to the empirical estimation of 
bubbles at the market level. The understanding is enhanced, since the bubble path 
graphed by the estimated bubbles illustrates the persistence level of stock prices 
deviated from their fundamental values. Moreover, the chapter also tests whether the 
estimated bubbles are different from price-earning and price-dividend ratios in terms 
of the information embedded.   
 
A further effort in a macro horizon is also made in Chapter 5. The aim of this chapter 
is to apply bubble theory to explain the “share price-inflation puzzle” by taking 
account of an inefficient stock market. The “share price-inflation relation” is tested 
using a method whereby a share price is decomposed into two parts, the fundamental 
value and bubbles, to be explained by inflation respectively in regression. It is found 
in our empirical work that the effect of inflation on share prices is made through the 
changes of interest, not bubbles or fundamental values.  
 
Thereafter, the firm-level value-frontier estimation is conducted in both chapters 6 
and 7. Chapter 6 is devoted to constructing a sound firm level value frontier model 
by employing a commonly acknowledged residual income valuation model devised 
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by Feltham and Ohlson (1995). The model is put into empirical estimation for the 
data of U.S. and U.K. stock markets. The bubble patterns at the industrial level are 
drawn by the estimated firm-level bubble. In fact, although applause should be raised 
for the success in the estimation of the firm-level bubbles, the bubble pictures in 
these two developed markets are not entirely intriguing, since the researchers of the 
bubble school have been studying both markets for a long time. Thus, the 
examination for an emerging market, the Chinese stock market, is more attractive, 
which is obtained in Chapter 7. The firm-level value frontier model is adjusted for 
the Chinese stock market according to a particularity that more than half of the 
shares are not tradable in the public market. The investigation on this market is 
carried out by jointly plotting the bubble figures of the U.S. and U.K. markets. The 
comparative study highlights a Chinese stock market that is moderate at present with 
more experienced investors in it.  
 
The value frontier methodology paves a new way for the inefficient market research. 
The predominance of this idea and the findings of our work are succinctly 
highlighted in Chapter 8. Also, in this final chapter, the description ends with the 
prospect of extensive future work. 
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Appendix 1.1 Historical Events of Bubbles 
 
Bubble Place Time Initial Displacement Stimulator of Crash 
Tulip Bubble Mania Holland 1630s Mosaic virus produced beautiful looking tulips; Prosperity of Holland  Government regulation to control the tulip craze 
South Sea Bubble Britain 1711-1718 Supposed monopoly on trade with Spanish ruled parts of America Failure of management and leaders’ selling 
Mississippi Bubble France 1717-1720 Rapidly growing trade with the New World Hyperinflation 
Stock Market Crash of 1929 America 1921-1929 Economic boom after the World War I Increase of the interest rate 
Stock Market Crash of 1987 America 1986-1987 Takeovers, leveraged buyouts and merger mania Discovery of inside-trading 
Nikkei Bubble Japan 1950-1991 Economic boom after the World War II Increase of the interest rate 
Dot-Com Bubble America 1990s Economic Growth caused by the techniques of computer and internet Reduced profits caused by the over output 
 
Sources: Shleifer (2000); http://www.stock-market-crash.net 
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Chapter 2  Literature Review of Current Studies in Stock 
Bubbles 
 
This chapter reviews literature in relation to bubble researches starting from the 
1980s when the financial theory of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was 
challenged by studies of the excess volatility of stock prices. The review is also 
extended to study the relationship between share prices and inflation so as to 
understand how the relationship between them is viewed in the past, which can help 
us make a new approach to look at this relationship through the application of our 
bubble research. This extension of the review is further followed by reviewing the 
accounting research on the company fundamental valuation, which is our theoretical 
basis for the firm-level bubble estimation in this thesis.  
 
2.1 The General Review of Research on Stock Market Bubbles 
 
Bubble research is needed to understand the cause of the volatility of stock prices. In 
order to find out the reason for excessive price volatility, two schools of research are 
utilised. One is used to look for an explanation for stock price volatility from the 
movement of dividend and discount rate respectively. The other is to view stock price 
fluctuation as a result of bubbles. The latter defines a stock price as consisting of two 
basic components: market fundamentals and bubbles.  
 
The bubble corresponding to noise trading and irrationality has been mentioned in 
many literatures regarding superior asset price movements. However, bubbles 
shouldn’t be confined within an irrational approach. Since the 1980s, rational 
bubbles have been viewed as a reason for capricious behaviours in stock markets, 
while financial economists are vexed about explanations for all the financial market 
behaviours under the EMH. For example, Blanchard & Watson (1982) portrayed 
rational bubbles as the deviation of the price from its fundamental value. The market 
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fundamental value of an asset as an intractable issue on bubble research is defined as 
the present expected discounted value of dividends (Flood & Garber, 1980). Diba & 
Grossman (1988b) illuminated a more theoretical definition which stated that “a 
rational bubble reflects a self-confirming belief that an asset’s price depends on a 
variable (or a combination of variables) that is intrinsically irrelevant, i.e. not part of 
market fundamentals or on truly relevant variables in a way that involves parameters 
that are not part of market fundamentals.”  
 
2.1.1 Defining Rational Bubbles From A Theoretical Perspective 
 
The theoretical efforts to understand stock bubbles can be traced back to John 
Maynard Keynes’s (1936) description of an equity market as an environment in 
which speculators anticipate “what average opinion expects average opinion to be,” 
rather than focusing on things fundamental to the market. He describes the 
forecasting of stock prices as conjectures about the winner of a beauty contest. The 
candidate’s beauty is not the basis of prediction. What is crucial is how one thinks the 
other judges’ perceptions of beauty will be reflected in their voting patterns. Even the 
supporter of EMH doesn’t refuse the existence of irrationality. They believe that 
irrationality can not substantially affect the stock market efficiency since the noise 
traders merely cancel each other out and are squeezed out of markets due to bad 
profits. Moreover, the irrationality is commonly treated as the cause of many 
historical bubbles.  
 
Blanchard & Watson (1982) believed that fundamentals are only part of what 
determines the prices of assets, and there can be rational deviations of the price from 
its value, which are rational bubbles. They defined two bubble paths: one is 
deterministic bubbles and another is explosive (stochastic) bubbles. In the first case, 
bubbles grow exponentially which means that negative bubbles are not possible, 
because a negative bubble today implies a positive probability of a future negative 
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price. The second path pictures bubbles with a probability pi to remain or to crash 
with the probability of 1- pi. They also describe allegorically rational bubbles as 
Ponzi games: if a market is composed of successive generations of participants, then 
bubbles can emerge. Their intuition is that “bubbles are more likely in markets where 
fundamentals are difficult to assess”. After exploring the pricing model with a 
rational bubble component carefully, Diba and Grossman (1987) believe that a 
rational bubble in the stock market must “start at date zero (the first date of trading) 
and this stock must have been continuously overvalued relative to market 
fundamentals”. This implies that once a positive rational bubble has burst, it cannot 
restart. Tirole (1985) asserts that bubbles are present “with an infinite succession of 
overlapping generations of asset holders with finite planning horizons as long as the 
growth rate of the economy is greater than or equal to the required rate of return”. 
 
An intrinsic bubble is considered as a simplified alternative to the rational bubble. 
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) developed a nonlinear market price model that is a 
function of dividends only. 2 Since the model captures the idea that stock prices 
overreact to news about dividends, and intrinsic bubbles are not obviously 
inconsistent with the apparent time-series properties of stock prices, their tests seem 
more parsimonious and capable. Sutherland (1996) pointed out that due to the mean 
reverting property of an intrinsic bubble, it owns similar characters with 
autoregressive fad which should be distinguished from the intrinsic bubble. Driffill 
and Sola (1998) combined the opinion of an intrinsic bubble with the 
regime-switching in their model and verified that the Markov switching model is 
more reasonable than a dividend assumption of constant random walk with drift. 
Similar to the focus of Froot and Obstfeld (1991), Ackert and Hunter (1999) analysed 
the nonlinear relationship between prices and dividends with a consideration of how 
managers choose the dividend payout. Their dividend-controlled model implies that 
                                                       
2
 One striking property of an intrinsic bubble is that, for a given level of exogenous fundamentals, the bubble will 
remain constant over time: intrinsic bubbles are deterministic functions of fundamentals alone (Froot & Obstfeld 
1991).  
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the non-linear relationship between prices and dividends may not depend on intrinsic 
bubbles. Empirically, in support of the intrinsic bubble model, Ma and Kanas (2004) 
revisited the intrinsic bubble model, of which the forecasting power is emphasised, 
against other bubble models. 
 
Many assumptions with respect to bubble movements were documented in the above 
literatures. Unfortunately, the efforts do not dramatically improve the authenticity of 
the theory; in fact they make the bubble research ambiguous due to the unrealistic 
assumptions of bubble paths. In particular, in the conventional theory of Blanchard’s 
bubbles3, the bubbles are assumed to crash completely and never restart thereafter; in 
other words the bubbles crash only once, which is apparently an unrealistic 
assumption. In order to overcome shortcomings in former researches, a sound 
improvement in the bubble modelling was made by Fukuta (1998). They clearly 
categorised previous bubble models into two classes: the class of simple rational 
bubbles and the class of complicated rational bubbles, under which a new three-state 
bubble model, namely incompletely bursting bubbles, was designed. In their new 
model, bubble paths are classified into three states: a large bubble state, a small 
bubble state and an incomplete burst state, which integrates and enhances the 
previous bubble models by exhibiting a more reasonable picture of rational bubbles, 
in which bubbles are allowed to rise again after incomplete crashes.  
 
Beside the endeavour on the design of bubble paths, the attention is also thrown on 
the economic background of the bubble modelling. Santos and Woodford (1997) 
systemically modelled an infinite-horizon economy in an intertemporal competitive 
equilibrium model, under which rational asset pricing bubbles may still be excluded. 
They proceed to an extensive result that the “Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing” 
designed in a finite-horizon economy can still be valid under an infinite-horizon 
assumption, i.e. rational asset pricing bubbles do not exist.     
                                                       
3
 Blanchard (1979) and Blanchard Watson (1982). 
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The above studies are interpreted within the compass of an infinite-dimensional 
economy. Alternatively, breaking the conventional belief of non-existence of rational 
pricing bubbles in a finite horizon, Loewenstein and Willard (2000) innovatively 
discuss the presence of bubbles in a finite-horizon continuous trading economy in 
which agents face wealth constraints. They conclude that bubbles are absent in a 
situation of positive asset supply, and when there is a zero asset supply, bubbles can 
generally exist. 
 
2.1.2 Empirical Studies in Rational Bubbles 
 
Along the direction of the bubble concept discussed above, empirical studies have 
been trying to develop new econometric techniques to find evidence for verifying the 
bubble hypothesis, while others lay particular stress on a well-specified model for 
fundamental values. However, the development of techniques is still very limited in 
helping to sufficiently prove bubble theories.  
 
In order to test the excessive price volitility, Shiller (1981) first employed the 
Standard and Poor’s series data that were used by most of the subsequent researchers. 
He defined separately “perfect foresight rational price” p*, which is the present 
discounted value of actual dividends, and its optimal forecast value - actual price p. 
He proposed that if markets are efficient, the actual price p, which is the expected 
discounted value of future dividends, should have less variance than p*, since the 
expected value of a set of numbers must be more stable than the numbers themselves, 
from which the variance bound inequality V (p) ≤ V (p*) is deduced. The results of 
his statistical tests and the plot analysis give a positive answer to the question of 
whether stock prices move too much to be justified by changes in dividends. 
Meanwhile, LeRoy and Porter (1981) raised a similar test by employing the earning 
variable into the model. They reach the same conclusion as Shiller (1981) which is 
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that stock prices are too volatile to be explained by the efficient capital market model. 
Although some critical issues are documented to the variance bound test, such as 
Flavin’s (1983) argument about the small sample bias and the negative comments 
from Marsh and Merton (1986) regarding the unrealistic stationary dividend 
assumption, plausible results of this new test are deemed to be the initial evidence 
alerting the EMH supporters.  
 
This idea was followed by West (1984)4 who undertook a three-step test on stock 
bubbles by using Shiller’s modified Dow-Jones and the Standard and Poor’s data. 
His empirical work comprised of the Euler equation specification test, the estimation 
on a prediction function for real dividends and the test on the consistency of the two 
asset price models. 5 Among the three steps, the consistency of the two models in 
the third step implies the strong evidence of stock price bubbles, while the 
specification of the models in the first two steps is the necessary condition for the 
final test. Flood et al (1986) reviewed the work of West (1984) and concluded that 
the bubble test model employed by West (1984) was misspecified due to the 
problems of the assumptions of a constant rate of return, and stationary dividends 
and prices in West’s work. After that, West (1987) developed and applied a new test 
for rational bubbles that “(a) allows for a wider class of bubbles; (b) is specifically 
designed to test against the alternative that bubbles are present, in contrast to the 
volatility tests of Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) and (c) is able to be 
applied even when prices and dividends are non-stationary, again in contrast to the 
volatility tests”. Estimations shown from these improved tests are that the annual 
data on the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (1871-1980) and the Dow Jones index 
(1928-1978) rejected the null hypothesis of no bubbles. In order to clarify the small 
sample power of West’s test, Dezhbakhsh and Demirguc-Kunt (1990) modified the 
                                                       
4
 The original paper “Speculative Bubbles and Stock Price Volatility” is shown in financial research center 
memorandum No.54 in Princeton University. 
5
 The first asset price model involves parameters estimated in the first two steps; the second asset price model 
involves estimating an unconstrained regression of the asset price on the information used to form the dividend 
forecasts. 
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third step of West’s procedure while keeping the first two steps of the 
misspecification tests. Contrary to West’s results, their two small samples cannot 
reject the non-existence of speculative bubbles. 
 
Campbell and Shiller (1987) argue that if the first differences of the unobservable 
variables (e.g. the future tax treatment of dividend income) and the first differences 
of dividends are stationary (in the mean), and if rational bubbles do not exist, then 
the model implies that the first differences of stock prices are stationary, and stock 
prices and dividends are cointegrated of order one. The converse inference is cited by 
Dibba and Grossman (1988b). That is, if the first differences of stock prices have a 
stationary mean and/or the stock prices are cointegrated with dividends, rational 
bubbles do not exist. However, if the empirical test shows the opposite result, it 
doesn’t imply the existence of rational bubbles since it may result from the 
nonstationarity of unobservable variables in market fundamentals. They proposed an 
empirical strategy based on stationary tests and rejected the existence of rational 
bubbles. However, the power of unit root tests is suspended by Evans (1991), in that 
the cointegration tests are misleading in the case of periodically collapsing bubbles. 
It over-rejects the null hypothesis of nonstationarity in favour of the non-existence of 
bubbles. The negative opinion on the cointegration test was also raised by Charemza 
and Deadman (1995). As they admitted, although their newly assumed bubble rout of 
the stochastic explosive roots (STER) are more parsimonious than the periodically 
collapsing bubble processes, it still holds a misleading nature when the unit root test 
is applied. This casts further doubts over the unit root tests for detecting bubbles. 
 
Flood and Hodrick (1990) summarised misspecifications and drawbacks on bubble 
tests in past empirical literatures. They were concerned that the existing empirical 
tests of bubbles are more likely specification tests than pure bubble tests. At the same 
time, they threw a laudatory light on the stock price volatility tests that were 
implemented by West (1988) and Campbell and Shiller (1988 a, b) who specially 
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consider the variance of discount rate in the volatility test, and stressed that bubble 
tests required a well-specified model of equilibrium. 
 
Evans (1991) emphasises that bubbles appear to be empirically implausible unless 
there is a significant chance that they will collapse after reaching high levels. He 
reviews the previous unit root tests of detecting rational bubbles and concludes that 
these tests are unable to detect periodically collapsing bubbles, which as he admitted, 
are not affirmably present in stock markets, and the presence of rational bubbles 
remains an open question. Another empirical work for the explosive bubbles was 
implemented by Norden and Schaller (1993). Based on a model describing two 
bubble paths which are initially documented by Blanchard and Watson (1982), they 
found the evidence of regime switches in stock returns in Toronto Stock Exchange 
using switching regression techniques. 
  
After demonstrating the problems in the data for the present-value model, Barsky and 
DeLong (1993) couched the stock price fluctuation in a rational expectation 
framework in which dividends follow a permanent growth rate. However, they didn’t 
deny the existence of positive feedback trading and bubbles in stock markets, and 
comprehensively summarised three alternative categories of stock price models: 
present-value model; “irrational” present-value model; and “fads” and “irrational 
bubble” models.   
 
McQueen & Thorley (1994) adapted the traditional duration dependence test and 
derived a new testable implication from the rational bubble model. In their test, the 
real monthly data of returns for both equally and value-weighted portfolios of all 
New York Stock Exchange stocks were employed instead of stock price data, and the 
rejection of the no-bubble hypothesis was particularly robust. Afterwards, Chan et al. 
(1998) extended this test method for six Asian stock markets (Hong Kong, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan) and found that none of these markets were 
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likely to be consistent with the presence of rational bubbles when the duration 
dependence was applied. Fung (1999) reviewed Blanchard & Watson’s (1982) two 
bubble types. After testing the value-weighted NYSE stocks that consist of 720 
monthly arithmetic nominal returns, he found a significant duration dependence 
effect in a given return series and concluded that the duration dependence effect is 
uniquely associated with periodically collapsed bubbles.  
 
Donaldson & Kamstra (1996) constructed a nonlinear ARMA-ARCH-ANN model to 
forecast the time-variant discounted dividend growth rate, which is a multiplier of the 
dividend in order to obtain the fundamental price. They found that under the new 
approximation procedure of fundamental values, the simulated fundamental values 
fitted the data of actual prices very well, and the unit root test failed to reject the 
hypothesis of no bubbles.  
 
With the development of econometric techniques, the discussion of bubble tests is 
resuscitated in recent work. Taylor and Peel (1998) raised a new non-cointegration 
test for periodically collapsing bubbles to weaken the size distortion of foregoing 
tests. Shiller’s (1989) data are duplicated in their work to reject the presence of 
bubbles. Psaradakis et al (2001) detected a periodically collapsing rational bubble 
based on random coefficient autoregressive models. Bohl (2003) applied the 
Enders-Siklos momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) technique to the 
examination of periodically collapsing rational bubbles. He ascribed his inconsistent 
results between the sub sample and the whole sample to the distinct performances 
between the short run and long run. Koustas and Serletis (2005) employed an 
autoregressive fractionally integrated moving average (ARFIMA) process to test the 
bubbles. Both the traditional unit root test procedure and the fractional integration 
test presented in their work reject the hypothesis of no bubbles. Cunado et al (2005) 
also applied the fractional integration test to the bubble examination. Instead of using 
the data of S&P 500 which are repeatedly used by most others, they focused attention 
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on the NASDAQ performance. They concluded that the fractional integration test is 
sensitive to the sampling frequency. 
 
In addition, empirical investigators are no longer satisfied with the unique sample of 
the U.S. market. They try to push forward the bubble research by applying a broader 
horizon of data. Ahmed, Li and Jr. (2000) examined the behaviour of the Shanghai 
stock index (China) during the 1990s since this stock market was established. Two 
alternative VAR models were estimated, one with global variables and another with 
domestic variables in the first differenced logarithmic form. Their empirical results 
are consistent with rejecting all nulls of no trends or persistence of bubbles and also 
with rejecting the null of no nonlinearity of the VAR residual series beyond ARCH 
effects. Although they recognised that their results must be viewed as provisional at 
best, the result of the existence of bubbles with possible nonlinear components in 
Chinese stock markets was fully obtained by their empirical work. Wu (2002) 
proposed a new testing procedure for rational bubbles in stock markets that improved 
the conventional unit root tests in the presence of collapsible bubbles. The tests were 
applied to weekly price and dividend yield data for the Standard and Poor’s 500 
Index and the Hang Seng Index (Hong Kong) from 1974 to 1998.  The results 
suggested that, after taking into account the time-varying growth and risk-premium, 
the evidence of a bubble in the U.S. market is weak but in Hong Kong it is strong. 
 
The investigation of rational bubbles aims to reveal how the market prices of stocks 
may deviate substantially from their fundamental values even when market agents 
are homogeneous, rational and the market is informationally efficient. Adam and 
Szafarz (1992) reviewed and analysed the traditional bubbles and rational bubbles in 
order to probe an intersection of foregoing variously defined bubbles. They consider 
that the answer for why and how the price deviates from fundamental values is still 
ambiguous due to the confused fundamental value criteria, and the study of economic 
behaviours which give rise to the rational bubbles might improve the understanding 
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of the real world phenomena. A similar opinion is mentioned by Cuthbertson (1996, 
p157) who claimed that the “origin” of bubbles still couldn’t be explained.  
 
2.1.3 Behavioural Finance and Bubbles 
 
Since the economic model cannot reach a consensus during two decades’ 
investigation, the research on investors’ behaviours becomes a fresh inspiration. 
Behavioural financial theories, which are mostly based upon the human psychology, 
are developed to describe and model the behaviours of investors in making their 
investment decisions, which offers an alternative to explain stock bubbles. 
 
In fact, the effect of psychology on prices was demonstrated in the early part of the 
20th century by some reputable economists, such as Adam Smith (“overweening 
conceit of mankind”), Irving Fisher (“money illusion”), John Maynard Keynes 
(“animal spirits in stock markets”), Harry Markowitz (“people focus on gains and 
losses relative to reference points”) and Herbert Simon (“bounded rationality”). 
Besides, many financial economists and socialists have provided alternative theories 
to the CAPM when the assumption of rational and homogeneous investors is relaxed. 
Hirshleifer (2001) surveyed some psychological effects that are potentially relevant 
to securities markets and summarised the diversified examinations on the dynamic 
psychology-based asset-pricing theory. All these researches stem from one common 
belief that bubbles exist in stock markets to restructure the asset pricing model with 
the participation of psychological elements. To highlight the contribution of 
behavioural researches in terms of modelling bubbles, in this section we will only 
review some studies that demonstrate the effects of human psychological patterns 
and/or investors’ behaviours on stock bubbles. 
 
Allen and Gorton (1991) modelled two groups of portfolio managers who are 
described theoretically as one of the reasons bubbles form in an infinite horizon 
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model with infinitely lived agents. White (1995) built a model of the brokers’ loan 
market. He found that the addition of bubbles improves the fit of the model. In Kraus 
and Smith’s (1998) sunspot model, a “pseudo-bubble”, which is unlike a true bubble 
and rational bubble because “it has no probability of ever bursting” and is not 
necessarily positive, is described as being produced by the “endogenous sunspots” 
which are raised by some investors’ uncertainty about others’ beliefs. Shleifer (2000) 
connects the model of positive feedback investment strategies with the existing price 
bubble theories, and recapitulates the historical famous bubble events. According to 
the studies on ten historical bubbles, they pointed out that important new elements of 
noise trading and “smart money”6 play a crucial role in the course of most bubbles. 
In the survey of bubbles in the area of behavioural finance, Shiller (2002) centralised 
the less-than-rational aspect of investors’ behaviours by which bubbles are amplified. 
Particularly, he emphasised that some factors, such as the concrete translation about 
the Prudent Person Standard mentioned in a relative law, the news media, the beliefs 
of EMH and the professionals’ “groupthink” etc., lead professionals to “ultimately 
end up generally assuming that what their colleagues believe is true”. With the view 
of bubble growth and burst, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) studied the dispersion of 
arbitrageurs’ opinions as well as their coordination and competition in the existing 
strategies. They concluded that bubbles can be long-lasting even though rational 
arbitrageurs are aware of the overvalued price. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), as 
well as Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) highlighted that a bubble arises as 
investors’ beliefs are heterogeneous and the optimism effect as well as the resale 
option effect jointly produce stock bubbles. Based on this theoretical argument, they 
found that the bubble’s size dramatically decreases with float as investors anticipate 
an increase in float with lockup expirations and speculate over the degree of insider 
selling. 
 
As a new layer of research regarding stock market bubbles, behavioural finance 
                                                       
6
 ‘The smart people who bought it early selling to dumb people who bought it late.’ Shleifer (2000) 
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paves a new way to closely examine the real occurrences. Different from classic 
economic research, behavioural studies began with the real world phenomena and the 
corresponding models are born to explain these happenings. However, as Shleifer 
mentioned in his book, “there is no single unifying model in behavioral finance…the 
field of behavioral finance is still in its infancy.” (Shleifer, 2000) 
 
2.1.4 Summary 
 
There are vast amounts of literature in this area. However, most of the bubble tests 
stand on a single market ground and strong assumptions on bubble movement paths 
make bubble research too far behind in terms of catching up with the real world. 
Furthermore, the majority of current empirical attention has largely focused on the 
hypothesis tests of existence of bubbles which are the first step towards bubble 
research. Demand for the appearance of more empirical evidence of bubbles calls for 
the study to move further to identify the magnitude of bubbles. Although the 
behavioural studies shine a light on the debilitated traditional bubble researches in 
terms of explaining the reality, it has its weakness in finding empirical support to its 
key assumptions about investors’ behaviours. If the bubble of a stock can be 
measured or estimated, it will be significantly helpful for us to lift the limit in 
examining the bubble impact of various investment behaviours expected by the 
current theory of behavioural finance. 
 
In addition, Shiller (2002) clearly indicates that “human patterns of 
less-than-perfectly rational behaviour are central to financial market behaviour, even 
among investment professionals”. However, most historical bubbles containing 
elements of irrationality cannot be interpreted by the rational bubble framework. 
Blanchard and Watson (1982) reveal why researchers lose sight of irrational bubbles: 
“It is hard to analyse rational bubbles. It would also be much harder to deal with 
irrational bubbles.” In spite of Blanchard’s explanation, going along with Shiller, we 
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confidently believe that, in most stock markets, irrationality generally exists. 
Therefore, this research is dedicated to developing a new technique to estimate 
bubbles caused by the interaction of rationality and irrationality without imposing the 
necessity of drawing any bubble paths. 
 
2.2 Share Price-Inflation Puzzle 
 
Challenging the EMH by verifying the market inefficiency, the school of bubbles has 
extensively documented stock bubbles, which paves a new way to explain the 
real-world occurrences plaguing the supporters of the EMH. However, the argument 
of “efficient or inefficient market” brings the confusion to the financial economic 
research, in which massive historical contributions were conducted on the basis of 
the EMH and were convincible in the era of the EMH. Therefore, the attention in this 
work is not only paid on the bubble picture itself, but also on a prospect to update the 
theories about the relationship between the economy and the stock market. A 
longstanding topic of the “share price-inflation puzzle” is targeted as an example in 
this work. Instead of the EMH, a bubble frame will be employed to derive the 
relationship between stock prices and inflation in Chapter 5. Thus, the former 
literatures in the area of share price-inflation relation are reviewed below.   
 
2.2.1 Early Evidence of the Positive Relationship 
 
Earlier opinions about the relationship between stock returns and inflation is based 
on the “Fisher Effect” (Fisher, 1930), in which a positive correlation between 
inflation and stock return is defined as the expected rates of return on common stocks 
which consist of a real return plus the expected rate of inflation. Dulan (1948) 
concurs with the positive correlation theory when he examines the performance of 
U.S. markets from 1939 to 1946, and concludes that the stock market functions as a 
hedge against inflation as the decline of purchasing power caused by inflation can be 
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compensated for by the inflated dividends. However, this positivism is soon 
challenged by the puzzling empirical results which instead show a negative 
correlation between inflation and stock prices.  
 
2.2.2 Micro Explanations to the Negative Relationship 
 
The early question to the “Fisher Effect” was answered by Nichols (1968), based on 
an analysis of three distinct sets of claims on the return to capital outlined as follows: 
“Inflation will always diminish the real value of fixed income claims, increase the 
real value of the tax authority claims, and have an effect on the value of the equity 
claim”. He implies that the inflation hedge is not true for all stocks. Firms with large 
monetary liabilities but low levels of depreciable assets will perform best. Motley 
(1969) extends Nichols’ results from the standpoint of the tax law and concludes that 
a continuing high inflation tends to reduce the real value of capital-intensive firms.  
 
Feldstein (1980) develops a model conveying how the inflation raises the effective 
tax rate on corporate-source income so as to reduce the price that investors are 
willing to pay for stocks. The constant rate of inflation and the expected future rate of 
inflation were shown to affect stocks differently. When a steady-state rate of inflation 
is higher, the share prices rise faster, but the expected future inflation causes a 
concurrent fall in the price-earning ratio.  
 
Unlike Motley and Feldstein’s accounting practice, Keran (1976) viewed the topic 
from a regulation standpoint and concluded that prices of utility stocks would be bid 
down by inflation relative to non-regulated industrial stocks in the same way that 
investors have bid down the prices of bonds relative to stocks due to the fact that the 
regulatory authority always attempts to maintain a constant nominal rate of return to 
utility firms in a period of accelerating inflation, leading to a decline in the real rate 
of return. He describes three interrelated factors by which an investor can value his 
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equity: first, the dividends and/or capital gains; second, the discount rate he uses to 
determine the present value of his future earning; and third, the degree of confidence 
with which he holds his expectations, i.e. risk. 
 
Modigliani and Cohn (M-C) (1979) claim that the inverse movement is a result of 
two investors’ errors in valuing shares.  First, investors do not recognise that the 
inflation will reduce the burden of debts so as to profit the shareholders. Second, 
investors fail to realise that inflation may raise the future nominal earnings. 
Following the Modigliani-Cohn (1979) hypothesis of two valuation errors, Cohn and 
Lessard (1981) observed eight countries’ behaviours and concluded on a strong 
negative stock return-inflation relation for the sample countries. The value of their 
work not only adds on the innovative multi-countries touch, but also their theoretical 
foundation of the absence of an EMH is a welcome step forward. However, to our 
surprise, their model lacks specification, as interest rate and inflation existing 
together in the model causes it to suffer from a colinearity problem. 
 
Feldstein and M-C‘s work theoretically explained the “economic enigma” from the 
different viewpoints. However, the limitation of dismissing other elements, such as 
foreign competition and declined productivity has been acknowledged. In particular, 
the unrealistic assumption in Feldstein’s model that corporations have no debt and 
pay out all earnings in dividends makes his work less convincible. Gordon (1983) 
summarised the Feldstein and M-C theories, and set out a valuation equation for 
Tobin’s q in which the two pioneer achievements were assimilated and improved. His 
findings confirmed Feldstein’s explanation that inflation and the capital gain tax 
combined to reduce the after-tax return on shares. In addition, he concluded that 
Tobin’s q fell between 1960 and 1980 in the U.S. market because of the decline of 
corporate profitability and the rise of the share yield required by the investors, and it 
will fall even further if nothing else changes but the inflation rate. 
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Carmichael (1985) presented a model showing that inflation levies a tax on corporate 
earnings through the cost of holding money and consequently depresses the stock 
price. Two effects on the stock price caused by inflation are contained in his theory: 
the decrease of firms’ profits (dividends) and the dividends cut by the 
inflation-enhanced tax burden. 
 
Deviating from other existing research, Sharpe (2002) tried to examine the negative 
relationship from the standpoint of stock valuation. After controlling for earning 
factors, the Price to Earnings ratio, which represents equity valuation, is still 
negatively affected by the inflation. The results confirm that two effects play the role 
in the negative relationship: real earnings growth and required real returns. 
 
2.2.3 Macro Explanations to the Negative Relationship 
 
The researches listed above imply a common idea that inflation depresses the stock 
prices through investors’ expectation on the firms’ real values measured by the 
discounted future dividend stream. While the researchers concentrated on the 
accounting explanations, Branch (1974) studied this topic from a macro standpoint. 
He indicates that instead of a one-to-one relationship, stocks may be only a partial 
hedge against inflation since inflationary expectations do depress stock prices. Three 
possible explanations are given for this strange occurrence: first, a high level of 
inflation may cause the government to adopt price control policies which are 
unfavourable to firms; second, countries with rapid inflation are likely to have 
overvalued currencies which put their export at a disadvantage due to the lagged 
exchange rate adjustments; third, business uncertainty is greater than before due to 
worse inflation expectations, which increases business difficulties. In addition, the 
impact of a tax increase may also worsen the situation. The empirical results are 
consistent with his consideration that stocks appear to be a partial rather than 
complete long-run inflation hedge. However, the compromise is not strong enough to 
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explain the whole scenario.  
 
Fama (1981) breathed fresh air into the investigation. He employed U.S. data and 
also reached a contrary to the norm conclusion that stocks move inversely with 
inflation. Although some supporters of the Fisher theory tried to maintain the 
traditional viewpoint, such as Firth (1979) who found evidence in British data in 
support of the “Fisher Effect”, Fama offered a plausible explanation for the 
“economic enigma”. He tried to release the “puzzle” from the view of traditional 
expectation combined with a macro opinion by explaining the negative correlation by 
a “proxy effect”, i.e. the negative stock return-inflation relation is the proxy for 
positive relations between stock returns and real activity which negatively relates to 
inflation. His fresh idea and fully explained empirical work represent a milestone in 
this area. However, his work has been challenged by some of other experts due to the 
unanswered macro questions. Also, his American study obviously is not enough to 
generalise the theory. Running on the same track as Fama, Day (1984) theoretically 
derived the negative relations between stock returns and inflation that are 
respectively explained by the exogenous economic shocks. Although his model fails 
to embrace all economic situations, it proves that a negative returns-inflation 
correlation model can be achieved from the existing theoretical framework under 
certain conditions, and the derivations have no way of offending the market 
efficiency theory. Cozier and Rahman (1988) found that the inverse relationship 
between stock returns and inflation is spurious in Canada due to the result of 
causality tests that inflation does not cause real stock returns, and they explained the 
specious relation by the “proxy effect” defined in Fama (1981). 
 
In Fama’s theory, the changes of real activity affect inflation through the alteration of 
money demand. In contrast, Geske and Roll (1983) introduced a model from the 
standpoint of money supply. They presented an inverse causality between stock 
returns and inflation: the stock market signals the inflation, i.e. a depressed stock 
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market will raise the government deficit, and then in such a situation the government 
would be more willing to monetise its debts, and the enhancive money supply will 
boost the inflation.  
 
Hess and Lee (1999) innovatively put the supply and demand shocks into 
consideration at the same time. After testing the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan, they 
conclude that the stock return-inflation relations can be either negative or positive 
depending on the relative importance of the two types of shocks. Their work seems 
to be just an update of previous research. However the full-scale examination 
reached a sound solution for the long existing puzzle.    
 
Chang and Pinegar (1987) add the risk element into the Fama (1981) and Geske-Roll 
(1983) models. Under the belief of negative movement between stock returns and 
inflation, they conclude that the relationship becomes more negative as security risk 
increases.  
 
The concern for the risk is also embraced in the research of Pindyck (1984), which 
attributes the decline of the New York Stock Exchange Index between 1965 and 1981 
to the substantially increased riskiness of capital investment instead of inflation that 
is proved only to function as a negligible part in the whole effect. This riskiness was 
related to unanticipated regulatory changes, exchange rate fluctuations and 
competition. This paper seems to alleviate the confusion of anomalous movement 
between inflation and stock returns by explaining the depressed share prices as a 
result of increased riskiness. Hasbrouck (1984) also finds that the relationship 
between real activity and inflation appears to be a less important explanation of the 
inverse relationship between stock return and inflation; however, he finds that the 
increased uncertainty of the economy is a major contributing factor, while also 
confirming that the impact of inflation declines economic profits which in turn 
depresses share prices. 
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Theoretical support also comes from the research by Jovanovic and Ueda (1998), in 
which the modern monetary theory is improved to explain the inflation-stock return 
dilemma. They believe that both firms and workers confuse the absolute and relative 
price changes. Therefore, an expected inflation will shift real income from firms to 
workers, so that stock returns are lowered. 
 
It is worth noting that a study on the stock market reaction to unemployment news by 
Boyd, Hu and Jagannanthan (2005) also sheds light on the puzzle of the “stock 
price-inflation relation”, since unemployment generally correlates with inflation. 
They raised an argument that the stock market’s response to unemployment news 
depends on whether the economy is expanding or contracting. The implication of 
their work on the “stock price-inflation relation” is that since stock prices can be 
influenced by three factors - the interest rate, the growth expectation and the risk 
premium which respond to the unemployment/inflation differently - stock prices do 
not need to go up when inflation falls. 
 
The finding of the relationship brings to the minds of researchers an ambitious idea 
that stock markets may function as a predictor of inflation. Titman and Warga (1989) 
regressed the inflation change rate on the lagged stock returns using American data 
from 1979 to 1982, and reported a positive relationship between stock returns and 
future inflation rate changes. Consequently, they made a point that stock returns 
forecast the future inflation. However, no convincible theoretical descriptions can be 
found in their maverick work. 
 
Single countries’ studies in previous work appear to have a limitation in the 
exploration of general rules. Gultekin (1983) filled the gap of the empirical work by 
employing the concept of expected and unexpected inflation from Fama to the 
investigation of 26 countries’ data in the time series and the cross-section format 
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respectively. The results, however, provide us with no insights into the existing 
confusion. A recent international investigation was made by Rapach (2002) who 
measured the long-run response of real stock prices to a permanent inflation shock in 
16 individual industrialised countries from 1957 to 2000. Inconsistent with most of 
the other researches, his results indicate a neutrality or positive relationship between 
stock price and inflation. 
 
2.2.4 Summary 
 
The “share price-inflation puzzle” has been well studied but not concluded yet. On 
first appearances, it does not seem hard to reveal the answer. However, after looking 
through the previous studies, it suggests that the difficulties are due to the scanty 
knowledge about stock markets. Some of researchers confine their theories within a 
framework relating with the EMH, others concentrate on the economic side but 
overlook the study of the stock market side. These fatal discrepancies in the former 
researches cause this topic to become an “economic enigma” plaguing the academia. 
To overcome these discrepancies, the attention should be focused on the investigation 
of the stock price forming process which can provide the answer by taking into 
account the bubble, since stock prices are constituted not only by fundamental values 
but also by bubbles as a result of the over-optimistic expectation and the speculation 
in stock markets. Withstanding this, one will recognise that the puzzle of share 
price-inflation relation, in fact, is the puzzle of respective inflationary effects on 
fundamental values and on stock bubbles. Thus, considering this topic within a 
framework of bubbles undoubtedly will make a breakthrough eventually disclosing 
this “economic enigma”. 
 
2.3 Share Valuation - Determination of Companies’ Fundamental Values 
 
While the bubble research in financial economics expands its view on the 
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accumulated market behaviours, accounting researchers stand on the 
company-specific accounting information assessing the relation between companies’ 
fundamental values and their prices in the stock market. They aim to obtain a 
valuation model which is able to best explain stock prices by regressing stock prices 
or returns with fundamental variables. The specification of the model is conducted by 
checking the stability of parameters and the explanatory power of fundamental 
variables with respect to stock prices or returns, i.e. R2. Since we intend to combine 
fundamental values and bubbles in the firm-level modelling of stock prices so as to 
achieve the measurement of bubbles for individual stocks, models of fundamental 
valuation in the past should be examined and then carefully quoted to the part of 
fundamental values in our model.  
 
The investigation in the area of fundamental valuation has experienced two stages: 
primary attempts in the early days of EMH and the recent extensive work with an 
acceptance of the stock market inefficiency. Researches of these two stages will be 
reviewed below. 
 
2.3.1 Research on the Fundamental Valuation in the Early Time 
 
The research linking accounting numbers to stock prices can be traced to the 1960s, 
when the modern capital market theories were developed. In the early days, this topic 
was known as the market-based accounting research (MBAR). Lev and Ohlson 
(1982) defined this research area as “the search into the relationship between 
publicly disclosed accounting information and the consequences of the use of the 
information by the major group of users: equity investors, as such consequences are 
reflected in characteristics of common stocks traded in major exchanges.” Its 
rudiments are some frameworks integrating the accounting information, prices and 
other market variables, and expected utilities of contingent consumption patterns.  
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However, the investigation of fundamental values was initially only a very small part 
of MBAR and stood along with the efficient capital market theory. The model started 
from the association between asset returns and accounting information. However, as 
Lev and Ohlson (1982) pointed out, the explanatory power of the examined variables 
with respect to the distribution of stock returns is rather low. Thus, an alternative 
method relating to stock prices was considered thereafter. The effort can be traced to 
the 1930s. Meader (1935) formulated a model to explain stock prices by five 
independent variables: stock turnover, book value per share, net working capital per 
share, earnings per share, and dividends per share. Since then, the empirical efforts 
had halted due to the unsatisfactory results from Meader’s work until the 1960s.  
Many researchers, such as Whitbeck and Kisor (1963), Malkiel and Cragg (1970), 
and Litzenberger and Rao (1971), attempted to construct a powerful and stable model 
to assess the fundamental values of stocks, but their results were not optimal. The 
slim progress is exhibited by incorporating the macroeconomic variables, such as 
interest rates, into models.  
 
Due to the limit of econometric methods, the analysis of cross-sectional or time 
series data is hardly trustworthy to estimate the stable parameters. In addition, the 
acceptance of the efficient market theory in MBAR gives rise to the difficulty in 
acquiring stable parameters with the high explanatory power by regressing stock 
prices with respect to fundamental variables. Lev and Ohlson (1982) pointed out this 
discrepancy by stating that “early studies appearing to indicate investor rationality 
have given way to discomfiting findings. It is now clear that the existence of some 
investor irrationality cannot be precluded. This is very disturbing because there are 
no satisfactory behavioural alternatives to investor rationality.”  However, since 
methodological refinement was one of the major difficulties waiting to break through 
in that age and the ignorance of the market inefficiency causes the valuation model 
heavy in hand, the MBAR research was more in the spirit of “the beginning of the 
end” than “the end of the beginning”, as Lev and Ohlson (1982) also noted.  
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2.3.2 Recent Studies on the Fundamental Valuation 
 
Until the late 1980s, as the opposite of the efficient market advocators, the school of 
stock bubbles had been gaining more influence in expecting the burst of bubbles and 
so the collapse of stock markets. Thus, with the development of stock markets and its 
corresponding theories against EMH, the research of capital asset valuation by 
fundamental variables expanded rapidly, and was named “valuation and fundamental 
analysis research”. All of these researches were aimed not only at establishing a 
channel between the financial market and accounting numbers, but also at seeking to 
determine firms’ intrinsic values under a demand for practically identifying 
mispriced securities for investment purposes. Kothari (2001) concluded that “the 
principal motivation for fundamental analysis research and its use in practice is to 
identify mispriced securities for investment purposes…” With sound motivation, 
however, the attention is mainly focused on estimating stable parameters and there 
are still no any elements representing the inefficiency in the valuation modelling. 
Their inference is that in an inefficient capital market, a good model of fundamental 
value should predictably generate positive or negative abnormal returns. Therefore, it 
is worthwhile establishing a valuation model which best explains share prices and/or 
has the most predictive power with respect to future returns (Kothari, 2001). 
 
Over several decades’ exploration, researchers and professional financial analysts 
have constructed a succession of valuation models which can be mainly divided into 
two streams: statistical valuation models and deduced valuation models (Skogsvik, 
2002). The first kind of model tries to explain the market prices or returns directly by 
financial ratios conceived relative to the fundamental values, while the other kind is 
deduced precisely upon the financial theories. Furthermore, in the deduced valuation 
models, two divisions respectively called the “residual income” and “value added” 
valuation model have been growing separately over the years.  
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Some researchers, such as Francis, Olsson and Oswald (2000) and Skogsvik (2002) 
reviewed and summarised the valuation models at a standpoint of practice, on the 
basis of which the strengths and weaknesses of these models were numerated.  
 
The models of the first kind yield the merit of simplicity. They are extremely easy to 
use as long as there are enough empirical data to hand. However, the difficulties are 
located in the modelling logic, which calls for complicated work on the statistical 
specification. Moreover, the efficient market hypothesis is the precondition of the 
model, due to the principles of this method which intend to find reasonable and 
stable parameters reflecting the relation of stock prices and a series of fundamental 
variables. 
 
The residual income valuation model developed from a dividend-discounting model 
was originated by Williams (1938). Generally, the dividend-discounting model 
defines share price as the present value of expected future dividends discounted at 
their risk-adjusted expected rate of return (Kothari, 2001). The discounted dividend 
model is abstracted from the financial theories which premise no arbitrage in markets 
and the investors evaluate the reasonable prices (fundamental values) by the total 
acquirable dividends from this investment. However, for the purpose of value 
estimation, the prediction of dividends is a barrier hardly conquered. Since the 
unrealistic assumptions are imposed in the estimation, the empirical work based on 
this model is bare of credit. Such a problem is sorted out by its transformation- 
residual income model. Although prediction is still the focal point of the research, the 
residual income model simplifies this process.  
 
Holding the idea that future dividends can be explained by the forecasted values of 
earnings and investments, Fama and Miller (1972, Chapter 2) transformed the 
dividend-discounting model to an earnings capitalisation model. This model yields a 
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basic point that value depends on the forecasted profitability of current and future 
investment which offers some new and understandable viewpoints to explain the 
fundamental value. However, this valuation model is regardless of the capital 
expansion either through the reinvestment or issuance of new equity. 
 
In line with the conclusion reached by pioneer accounting researchers, a 
path-breaking achievement was made by Ohlson and Feltham (F-O) whose 
contribution is deemed as the milestone of this area. Kothari (2001) concluded: 
“Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) deserve credit for successfully 
reviving the residual income valuation idea, for developing this idea more rigorously 
and for impacting the empirical literature”. In their model, the fundamental value is 
defined as the sum of the current book value and the discounted present value of 
expected abnormal earnings which is the profit above a capital charge. 
 
Regardless of the algebraic derivation, Penman (1997) analysed the equity valuation 
in the sight of accounting. Following the idea that any differences between the 
benchmark price and market price are treated as mispricing in the market, he 
investigated approximate benchmark valuations by combining two elements, book 
value and earnings, which are traditionally considered separately. His research 
focuses on the weights of the two components, but differs from the F-O model in that 
weights change over time rather than being fixed.  
 
Finally, the value-added valuation model comes from the consideration of company 
free cash flow. This model has become increasingly popular in recent years in virtue 
of caring about the accounting details. Nevertheless, some arguments revolve around 
the calculation of free cash flow: the more comprehensive variables are considered, 
the more biases are produced from the unavoidable accounting record mistakes. 
Furthermore, the complicated process of calculation makes the model heavy-handed. 
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In summary, in the recent literatures, there are two basic approaches to convey the 
linkage between accounting numbers and stock prices. One is statistical valuation 
models which excel due to their simplicity. Another is deduced valuation models 
which bear the virtue of containing more delicate calculations and theories.  
 
2.3.3 Summary 
 
The research of fundamental valuation has been enhanced with the development of 
capital market theories. The early attempts in the light of the efficient market theory 
and the recent efforts with an acceptance of market inefficiency have conveyed 
extensive valuation models which are designed under the criteria of best explaining 
stock prices. However, although all of these approaches employ stock prices as the 
dependent variable in their empirical estimation and some of them accept the opinion 
of an inefficient market, the linkage established between stock prices and 
fundamental variables doesn’t embrace bubbles, which are the part of stock prices in 
excess of fundamental values, since the aim of their studies is to find the best 
combination of fundamental variables to reveal companies’ values, not to model 
stock prices. In our study of stock price modelling, stock prices are composed by two 
parts: fundamental values and bubbles. The most popular residual income valuation 
model will be adopted in the model to obtain the part of fundamental values. Having 
formulated the firm-level model of stock prices, the measurement of bubbles for all 
individual stocks in the sample can be made in the empirical work. 
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Chapter 3  Bubbles: Theories and Development of the New 
Estimation Methodology  
 
The objective of this chapter is to conduct a critical review of the theoretical 
foundation of the research, which aims to extend the theory of bubbles to facilitate us 
in developing a new technical approach to estimate bubbles. The new estimation 
methodology will lead us to change the course of research on bubbles from verifying 
their existence over a time period to identifying the determinants of them, since the 
new methodology makes a breakthrough by allowing us to estimate the magnitude of 
bubbles at a particular point in time. The structure of this chapter is as follows: 
Section 3.1 is devoted to review current bubble theories; Section 3.2 will discuss the 
value frontier theory in order to build up a theoretical framework in support of the 
new statistical approach to estimate bubbles, and the new approach will be discussed 
in Section 3.3.  
 
3.1 Bubble Behaves: Current Theories 
 
“Bubble” is not a word specific to the stock market. The initial opinions about 
so-called price bubbles refer to various kinds of assets, such as foreign exchange, 
gold, real estate, and stock. Bubbles have been concerned with driving up all these 
asset prices to grow rapidly. Following Blanchard and Watson (1982) who stated that 
bubbles are more likely to exist in the price of an asset with obscure fundamental 
values, it is expected that bubbles hardly exist if the fundamental value of an asset is 
easily identified. With this idea in mind, it is expected that the research of bubbles is 
best conducted in stock markets where the fundamental values of stocks are blurry. 
Thus, we review some of the previous theories with the focus on stock bubbles, 
although most of them theorize about bubbles in a general manner, not about stock 
bubbles in particular. 
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The research on stock market bubbles is, in fact, a study of the stock market 
inefficiency, and the investigation about the stock market inefficiency should 
embrace three layers of topics. First, how to verify the market/share price 
inefficiency; Second, how to measure the market/share price inefficiency; Third, 
what cause the market/share price inefficiency? The first and third questions are the 
major issues to direct the researchers’ attention from the efficient market hypothesis 
to the rational bubble studies as well as the recent behavioural theories. Accordingly, 
various types of bubbles have been modelled in these two layers of research. 
 
3.1.1 Bubbles in Normative Models 
 
The challenges to the EMH begin in the 1980s when some empirical evidence failed 
to cope with the efficient market theory. The primary explanations focus on a rational 
bubble hypothesis which cannot be rejected by various econometric tests. The 
theoretical model is based on an expectation formula and is illustrated clearly by 
(West, 1987): 
 
tttt IDPEP )( 11 ++ += κ   with 1≤κ         (3.1) 
 
where tP  is the observed price at time t, )( 11 ++ + tt DPE  is the expected sum of 
price and dividends of the next period with the present information tI , and i+
=
1
1
κ . 
With the assumption of constant discount rate i , the equation (3.1) can be resolved 
recursively forward to get: 
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If the transversality condition 
∞→n
lim 0| =Ε + tntn IPκ  is achieved, the observed price 
equals the fundamental value fP : 
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Similar to solutions documented in literatures before West (1987), such as Blanchard 
and Watson (1982) and Shiller (1978), the failure of transversality condition means 
the observed stock price fails to be equal to the fundamental value Ptf. Thus the price 
tP  can be thought of as the sum of the fundamental value Pt
f and a bubble tB :  
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Equation (3.5) implies that an investor who pays for an asset today is expected to be 
rewarded by an even higher value than the fundamental-expected value of the next 
period. Therefore, although investors rationally know that the current market price 
exceeds the present value of future dividend payments, they still invest in the market 
(Donaldson and Kamstra, 1996). This bubble is deemed as the result of a 
self-fulfilling behaviour which is called rational bubbles or speculative bubbles. 
 
Regarding the assumption of a non-negative bubble path in the theoretical deduction 
above, there are two points raised by researchers’ contentions. First, negative bubbles 
are impossible because if tB  is a negative value today then (3.5) implies that there 
is a positive probability that at some point t+i, itB + will be largely negative enough 
to make the price negative. Second, if bubbles exist, they must start on the first day, 
and will not restart after bursts (Diba and Grossman, 1988b). However, these 
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implications from (3.5) are obviously inconsistent with the real world.  
 
Moreover, the evidence of bubbles is based on the rejection of the transversality 
condition. The representative investor model pictures an equilibrium price at which 
the transversality condition is achieved, i.e. a competitive agent will always buy 
undervalued stocks and sell overvalued ones which adjusts the demand so as to draw 
the stock price back to the equilibrium point (fundamental value). However, this 
theory is little more than an oversimplified conception which pays no attention to a 
special property of stock markets that fundamental values are uncertain. The 
fundamental value depends on the future dividends which don’t appear in the present 
and cannot be forecasted ascertainably by any statistic modelling techniques.  
 
As many researchers realised, the above theory is fragile due to the naturally weak 
assumption of equation (3.5). In order to overcome the fatal problem in the initial 
theory of rational bubbles, some new bubble paths are specified.   
 
Blanchard and Watson (1982) as well as West (1987) illustrated two bubble paths. 
The first one is called a deterministic bubble: 
 
 
t
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Another one with an explosive property is accordingly called a stochastic bubble: 
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In equation (3.7), B  represents speculative bubbles and B  is the starting-point 
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bubble. The probability that a bubble grows is tpi , and the probability that it collapses 
is tpi−1 . 
 
Norden and Schaller (1993) generalised Blanchard and Watson’s (1982) bubble paths 
in two ways: first, the probability of collapse is enlarged with the bubble growth; 
second, the model allows the collapsed bubbles to be above zero (partially 
collapsed). 
 
Afterwards, Diba and Grossman (1988a) mentioned that bubbles periodically shrink. 
This periodically collapsed bubble is illustrated by Evan (1991): 
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αδ )1(0 i+<<  10 << pi           (3.8) 
 
δ and α  are positive parameters, and changes in them can alter the frequency with 
which bubbles erupt and the average length of time before collapse; ε is an 
exogenous independently and identically distributed positive random variable with a 
mean of 1, and θ  is an exogenous independently and identically distributed 
Bernoulli process which takes the value 1 with a probability of pi  and 0 with a 
probability of pi−1 . The characteristics of bubbles can be adjusted by varying the 
parameters δ ,α , and pi .  In (3.8), only if α≤B , bubbles grow at a rate of 
)1( i+ . As long as α>B , bubbles move into an eruption pattern until collapse. 
When bubbles collapse, they fall to a mean value of δ , i.e. bubbles can restart after 
collapse.  
 
In order to integrate the foregoing descriptions about bubbles, Fukuta (1998) devised 
a three-state bubble model: 
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State 1: the state of large bubbles 
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State 2: the state of small bubbles 
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State 3: the state of incomplete bursts 
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where 1ϖ  and 2ϖ  are arbitrary with assumptions of 10 1 << ϖ , 10 2 << ϖ  and 
110 21 <−−< ϖϖ . 1pi , 2pi  and 211 pipi −−  are the probability of each state and 
they are strictly positive. The condition of 
11222121 //)1/()1( piϖpiϖpipiϖϖ <<−−−−  is also assumed. With various 
assumptions of ϖ andpi , (3.9) can be transformed into the same specification of 
other bubble models described before. 
 
As a parsimonious alternative of rational bubbles, Froot and Obstfeld (1991) defined 
an intrinsic bubble which is the function of only dividends. The idea stems from an 
intuition that bubbles are generated from an overreaction regarding dividend news, 
and the model appears to fit the data in the U.S. stock market during both the 1960s 
and 1970s. However, at the same time, this model with the newly defined bubble is 
inconsistent with the conventional description of fundamental values which is 
defined as irrelevant with the bubble term. However, the overreaction-driven bubbles 
should in fact be generally free from dividends, though it is the result of the news 
about dividends. For example, investors push up the price by buying stocks because 
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they believe the fundamental values of stocks will increase due to the good news 
about dividends. Since investors are heterogeneous, and no two can ever react 
identically. The different levels of overreaction are not due to dividends but to the 
heterogeneity of investors’ decisions. Therefore, the intrinsic bubble seems to lack a 
sound theoretical foundation.  
 
With the improvement of the bubble assumption, the rational bubble theory seems to 
be further developed. However, one problem remains; it is still quite difficult to 
mimic a bubble path, since they are moving with uncertain decisions from 
heterogeneous investors. 
 
3.1.2 Bubbles in Behavioural Studies 
 
While the rational bubble researchers struggle to extend the efficient market theory 
into a more realistic model of rational bubbles, with the accumulation of theoretical 
challenges and empirical deviations, the substance of EMH has been evaded. Instead, 
with a new body of theory, a new set of explanations of empirical regularities, as well 
as a new set of predictions, behavioural finance has been generated as a study of 
human fallibility in competitive markets. The behavioural economists consider that 
“financial markets are not expected to be efficient and the market efficiency only 
emerges as an extreme special case unlikely to hold under plausible circumstances” 
(Shleifer, 2000). Shiller (2002) similarly indicated that the efficient market theory is 
only “a half-truth”. While irrational traders are often known as “noise traders” and 
rational traders are referred to as “arbitrageurs” who raise the riskless and costless 
profit in their investment, the school of behavioural finance argues that the strategies 
adopted by rational investors are not necessarily arbitrages since they are often risky 
and costly. As a result, the mispricing can remain unchallenged (Thaler, 2005). 
 
Shleifer (2000) summarises three areas in which people deviate from the standard 
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decision making model: attitudes toward risk, non-Bayesian expectation formation, 
and sensitivity of decision. In addition, Black (1986) indicates that many investors 
trade on noise rather than information, namely “noise traders” or “unsophisticated 
traders”. The investors’ belief, which conforms to the psychological evidence rather 
than the economic model, is named “investor sentiment”. 
 
The two major foundations of behavioural finance are “limited arbitrage” and 
“investor sentiment”, which are the direct disapproval to the principal assumptions of 
EMH - the irrelevance of irrationality. Under EMH, markets are fully rational, since 
irrational trading strategies are uncorrelated and offset to each other. Rational 
arbitrageurs, who “simultaneous purchase and sale the same or essentially similar 
security in two different markets at advantageously different price”, bring the 
security prices in line with their fundamental values and squeeze the irrational traders 
out of the market. As the alternative approach to the study of the financial market, 
behavioural finance is aimed to theoretically and empirically model the real world, in 
which “arbitrage is risky and therefore limited” and investors form their beliefs by 
sentiment. Although the initial aim of those models is to display a price forming 
process with a consideration of investors’ psychological factors, there are some 
strong resemblances to bubbles implied in the models. Four models, namely the 
noise trader risk model, the model of relative returns of noise traders and arbitrageurs, 
a model of investor sentiment and the positive feedback model, are reviewed below 
with the intention of picking up some pioneering ideas about bubbles in the 
behavioural finance.  
 
At the arbitrage side of research, DeLong et al (1990) defined two kinds of risks that 
arbitrageurs may face. The first one is the risk caused by imperfect substitutes of 
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securities, and the second one is called “noise trader risk”7. In other words, the latter 
is the possibility that mispricing becomes worse due to noise trading. Furthermore, 
Shleifer (2000) introduces two models which are against the assumption of rational 
markets. One is a pricing function which describes how noise traders affect the price. 
Its final equation is written: 
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where µ  presents the noise traders, and µ−1  presents the arbitrageurs. tρ  
represents noise traders’ misperceptions of the expected price. γ  is a behavioural 
parameter capturing the risk aversion and r is the riskless rate. The implication of 
each term in (3.10) is explained by Shleifer (2000). The second term of equation 
(3.10) means that the more noise traders’ misperceptions depart from the average, the 
more prices fluctuate. Since the average misperception *ρ  is not zero, the third 
term captures the deviation of price from its fundamental value. The final term of 
equation (3.10) can be interpreted as meaning that a noise trader’s negative outlook 
on risks drives the price down.  
 
The central point of the noise trader risk model above is to mark out the impact of 
noise traders on the stock price, which implies a self-evident extrapolation that the 
price deviation can be traced to the irrational behaviours of noise traders. In other 
words, from the standpoint of the bubble research, the noise trading behaviours 
contribute to the bubble by keeping arbitrageurs from driving prices all the way back 
to fundamental values. That calls for another model which is concerned with the 
misperception of EMH about the noise trader, i.e. it’s not always the case that noise 
                                                       
7
 The risk that noise traders’ beliefs become even more extreme before they revert to the mean. “An arbitrageur 
selling an asset short when bullish noise traders have driven its price up must remember that noise traders might 
become even more bullish tomorrow, and so must take a position that accounts for the risk of a further price rise 
when he has to buy back the asset.” Shleifer (2000, page 29) 
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traders are weeded out of markets since they can earn a higher return than the 
arbitrageurs. 
 
The idea is illustrated by analysing the expected difference between noise traders’ 
and arbitrageurs’ total return )( RE ∆ . 
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The first term of the equation implies the “hold more” effect, i.e. when noise traders 
on average hold more of the risky assets, their expected returns are higher than those 
of arbitrageurs. The numerator of the second term of equation (3.11) combines the 
“price pressure” effect and the “buy high-sell low” effect. The denominator contains 
the “create space” effect. The “price pressure” effect means that the returns are 
diminishing with the growing price provoked by noise traders’ misperceptions. The 
“buy high-sell low” effect refers to how the large variation of noise traders’ beliefs 
damages their expected returns. Also, the various beliefs of noise traders push up the 
price risk so as to “create more spaces” for noise traders by expelling some 
risk-averse arbitrageurs. Therefore, the “create space” effect captured by the 
denominator can reduce the damages of noise traders’ expected returns resulting 
from the “price pressure” and “buy high-sell low” effects. In addition, Shleifer (2000) 
considers that the noise traders may keep coming back even when they suffer capital 
losses, since “they keep earning investable labor income, besides, there is a noise 
trader born every minute”.  
 
The implication of the behavioural models discussed above to the study of bubbles is 
clear. First, financial markets are not efficient due to the persistent irrationality. 
Second, the deviation of prices from fundamental values, the so-called bubbles, is the 
outcome of noise trading.  
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The model of investor sentiment is devoted to the simulation of the belief formation 
using psychological theories. There are two important psychological phenomena 
involved: representativeness and conservatism. As a result of representativeness, 
“people see patterns in truly random sequences” (Shleifer, 2000). The slow updating 
of models in the face of new evidence is formed by the conservatism (Edwards 1968). 
Accordingly, the two psychological phenomena are suggestive of the investors’ 
overreaction and underreaction of prices. A model of the investor sentiment 
introduced by Shleifer (2000) starts from an assumption that investors believe the 
earning shocks y  following one of the two models which represent two “states” or 
“regimes” of the economy: 
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(3.12) 
where Lpi  and Hpi  are probabilities of changing the sign of the earning shock with 
HL pipi < , i.e. under model 1, the positive shock is likely to be reversed and under 
model 2, a positive shock is likely to be followed by another positive shock. 
Furthermore, the probabilities of switching from one model to another are also 
defined as 1λ and 2λ  with 121 <+ λλ . 
 
With the acceptance of the valuation model that prices are the expectations of the 
discounted future earnings, the final equation is derived: 
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where tN is the earnings and ty  is shock to earnings at time t, δ  is the discount 
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rate, and 1p  and 2p  are constants that depend on Lpi , Hpi , 1λ  and 2λ . tq  
represents the probability that ty  is generated by model 1 and is calculated 
according to the Bayes Rule. 
 
Shleifer (2000) illustrates the deviation of the price from its “correct value” as a 
result of investors’ ignorance of the randomly walking earnings. Instead, the price is 
modelled as an expectation formula, not as a set of random true numbers. Therefore, 
the first term of equation (3.13) is interpreted as “the price that would obtain if the 
investor used the true random walk process to forecast earnings”. Thus, the second 
term stands for the deviation of prices from fundamental values. Shleifer (2000) also 
pointed out sufficient conditions on 1p  and 2p  which allow both behaviours of 
overreaction and underreaction in the model (3.13). This implies a possible negative 
sign to the second term8, which is obviously different from the assumption of 
positive bubbles in the rational bubble model. 
  
The diction of “bubble” appearing in behavioural research is used for the positive 
feedback trading theory in which bubbles are considered to occur in a situation of 
price soaring without news. Three kinds of investors, namely noise traders, passive 
investors and arbitrageurs, are involved in the model. Since noise traders are positive 
feedback traders who buy securities after prices rise and sell after prices fall, they 
play the role of trend chasing. In contrast, passive investors, who do not play an 
active role in the business, will purchase investments with the intention of long-term 
appreciation and limited maintenance. Meanwhile, the stabilising power of arbitrage 
is challenged, because the arbitrageurs amplify the positive feedback trading, i.e. 
arbitrageurs buying more today with the superior information will stimulate buying 
more tomorrow, so as to drive prices above fundamental values. The model of 
positive feedback trading affects the bubble as a result of price-chasing-up 
                                                       
8
 The negative sign is caused by the behaviour of the underreaction which means the stock price doesn’t react 
sufficiently to the shock, leaving the price below the fundamental value. 
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behaviours after the arbitrageurs’ anticipatory pumping up of the price.  
 
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), as well as Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006), 
defined a bubble equivalent to the resale option value which depends on the current 
difference between the beliefs of the other group’s agents and the belief of the current 
owner. In their theory, bubbles can be presented as follows: 
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Where Af 0  and Bf 0  are the prior beliefs of group A and B at t=0; τη
Q
 is the risk 
discount; ABA ffl 111 −=  and BAB ffl 111 −=  represent the difference in opinions 
between the investors in group A and B at t=1; ∑ A  and ∑ B are the next-period 
price change variances under two groups’ beliefs. 
 
Stock prices only reflect the belief of optimists. Given that group A investors are 
optimists at t=0, in Case 1, the bubble is concerned with embracing two parts: the 
optimism effect (
2
00
BA ff − ) and the resale option effect ( )],([ 10 τη
QlHE AA ); in Case 2, 
both groups of investors are at long position at t=0 so that the bubble component is a 
weighted average of the resale options of groups A and B 
( )],([)],([ 1010 ττ ηη
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), but the bias in price due to 
initially different beliefs depend on the difference in the perceived variances of the 
two groups for holding the stock between t=0 and t=1. In Case 3, group B investors 
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are optimists and so the optimism bias is given by (
2
00
AB ff − ), and the resale option 
is determined by group B investors ( )],([ 10 τη
QlHE BB ). 
 
The theory of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), as well as Hong, Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2006), is superior to others in that they innovatively modelled the formation 
of bubbles with two effects: the optimism effect and the resale option effect, which 
stem from an opinion of heterogeneous beliefs among investors. Moreover, they 
concluded that the magnitude of bubbles changes with float ( Q ) as investors 
anticipate the change in asset float over time and speculate on the degree of insider 
selling. 
   
3.1.3 Summary 
 
With the purpose of collecting empirical evidence of inefficiency, and of picturing 
the true behaviours in financial markets, the school of rational bubbles and 
behavioural researchers breathe new life into the financial area. The school of 
rational bubbles has been trying to verify the existence of bubbles, and the 
researchers of the behavioural finance have been enriching the quantitative price 
model with categorised traders’ behaviours. In other words, behavioural finance 
studies market inefficiency by examining the cause of investors’ behaviours rather 
than verifying its existence which is the aim of the school of rational bubbles. 
However, it seems a vain attempt to integrate concepts and terms in these two 
research areas, since contradictive descriptions may be given respectively in these 
two approaches to the similar behaviours. For example, a rational bubble is defined 
as the outcome of self-fulfilling behaviours, i.e. investors buy stocks and drive the 
price up, with a belief that the price will increase. This plausible scenario exhibits a 
similar phase with some professionally defined behaviours in behavioural theories, 
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such as the positive feedback trading and the arbitrageurs’ anticipatory trading9, 
which are deemed as noise trading or irrationality in behavioural finance.  
 
Among the three research layers of the inefficient market described at the beginning 
of the review, the rational bubble researchers and the school of behavioural finance 
have been dedicated to the first and third layers. The second topic is still a gap and 
attracts us to fill it.     
 
3.2 Theoretical Basis of Value Frontier Framework 
 
Following the route of bubble research, there are two opposite arguments: existence 
of bubbles and no bubbles. The school of arguing against bubbles has a subjective 
opinion. They are trying to construct a fundamental estimation model which matches 
the observed price very well by processing ample historical data. For example, 
Donaldson and Kamstra (1996) used the neural network technique to conduce to a 
satisfactory result. However, their simulated fundamental path still fails to overlap 
with the observed actual price movement, although their bubble-dismissing result is 
verified on the basis of the unit root test, the robustness of the method is 
questionable.  
 
Intuitively, the argument for bubbles should be continuing if we believe that a stock 
price consists of two parts: the fundamental value and the excess value over the 
fundamental value. The statistical failure in verifying the presence of bubbles may be 
due to the inappropriate econometric technique applied, which is a 
time-series-data-based testing method. This method has a fatal problem. It merely 
                                                       
9
 Positive feedback trading: The behaviour of buying securities after prices rise and selling after prices fall. 
(Shleifer, 2000, page 155) 
Arbitrageur’s anticipatory trading: When arbitrageurs receive good news, they realize that the initial price 
increase will stimulate buying by positive feedback traders tomorrow. In anticipation of these purchases, 
informed arbitrageurs buy today and so drive price above the fundamental news warrants. (Shleifer, 2000, page 
156) 
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enables us to test the existence of bubbles over a time period and not to estimate 
bubbles at a particular point of time. This problem imposes a serious discrepancy in 
studying bubbles and, in particular, on studying what determines bubbles due to the 
failure of the method in estimating bubble changes over time. To challenge the 
problem, it calls for rethinking of current methods in estimating bubbles. Can we 
really estimate the magnitude of bubbles at a point in time? Against the question, we 
take an innovative approach to investigate bubbles, which is fundamentally different 
from the existing time-series-data-based approach in terms of its theoretical 
framework and statistical estimation method.  
 
The fundamental concern of our work is that bubbles persist in the stock market. This 
opinion can be traced to the work of Binswanger (1999), in which persistent bubbles 
are considered to be sustainable if bubbles move with the development of a real 
economy. His empirical work in 2000 further verified and highlighted the persistent 
bubbles since the early 1980s. Also, McFadden (1998) raised an idea that human 
judgement not always leads to reasonable answers; the axioms of rational choice are 
often consistently violated by sophisticated as well as naive respondents and the 
violations are often large and highly persistent. Summers (1986) documented that 
both theoretical and empirical considerations suggest the existence of frequent and 
substantial deviations from fundamental values; and this deviation is being made 
continuously. In fact, many researchers, such as West (1988), Shiller (1984), and 
Debondt and Thaler (1985), have already realised that there is a significant stationary 
component in a stock price which is documented to be suggestive of fads. 
Furthermore, Lee (1998) and Chung and Lee (1998) empirically identified fads in 
several stock markets. However, there is no general agreement concerning the 
distinction between fads and bubbles. For example, following Cochrane (1991), Lee 
(1998) and Chung and Lee (1998) considered price deviations which slowly return to 
fundamental values as fads, whereas bubbles are expected to continue until bursts 
occur. Different from them, Shiller (1988) defined a bubble as a fad if the contagion 
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of the fad occurs through price. Faced with this confusion, Bingswanger (2004) 
didn’t make a distinction between bubbles and fads. Instead, he interpreted the 
persistent deviations of stock prices from fundamental values as bubbles. Our work 
follows Bingswanger’s view (2004) that any non-fundamental components in stock 
prices, except for statistical noises, will be recognised as bubbles which are persistent 
in a stock market and these assumptions exclude exceptional shocks at a point in 
time. This belief leads us to an innovative work of measuring bubbles. 
 
Our work will follow the school of bubbles and will stem from three basic opinions: 
firstly, the traditional theory of market efficiency focuses on the study of information 
revealing efficiency. The assumptions of homogeneous and rational investors are the 
basis of its modeling. However, in reality, the response of investors to the 
information is neither fully rational nor homogeneous, and the research of bubbles 
(or inefficient markets) should be traced to a study of responding inefficiency. 
Secondly, it is concerned that heterogeneous beliefs produce heterogeneous 
fundamental valuation. Thus, the determination of fundamental values is the most 
crucial part in our bubble estimation. Finally, bubbles persist in stock markets since 
they are result from optimistic beliefs and speculative behaviours which dominate the 
market always. In addition, the market friction may also cause the price to deviate 
from its fundamental value.  
 
In addition, it is worth highlighting that the above three opinions jointly show a new 
framework combining the arguments of rational bubbles and behavioural theories as 
bubbles are deemed to be produced by the rational distortion (the basic opinion of the 
rational bubble school) and irrationality (the central issue of behavioural researches). 
This section will discuss in detail the above three arguments which provide the 
theoretical foundation of our alternative approach to estimate bubbles. 
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3.2.1 Information Revealing Efficiency and Responding Inefficiency 
 
In the traditional framework where agents are rational and there are no frictions in a 
market, a security’s price equals its “fundamental value” (Thaler, 2005). There are 
two underlining assumptions to this statement: information revealing efficiency and 
responding efficiency (investors correctly process all available information in 
forming expectations). The hypothesis that actual prices reflect fundamental values is 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). However, the rational bubble school 
documents that there can be rational deviations of the price from its fundamental 
value, which are called rational bubbles (Blanchard and Watson, 1982). In addition, 
behavioural researchers argue that some features of asset prices are most plausibly 
interpreted as deviations from fundamental value, and these deviations are brought 
about by the presence of traders who are not fully rational (Thaler, 2005). In our 
study of stock bubbles, the value frontier theory is a compromise between the bubble 
school and EMH, which can be explained as follows.  
 
In theory, information revealing efficiency means that the information in a stock 
market is identical to all participants who are led by the information, and the 
technique of fundamental valuation is common knowledge in the market. 
Information responding efficiency reflects that the response of investors to the 
information is rational and homogeneous. The EMH implies that the stock price can 
fully reflect all available information under the assumption of homogenous investors. 
In our value frontier theory, it has relaxed the homogenous assumption because 
investors are heterogeneous in responding to the given information in evaluating 
stocks. The efficient market theory doesn’t deny the price deviation in the short term. 
However, in the long run, the arbitrageur is considered “smart” enough to drag the 
deviated price back to the fundamental value and the irrationality will be squeezed 
out of the market. Our theory is partially consistent with EMH in terms of 
information revealing efficiency, which is the assumption of the value frontier 
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modelling. However, in our view, the information responding efficiency cannot be 
fulfilled in stock markets since the arbitrageur can also overestimate the fundamental 
value in the long run, so as to cause the stock price to always deviate up from the 
fundamental value. This, to some extent, is in accordance with the argument of 
rational bubbles. Blanchard and Watson (1982) clarified that rationality does not 
imply that the price of an asset is equal to its fundamental value, and there can be 
rational deviations of the price from this value, rational bubbles. Moreover, the 
irrationality is significant and cannot be completely wiped off, which is in support of 
the behavioural researchers who verified that irrationality can have a substantial and 
long-lived impact on prices (Thaler, 2005). Thus, the price deviation can be caused 
by the interaction of rationality and irrationality. 
 
In the empirical modelling, our idea is consistent with the argument of Shiller (1981). 
EMH is conceived of an equilibrium situation, which is the fundamental value of our 
models, though the observed stock prices are believed to always be deviating from it.  
 
3.2.2 The Determination of Fundamental Values 
 
 
Having analysed the failure of the traditional assumption of homogenerity, we turn to 
the crucial problem of the value frontier estimation – the determination of 
fundamental values.  
 
Theoretically, following the rational bubble school (for example: Flood and Garber, 
1980; Blanchard and Watson, 1982), the market fundamental value of an asset is 
defined as the present value of expected future dividends. However, in contrast to 
their theory which is based on an assumption of homogeneous investors, we believe 
that stock prices originate from the expectation of the over-optimistic investors who 
own heterogenous beliefs and inefficiently make the decision very often in 
responding to information. There are two reasons that can result in this heterogeneity 
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among investors in analysing the fundamental values. Firstly, the information may be 
not identically available to all investors which will lead to heterogeneous perception 
of fundamental values. Blanchard and Watson (1982) proposed that each agent will 
have his own perception of the fundamental value and there will be agent specific 
fundamental values when the information received by investors is not the same. This 
opinion also can be viewed in the argument of myopic rational expectation 
equilibrium in Tirole (1982) who gave rise to an equilibrium of a stock market with 
heterogeneous information in which the market fundamental values of different 
traders are not generally equal. Secondly, even if the information is available to all 
investors, different people will make their own inferences from the information so as 
to produce heterogeneous beliefs. This argument can be proved by extensive 
psychological findings, such as those by Alpert and Raiffa (1982), Fischhoff, Slovic 
and Lichtenstein (1977), Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1982), Gervais and 
Odean (2001), and Thaler (2005), which show that people normally exhibit 
overconfidence to form beliefs in practice.10 As Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) 
noted, one of the tractable ways to generate the heterogeneous beliefs is 
‘overconfidence’. Hirshleifer (2001) also put forward that mistaken beliefs can be 
caused by overconfidence, representativeness, conservation etc. When investors are 
heterogeneous, mistaken beliefs may exist.  
 
Therefore, although the standard formula of calculating fundamental values, which is 
the present value of expected future dividends, are utilised by investors in their 
fundamental valuations, heterogeneous beliefs/expectation will produce investors’ 
specific fundamental values. To clarify the fundamental valuation in the value 
frontier modeling, we divide the heterogeneous beliefs/expectations into three 
scenarios: the optimistic expectation, the pessimistic expectation and the neutral 
expectation. The optimistic investors expect that the fundamental value of a stock in 
the future will be better than the present; on the contrary, the pessimistic investors 
                                                       
10
 Overconfidence can be learnt as two biases, self-attribution bias and hindsight bias. (see Thaler, 2005) 
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believe that the fundamental value of a stock will be worse in the future, and the 
expectation that the future will be neither better nor worse than the present is called 
neutral beliefs/expectations. The pessimistic investors will sit out of the market 
because of short-sales constraints.11 This group of investors may exist in the short 
run but will quit from the market in the long run. Thus, we utilise the fundamental 
valuation of investors with the neutral expectation to formulate the fundamental 
value in our bubble estimation model. Under this fundamental valuation mechanism, 
the difference between the optimistic valuation and the neutral expectation is treated 
as one source of bubbles.  
 
3.2.3 The Forming Process of Bubbles 
 
Before discussing the value frontier framework and its statistical methodology to 
measure the magnitude of bubbles, we first discuss how bubbles can be formed or 
determined. 
 
We believe that the stock prices result from two processes: the “investor decision 
process” and the “market transmission process”, and we name the efficiencies in 
these two processes the “decision efficiency” and the “transmission efficiency” 
accordingly.  
 
The “decision efficiency” means that investors make the correct trading decision 
according to the existing information driving stock prices equal to their fundamental 
values. The heterogeneous response to the information and the speculation will cause 
stock bubbles called the “investor-made bubble”. The heterogeneous beliefs of 
investors are the essential reason for stimulating and sustaining bubbles. This idea 
follows the basic argument of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong, Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2006) who attributed the formation of bubbles to two effects which are 
                                                       
11
 Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) summarized three reasons that short-sales constraints arise often in reality. Our 
assumption in terms of short-sales constraints is in line with Harrison and Kreps (1978), Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003) and Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006). 
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led by heterogeneous beliefs: the optimism effect and the resale option effect. The 
optimism effect means that investors have different initial beliefs about fundamental 
values. The explanation to the resale option effect is that investors pay higher prices 
than their own valuation of future dividends since they anticipate finding a buyer 
willing to pay even more in the future. The support to the effects of heterogeneous 
beliefs in stock markets can be also found in other literatures, such as Miller (1977), 
Chen et al (2002) etc. Their common opinion about heterogeneous beliefs in stock 
markets implies that stock price generally contains bubbles as bubbles are generated 
by the heterogeneous beliefs of investors. To some extent, it further supports the 
assumption of our work: bubbles persist in stock markets. Furthermore, to study the 
causes of bubbles in a deeper level, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong, 
Scheinkam and Xiong (2006) raised a psychological explanation to the heterogeneity 
among investors. They indicated that overconfidence generates disagreements among 
investors regarding asset fundamental values. In fact, overconfidence is merely one 
factor of forming beliefs in practice. Thaler (2005) summarised seven psychological 
factors of affecting investors’ beliefs: overconfidence (e.g. Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; 
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1977), optimism and wishful thinking (e.g. 
Buehler, Griffin and Ross, 1994), representativeness (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 
1974), conservatism (e.g. Edwards, 1968), belief perseverance (e.g. Lord, Ross, and 
Lepper, 1979), anchoring (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) and availability biases 
(e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). Although these psychological conceptions are 
not described in a comprehensive and explicit manner, they are no doubt playing a 
crucial role in supporting our argument in terms of the causes of bubbles.  
 
Withstanding the above opinions, however, it is worth noting that bubbles can also 
be learnt about from another point of view. A large amount of literature suggests that 
in stock markets, rationality and irrationality interact. DeLong et al. (1990) propose 
three types of agents, feedback traders, passive investors and speculators who are 
argued by Haruvy and Noussair (2006) to interact in a market to form persistent 
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bubbles. The feedback trading, as Lei et al. (2001) and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) 
documented, provides a plausible and precise structure for the “irrational” behaviour. 
Passive investors who trade based on fundamental values and speculators who 
speculate in a market are more likely to be rational. Therefore, it claims that the 
causes of bubbles can be divided into two types: rational distortion and irrationality 
(or bounded rationality)12. Rationality is clarified by Thaler (2005) as two things. 
First, agents perceive the information correctly in the manner described by Bayes’s 
law. Second, given beliefs, agents make choices that are normatively acceptable. A 
similar opinion can be also found in the research of Blanchard and Watson (1982), in 
which rationality is described respectively as rational expectations and rational 
behaviours. Thus, in the sense of Blanchard and Watson (1982) as well as Thaler 
(2005)’s notion, irrational bubbles can be caused either by the failure in correctly 
perceiving information to form beliefs, or by unacceptable choices with certain 
beliefs. In particular, the choices are not necessarily based on their beliefs. 
Meanwhile, rational bubble supporters (e.g. Blanchard and Watson, 1982) stated that 
there can be rational deviations of the price from its fundamental value, which are 
rational bubbles. Rational bubbles are thought of as part of the stock prices due to 
self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 
From a theoretical viewpoint, it is hard to integrate the above two angles of research 
for two reasons: Firstly, the discussion on the meaning of rationality is not clear-cut. 
McFadden (1998) analysed the distinction between the attitudes of psychologists and 
economists on rationality. Between them, the latter ones give a much more specific 
meaning within a framework of maximisation; and the former ones define rational 
behaviours in a broad meaning of being sensible, planned and consistent. Although 
the assumption of rationality, to some extent, speeds up the theoretical progress in 
terms of using mathematical techniques, the normative models do not give an 
                                                       
12
 Simmon described that limited calculationg power and the complexity of decision problems prevent fully 
rational decisions, which leads to the bounded rationality. 
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integrated and convincible explanation on the notion of rationality. Hammond (1997) 
pointed out that the “rationality” is an over-used and misused word in economics. 
Obviously, it is hard to use the criteria of rationality and irrationality to describe 
investors’ decisions in a descriptive model13because the debate on understanding the 
word of “rationality” is still ongoing. 
 
Secondly, a huge amount of literature on decision theory and behavioural finance 
documents the fact that people are not fully rational and the irrationality (or bounded 
rationality) is the norm in humans forming decision patterns. Some reputable 
economists, such as Adam Smith, Fisher and Keynes have already raised the opinion 
at an earlier time that individual psychology affects prices (Hirshleifer, 2001). 
Hirshleifer (2001) argued that heuristic simplification, self-deception, and emotional 
loss of control provide a unified explanation for most known judgement and decision 
biases which suggests the limitation of Bayesian Law in explaining the human 
behaviour, and presented asset-pricing theories based on imperfect rationality. Ritter 
(2003) and Thaler (2005) summarised that cognitive psychology is one building 
block of behavioural finance and financial phenomena that can be better understood 
using models in which agents are not fully rational. Thus, we are concerned that the 
interaction of rationality and irrationality not only appears at the market level but 
also exists in the decision process of a single investor. To this extent, it can be argued 
that separating the rationality and the irrationality in the study of bubble formation is 
unfeasible and meaningless. 
 
From the above analysis, it is easy to see that the study on bubbles focuses more on 
the investor psychology rather than examining how the assumption of rationality fails. 
Therefore, we conclude that the “investor-made bubble” can be formed and inflated 
through three reasons: optimistic fundamental valuation (the optimism effect), 
                                                       
13
 Hammond (1997) labeled the psychological model the “descriptive model” in contrast to the “standard 
normative model”. 
- 80 -  
speculation (the resale option effect) 14 and other random behaviours (such as noise 
trading, the feedback trading and manipulation etc). The optimism effect, which 
results from heterogeneous initial beliefs on fundamental values, will drive the price 
bias upward since stock prices only reflect the beliefs of the optimistic group and the 
pessimistic group simply sit out of the market due to short-sales constraints (Hong, 
Scheinkam and Xiong, 2006). Stock market speculation is the behaviour of 
purchasing a stock with the sole purpose of selling it to someone else at a higher 
price. The feedback traders, who make purchases and sales independent of 
fundamental values, buy assets when prices have been rising so as to inflate bubbles 
(Haruvy and Noussair, 2006). Manipulation differs from other behaviours, which is 
an illegal behaviour of attempting to affect or control the price of a stock through 
aggressive trading. Briefly, speculators act in response to prices and, in contrast, 
manipulators are trying to act in influencing or controlling. It is worth noting that we 
give consideration to the “manipulation” in our work, which is missing in most other 
bubble studies, since many researchers, such as Aggarwal and Wu (2003), have 
shown that the stock market manipulation has important impacts on market 
efficiency.  
 
Having studied the “decision process”, the latent demands of investors are ultimately 
translated into transactions by a process. During the past two decades, many 
academic literatures have been focusing on the study of this process, the so-called 
research of market microstructure. Inspired by theories in this area, we believe that 
bubbles are not only produced by the investors’ decision but are also generated in 
this process, the so-called “transmission process”. Madhavan (2000) stated that asset 
prices need not equal full-information expectations of value because of a variety of 
“frictions” in the market. If this process is efficient, the prices will perfectly reflect 
the investors’ decision. Otherwise, the “market-made bubble” appears due to the 
                                                       
14
 Hong, Scheinkam and Xiong (2006) marked it using an alternative label - the “resale option”. We still use the 
word of “speculation” because it is more understandable within our framework. 
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“friction” of markets (such as slow transaction, bid-ask bias and the limitation of 
rules). Furthermore, he pointed out that the market structure, such as rules governing 
the trading process and trading systems15, does influence the liquidity of a market 
and the expected returns must reflect a compensation for illiquidity. The support can 
be found in the work of Uno et al (2002), in which differences in trading systems are 
verified to affect pricing and liquidity in the Japanese stock market. The institutional 
design, such as the degree of short selling, can also affect bubbles. For example, 
Ackert (1993) found that the ability to short sell drives prices close to fundamental 
values; Haruvy and Noussair (2006) argued that short selling may overcompensate 
for bubbles and make prices lower than fundamental values. Therefore, in the extent 
of stock bubbles, the “mispricing” caused by the market structure is deemed as the 
“market-made bubbles”. 
 
In summary, it is shown that bubbles are composed of the “investor-made bubble” 
and the “market-made bubble” which are generated respectively in the “decision 
process” and the “transmission process” due to the decision and transmission 
inefficiency. In the “decision process”, heterogeneous beliefs of investors 
incontrovertibly raise a stock price in excess of its fundamental curve, and the 
psychological properties of investors, such as overconfidence16 , are the major 
sources of this disagreement. To some extent, these psychological properties of the 
human thinking mechanism can further prove the general existence of irrationality 
which is one of the major forces driving the market price deviating from the 
fundamental value in stock markets. This view is supported by Shiller (2002) who 
clearly states: “human patterns of less-than-perfectly-rational behavior are central to 
financial market behaviours, even among investment professionals”.  
 
                                                       
15
 Types of worldwide trading systems are: continuous, floor-based, dealer presence and multilateral trading 
systems. 
16
 Overconfidence: the belief of an agent that his information is more accurate than in fact it is. 
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3.2.4 Value Frontier Framework 
 
Having demonstrated the bubble forming process, our study moves further to discuss 
the theoretical basis of a new bubble measurement methodology - value frontier 
estimation framework. 
 
Suppose that investors are optimistic in response to a series of information available 
in the market with an intention to minimise their decision errors. Share prices driven 
by investors’ decisions contain two basic components: share fundamental values and 
bubbles. The fundamental value is defined as “a value with the deterministic relation 
to a set of company’s fundamentals”. The deterministic relation means only one 
fundamental value can be accepted in response to a company’s set of fundamental 
variables at a point of time. The property of the fundamental value implies that given 
the set of fundamental variables, there is no other fundamental-related value above 
the fundamental value except bubbles or other statistical random noises. As clarified 
in Section 3.2.2, the fundamental value is calibrated by the fundamental valuation of 
investors with neutral beliefs/expectation on the future dividend income. In the 
theoretical structure of the value frontier model, fundamental values are represented 
by the value frontier. Since the pessimistic investors will sit out of markets under the 
short-sales constraint, any values below the value frontier are theoretically 
impossible in the long run but are possible in the very short term. As a consequence, 
the observed price reflects both share fundamental values and excessive value 
perceived by investors. It can be viewed as the sum of two components: frontier 
value fP and bubbles B .  
 
The first component is equivalent to the fundamental value which is determined by a 
set of the fundamental variables, x , and  ),...,( 1 Nf xxfP = . fP  is the value 
deterministically associated with the fundamental variables, x. We call fP  the 
frontier value since it represents the best value obtained from a market perceptive 
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valuation technique. In theory, the frontier value equals the fundamental value and a 
line to connect frontier values in corresponding to different x is called a value 
frontier. 
 
In Figure 3.1, the relationship between the observed stock price, P , a frontier value 
fP on the value frontier line, and bubble, B  is drawn up.   
P
         
BPP f +=  
)( xfP f =  
                             
      
fP           
              x   
 
 
The value frontier framework is assumed to satisfy the following three conditions: 
 
First, as documented in Section 3.2.1, the market is partially efficient in terms of its 
information revealing process but not for investors’ responses to information which 
are heterogeneous. The fundamental valuation technique is a common knowledge, i.e. 
the standard formula of fundamental valuation, which is the present value of 
expected future dividend stream, is accepted by all investors. However, the investors’ 
beliefs in expecting the future dividends are heterogeneous due to the psychological 
properties of humans, such as overconfidence, representativeness and conservatism 
etc. In other words, even though the information is identical to all participants in the 
market, they can respond differently. This information-responding heterogeneity in 
forming the expectation can be mainly caused by the “expectation distortion” (or 
optimistic valuation) and speculative tradings.  
 
Second, the values on the value frontier reflect the best combination of fundamental 
Figure 3.1 The Value Frontier of  A Stock 
B 
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variables )(xf , and )(xfP f = . Any other combinations of fundamental variables 
)(xg  must be under the line of value frontier, i.e. )()( xfxg ≤ . In addition, the 
frontier curve is not required to be concave, convex or linear. This assumption 
implies that the combination of fundamental variables making up the value frontier is 
the optimal function in calculating fundamental values, and any other functions will 
lead to the underestimation of fundamental values. The relationship among these 
fundamental variables can be linear or nonlinear. 
 
Third, the bubble B represents the difference between an observed price and the 
value frontier, and its function is fPPB −= , 0≥B . The assumption of the 
non-negative value of bubbles means that underestimation of a stock price relative to 
its fundamental value cannot exist in the long run since pessimistic investors will quit 
markets when short selling is restricted. This idea is in line with Hong, Scheikman 
and Xiong (2006) who argue that “a stock price will be upwardly biased when there 
is a sufficient divergence of opinion because it will only reflect the valuation of 
optimists, as pessimists simply sit out of the market instead of short-selling”. The 
same opinion can be also found in the work of Miller (1977), Chen, Hong and Stein 
(2002), and Mei et al (2005). In addition, asymmetric effects of arbitrageurs in 
response to the undervalued and overvalued price may be another explanation to 
non-negative bubbles. It is felt that if restrictions on short sales are tight, optimistic 
investors will make the purchase but few pessimist will sell stocks, which makes the 
“pessimistic bubble” impossible (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006). Thus, with the 
short-sales constraint, arbitrageurs appear more efficient in correcting the 
undervalued stock prices than the overvalued ones, since it is always easier to buy 
than to sell with the restriction of short selling. In detail, the short selling of 
pessimistic investors can drive down the overvalued stock price; however, in the 
absence of short selling, the price will simply be determined by the most optimistic 
trader with sufficient funds (Haruvy and Noussair, 2006). This is because the cost 
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constraint on buying is smaller than on selling with the short-sales restriction. The 
selling needs to meet two constraints. One is a new buyer’s expectation constraint: 
buying a share with an expectation of higher prices after buying. Another is the 
constraint of a seller’s incurred losses if the seller sells shares below his/her purchase 
price. We know that sometimes arbitrageurs have to face potentially uncontrollable 
steep losses when the selling position occupies the market. This can also make them 
extremely cautious before liquidating their positions. As a result, the undervaluation 
of stock prices is likely to exist in the short term but not in the long term, since it is 
most likely to be corrected by arbitrageurs. However, the overvaluation of prices can 
be held for a long time in the market, which brings out the picture of positive bubbles. 
It is worth noting that although some researchers, such as King et al. (1993), Ackert 
et al. (2001) and Haruvy and Noussair (2006), documented the significant effects of 
short selling on asset price bubbles, the restriction of short-sales is extensively 
considered to arise from many distinct sources in reality (Scheikman and Xiong, 
2003)17. In addition, if the price of a stock is undervalued to a certain extent, the 
management buyout becomes increasingly likely, which may also reduce the 
probability of negative bubbles. In fact, the assumption of non-negative bubbles has 
been utilised in the theory of rational bubbles in that negative bubbles are not 
allowed in an autogressive bubble path with limited liability18.  
 
3.2.5 Summary 
 
The value frontier framework gives a value benchmark which is called the value 
frontier to represent the fundamental value. As long as this benchmark is nominated, 
the bubble, which identifies the level of upward mispricing in a stock market, can be 
estimated and compared. This can be obtained empirically by applying the stochastic 
frontier estimation technique.  
                                                       
17
 Scheikman and Xiong (2003) imposed three major sources of the short-sale restriction. 
18
 Limited liability: investors can not lose more than the amount invested. 
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3.3 Stochastic Frontier Estimation and Its Application to the Value Frontier 
Framework 
 
Having discussed the theoretical basis of value frontier framework, this section is 
devoted to applying the theory to identify a statistical method as a new approach to 
estimate bubbles. The methodology of the stochastic frontier estimation for 
examining technical inefficiency can be applied to the value frontier framework so as 
to eventually measure out bubbles. 
 
3.3.1 Critical Review of Stochastic Frontier Estimation 
 
The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) model, which is proposed firstly by Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977), is initially developed to estimate technical efficiency (TE) 
that is defined as the deviation of the actual value of output from its optimal value for 
given input. The comparison is taken into two orientations. One is called 
output-augmenting orientation which is a ratio of observed to maximum potential 
output obtainable from the given input. Another is the ratio of minimal potential to 
the observed input required to produce the given output, which is named 
input-conserving orientation (Kumbhaker & Lovell, 2000 p43). Accordingly, the 
econometric models for SFA embrace a stochastic production frontier and a 
stochastic cost frontier. 
 
The development of the frontier models underwent two stages. In the early research, 
the stochastic elements are neglected in the model, and accordingly this model is 
called the “deterministic frontier”. Under the interpretation of the deterministic 
frontier, the random elements, which are out of the control of producers, are analysed 
as the inefficiency. Some imperfections in the specification of the model may also be 
treated as the inefficiency.  
 
A more reasonable model compared to the deterministic frontier was developed in 
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the second stage of the research - the “stochastic frontier model”. Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) who proposed the stochastic production frontier (ALS frontier model) 
carried out the pioneering work using a stochastic frontier model. The basic 
framework is written: 
 
( ) ( )iiii uvxfy ±⋅= exp; β            (3.14)    
    
( ) ( )}{ ( )iii
i
i u
xf
y
TE ±=
⋅
= exp
exp; νβ           (3.15) 
 
where β is a vector of parameters and i stands for producers. The composite error is e 
= v-u for production function. νi is the random disturbance that is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed as N (0, σ2). ui ≥0, following non-negative 
half normal distribution, represents the technical inefficiency. A simple 
transformation from the stochastic production frontier model to a stochastic cost 
frontier model can be extrapolated by changing the sign of the inefficiency error 
component ui from negative to positive. yi is scalar output and xi is a vector of inputs 
or function of inputs in the production frontier model and interchanges their 
meanings in the cost frontier model. The deterministic frontier is ƒ (xi; β) and the 
stochastic frontier is {ƒ (xi; β) exp (νi)}. The frontier performance represents the 
optimised output or cost without inefficient elements, which is shown as
( ) }{νβ exp, ⋅xf . 
 
The basic distributional assumptions of the “composed error” are: 
(i) ],0[~ 2vi Niidv σ . 
(ii) [ ]2,0~ ui Niidu σ+ 19. 
                                                       
19
 ALS considered both half normal distribution and exponential distribution. Other distributional assumptions, 
such as a normal—truncated-normal ),(~ 2µσµ+Niidui  (Stevenson, 1980), or normal-gamma model 
gammaiidu i ~  (Afriat and Richmond, Greene, 1980 a,b) were also considered.  
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(iii) iν  and iu  are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors. 
 
The model (3.14) can be written in a logarithmic form which is the standard formula 
of its econometric model: 
  
( ) ( ) ifiiiii uyuvxfy ±=±+= ln;lnln β         (3.16) 
 
The inefficiency term u  can be interpreted as the percentage deviation of observed 
performance y from its frontier yf 
 
( ) f
i
i
ii y
y
uU =±= exp              (3.17) 
Addition (+) is cost frontier, minus (-) is production frontier. 
 
With panel data, the foregoing basic framework can be extended into three different 
models to estimateu : (1) fixed effects frontier model; (2) random effects frontier 
model; (3) the latent class frontier model. Under the panel data estimation technique, 
at least one producer at one time is assumed to be 100% efficient, i.e. U=1, and the 
efficiencies of other producers are measured relative to this mark point. 
 
The fixed effects and random effects frontier models are generated with the 
popularity of panel data. The technique starts from an estimation of the 
time-invariant inefficiency component. Afterwards, Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles 
(CSS) (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990) first proposed a stochastic production frontier 
panel data model with time-varying efficiency. The estimation has been pursued in a 
maximum likelihood approach. Therefore, the equation (3.16) becomes:  
 
itititit vxfy ++= );(lnln βα            (3.18) 
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ititu αα −= 0  or 0αα −it             (3.19) 
 
where 0α  is the intercept common to all individuals and itα  is the intercept of 
individual i in period t.  
 
Lee and Schmidt (1993) reckoned the technical efficiency term could use a more 
flexible formulation than the CSS model: 
 
iit utu ⋅= )(β               (3.20) 
 
where )(tβ  is specified as a set of time dummy variables tβ . 
 
Greene (2002a,b) showed the serious bias caused by the incidental parameters’ 
problem in the fixed effects frontier model. However, the existing evidence reveals 
that the biases are serious only when the observed period is small (five in Greene’s 
two applications).  
 
The third approach of the frontier model for panel data is the latent class stochastic 
frontier model (LCSFM). The conventional measurements of the efficiency stand on 
the assumption of a common technology available to all producers. However, 
individual firms may use different technologies in the real world giving rise to the 
unfavourable and biased estimations. To reduce the misspecification caused by the 
technology variances, a two-stage estimation is employed by classifying the sample 
observations into certain categories. LCSFM comprising a single-stage approach is a 
parsimonious alternative to the two-stage estimation. The latent class model may be 
expressed as the mixture of the stochastic frontier model and a model for the mixing 
probabilities, which are written as (3.21) and (3.22) respectively: 
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The latent class stochastic frontier model combines the stochastic frontier approach 
and a latent class structure. In practical terms, LCSFM is somewhat less flexible and 
its advantage as an empirical tool remains to be verified as it’s still in the inception 
period (Greene 2001a,b).  
 
Among the three extensions of the stochastic frontier model, the fixed effects frontier 
model is regarded as a more efficient estimator, though the random and latent class 
models are particularly versatile and have great potential (Greene, 2002a).  
 
On the basis of the above models, some applied studies were made in various areas. 
Luis Orea and Subal C. Kumbhakar (2003) presented an application of the latent 
class stochastic frontier model by data on the Spanish banking system in which 
different types of banks coexist. Yougesh Khatri et al (2002) used the frontier model 
in an area of corporate performance and governance. A dataset of 31 non-financial 
companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange in the periods between 1995 
and 1999 was examined.  The frontier model has also been applied to sport 
economics. Sam Richardson (2002) modelled two separate frontier models to two 
groups of different football teams and found the existence of a home-ground 
advantage. William Greene (2003) explored a large number of recently developed 
approaches on frontier models with panel data, and applied them to the WHO data, 
which consisted of 191 countries with a five-year panel.  
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3.3.2 Application of Stochastic Frontier Estimation to the Value Frontier 
Framework 
 
The critical review above on the production/cost frontier function helps us compare 
the SFA with the value frontier theory.  
 
As defined, technical inefficiency itU  in setting the cost for producing a given level 
of output at time t  is: 
 
),( βitfit
it
it
zC
CU =    1≥itU          (3.23) 
 
where, for given output z , C  is the actual level of costs, and fC  is the cost 
frontier which is the optimal level of costs expected by the optimal theory of 
production, i.e. it means the best use of inputs in production. Therefore, itU  implies 
the cost in excess of the optimal level, which results from the inefficient use of 
inputs. 
 
In comparison to itU , a variable BI representing the bubble index which is the 
deviation of a market value from the fundamental value at time t  can be stated as: 
 
 )(xP
PBI fit =     1≥itBI          (3.24) 
 
where, given the set of fundamental variables x , P  is the observed actual price of a 
stock and fP  is the frontier value that is entirely determined by the given 
fundamental variables. The value frontier indicates the value that is fundamentally 
recognised by the market from a valuing-technique perception for the fundamental 
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variables. With this perception, no other values can be formed below the fundamental 
level. Any values in excess of the fundamental value or the value frontier are called 
“bubbles”, which result from the overoptimistic expectation to fundamental values, 
speculation and noise trading etc. It is worth noting that BI in (3.24) is defined as 
the percentage deviation of a stock price from the value frontier, which is not the 
absolute value of bubbles B . In this sense, we name BI  the “bubble index” or the 
“estimated bubble”. 
 
The comparison between the technical inefficiency of a firm in cost setting and the 
decision inefficiency in forming a market value enables us to extend the application 
of stochastic frontier technique from estimating the cost inefficiency in production to 
estimating the stock price inefficiency driven by inefficient investment decision. To 
make the cost inefficiency estimable, itU  is redefined as: 
 
 )exp(),()exp( ititfit
it
itit
vzC
C
uU
⋅
== β           (3.25) 
 
The statistical model is written in a logarithmic format: 
  
 ititit
f
itit vuzCC ++= ),(lnln β   with 0≥itu       (3.26) 
 
For the same analogy, the bubble index can be expressed in a statistically estimable 
term as: 
 
 )exp(),()exp( ititfit
it
itit
xP
PbBI
εγ ⋅
==
         (3.27) 
 
or ititit
f
itit bxPP εγ ++= ),(lnln   with 0≥itb        (3.28) 
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itν  in (3.26) and itε  in (3.27) capture the random disturbances in setting the cost 
and the stock price, with normal distribution of ),0(~ 2itit N σν  and ),0(~ 2itit N ϖε  
respectively. 
 
The underlying assumptions to apply (3.26) in estimating the cost inefficiency is that 
the production technology and input factors are identical in the product market for 
every firm, and at least one producer at one time is assumed to be least inefficient, i.e. 
the lowest inputs consumed for a given output relative to others in the market. This 
enables us to interpret itU  as excess costs or inefficiency relative to the best level of 
the industry or market. Thus, itU  is a relative term in (3.26). The same is true for 
underlying assumptions to estimate (3.28), in which the stock valuation technique 
and fundamental information are the common knowledge that is applied in the stock 
market to value the fundamental values of each company. At least there is one stock 
with the lowest price relative to others for the given fundamental variables. This 
lowest stock price is chosen to present the value frontier which is regarded to be 
closest to the fundamental value among all observed stock prices. Therefore, we take 
this value as “the proxy of fundamental value” in the empirical estimation. The above 
assumptions ensure that the property of (3.26) can be applicable to (3.28), which 
allows us to interpret itBI  as the excess value relative to the closest value to the 
fundamental level of a sample. So itBI  is also a relative term in (3.28) which is 
relative to the closest value to the fundamental value perceived technically by the 
market. 
 
If the stock valuation technique becomes common and identical knowledge applied 
for valuing fundamental values of each stock, the fundamental value of each stock 
can then be perceived commonly by the market. Under this circumstance, for the 
given fundamental values, any difference between stock prices reflects the value 
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exaggeration of one relative to another. Hence, in the empirical estimation, the 
deviation of a price relative to the lowest price for given fundamental values can be 
interpreted as “excessive value” which has resulted from an inefficient value decision 
such as over-optimistic expectation or irrationalities etc. In this sense, the lowest 
price of given fundamental values is defined as a “benchmark” to represent the value 
frontier of the sample, which is assumed as a best proxy of the fundamental value. 
 
3.3.3 Summary 
 
The critical review of the stochastic frontier theory enables us to identify the 
comparable structures and properties between two theories of cost frontier and value 
frontier. The similar properties of two theories and the same analogy of underlying 
assumptions applied in both theories lead us to make a breakthrough in extending the 
application of the frontier technique from estimating cost inefficiency to the 
estimation of value inefficiency. This breakthrough is profound in terms of 
developing a bubble estimation method to enrich the current financial research. The 
new development enables us to go beyond the verification of bubbles to estimate the 
magnitudes of bubbles, which facilitates more in-depth research in looking at bubble 
movements rather than merely in testing bubbles.  
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
Ongoing researches in stock bubbles can be divided into two groups: the study of 
rational bubbles and behavioural finance. The school of rational bubbles has been 
trying to verify the existence of bubbles based on diversified assumptions of bubble 
path and advanced econometrical techniques. Meanwhile, as the opposite of EMH, 
behavioural finance argues that deviations of asset prices are brought about by the 
presence of traders who are not fully rational (Thaler, 2005). However, none of them 
have studied bubbles in light of measuring their magnitudes. The school of rational 
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bubbles focus on the statistic test of the presence of bubbles, while the behavioural 
researchers try to model the stock market with individual trading behaviours. 
Standing along with these two schools advocating the stock market inefficiency, we 
put the research attention innovatively on establishing the value frontier framework 
that lays theoretical foundation for bubble measurement.  
 
This chapter contributes to the research of bubbles by refining the theories of 
fundamental valuation and bubble formation within a well-acknowledged stock price 
framework (prices equal to fundamental values plus bubbles). To define the 
fundamental value in the value frontier framework, the heterogeneous investors are 
categorised into three types: optimists, pessimists and investors with the neutral 
expectation. The fundamental value is determined by the fundamental valuation of 
investors with the neutral expectation. The pessimists may always sit out of the 
market under the short sales constraints which keep bubbles non-negative in the long 
run. Meanwhile, based on the views of Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006), the 
formation of bubbles are attributed to three effects: the optimism effect, the 
speculation effect and the effect of other random trading (e.g. noise trading, positive 
feedback trading and manipulation etc.). These arguments provide a sound 
justification for accommodating the stochastic frontier estimation technique to 
financial theories.  
 
However, the value frontier framework is just a conceptual structure which could be 
further improved with the development of financial theories. Particularly, designing a 
more comprehensive fundamental valuation structure in the value frontier model 
should be the focus in the future.  
 
In addition, it is worth mentioning that the value frontier approach proposed in this 
chapter is largely descriptive since the empirical estimation doesn’t need to model 
the formation of bubbles in detail. Although the theoretical description is sufficient 
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for studying the measurement of bubbles in this work, it will show the limitation in 
studying the formation of bubbles. Therefore, a strictly derived model about bubble 
formation is expected to enhance the theoretical foundation of the value frontier 
framework so that a theory of stock market inefficiency underpinning the bubble 
estimation could finally be well established. 
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Chapter 4  Application of the Value Frontier Methodology I: 
Estimation of Market-level Bubbles Around the World  
 
The value frontier model paves a new way to expand bubble studies since it stands to 
reverse a declining trend of research in the recent time due to the methodological 
limitation. This chapter aims to apply the new approach discussed in Chapter 3 to 
empirically identify the magnitude of bubbles in each market at a point in time 
relative to the proxy of fundamental values at the market aggregate level. The 
estimated bubbles enable us to plot their movements over time and compare them 
amongst different markets. This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 4.1 conducts 
the time-variant cross-country estimation of stock bubbles; Section 4.2 pertains to 
comparatively analyze bubble movements across the sample markets; Section 4.3 
snaps some real-world pictures conformable to the bubble results with the purpose of 
enhancing the confidence to the bubble estimation methodology; Section 4.4 deals 
with the summary and conclusions.  
 
4.1 Bubble Estimation for 37 Countries Around the World 
 
4.1.1 Models 
 
In the ongoing bubble research, the stock price is defined under the rational 
expectation framework, which considers that, in an efficient market, the stock price 
should be determined by the following relationship (West, 1987): 
 
( ) tttt IDPkP |11 ++ +Ε⋅=             (4.1) 
 
tP  is the observed real stock price at the beginning of period t; k is the 
instantaneous discount rate, 1)1/(10 <+=< rk , r is the constant expected return; 
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( )⋅Ε  is the market’s expectation. Pt+1 and Dt+1 is the observed real price and real 
dividend paid in the period of t+1 respectively. It represents the information known in 
period t. (4.1) can be specified as:  
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Derived by applying the transversality condition,  
 
∞→n
lim 0| =Ε + tntn IPk              (4.3) 
 
and assuming a constant dividend growth rate of g, (4.2) successively converges to:  
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(4.4) implies that if the transversality condition of (4.3) holds, the observed real stock 
price equals the fundamental value, i.e. rational bubbles are ruled out. Rational 
bubbles ( B& ) are accordingly defined as the deviation of observed real prices (P) 
from fundamental values (P*), which is defined as: 
 
ttt BPP &+=
*
 0>tB&             (4.5) 
 
However, under the new value frontier theory, as discussed in Chapter 3, the bubble 
variable (BI) is modelled as the observed price divided by the value frontier fP
which is a function of a set of fundamental variables x. The mathematical expression 
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is: 
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f
tt BIxfBIPP ×=×= )(   with 1≥tBI          
)(xf
P
BI tt =                (4.6) 
 
If the frontier value fP  is presented by the fundamental variable x, it seems that the 
new bubble definition is consistent with the traditional theory, since (4.6) is a 
nonlinear expression of (4.5). However, it is worth noticing that, although the 
concept of the frontier value is identical to the fundamental value in theory, these two 
values are not exactly the same empirically, since the value frontier is the lowest 
stock price for given fundamental variables x in a sample, and this lowest value is 
regarded empirically as a proxy of the fundamental value, which may or may not 
equal the fundamental value. However, if negative bubbles do not exist in the long 
run, using the lowest-valued stock in a sample should be acceptable as a benchmark 
to represent the fundamental value of the sample. In this sense, it is understood that 
the estimated bubble BI is relative to the sample-defined benchmark of the 
fundamental value. When every observed stock price is compared with the sample 
benchmark or the value frontier, the value deviation relative to the value frontier can 
appear at a range from 0 to a positive number. This relative deviation is the “bubble” 
of a sample, known as the “bubble index” or the “estimated bubble”.   
 
In order to identify the fundamental value empirically at the market level, and 
following antecedent modelling of market-level fundamental values (for example, 
Flood and Garber, 1980; Shiller, 1981; and West, 1987 etc.), the dividend (D), as the 
classical market-level fundamental variable, is defined as the determinant of the 
value frontier fP . Following West (1987), the frontier value can be formulated as the 
present value of expected future dividends (Eq. 4.4). As documented in Section 3.2, 
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the fundamental value is determined by the fundamental valuation of investors with 
the neutral expectation. Thus, fP  can be stated as: 
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and thus (4.6) can be transformed to: 
 
ititit
f
itit BIDBIPP ×=×= α    with 1>itBI      (4.8) 
 
where the value frontier is specified as itfit DP α= . 
       
Taking a logarithmic form, (4.8) becomes: 
 
ititititititit bDBIDP εβαεα +++′=++= lnln)ln(ln      (4.9) 
 
where itit BIb ln=  with ),(~ 2biidNb σµ+  and ),0(~ 2εσε iidN . i denotes an 
individual market and t represents a point of time.     
 
Lovell (1993, p7) suggested that the efficiency estimation could combine dummy 
variables in frontier models, under which the fluctuated time-variant efficiency can 
be estimable without inventing any new frontier technique. Following Lovell’s idea, 
the individual dummy variables (Ai) are liable to attend the model to capture the 
specific effect of a market. Meanwhile, time dummies (Tt) can pick up the global 
shock on a particular year in the estimation. Therefore, the final model is specified 
as:  
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ititittiit bDTAP εβ ++++= lnln           (4.10) 
 
where P is the observed stock price, D is the dividend and A and T represent the 
individual and time dummies. 
 
In order to control the size-effect of markets, the number of shares (N) in each 
sample market is inserted into the model (4.10): 
 
itititittiit bNDTAP εδβ +++++= lnln          (4.11) 
 
Another extension is to divide Pit and Dit by Nit before transforming them into the 
logarithmic form: 
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For the robust test, another model is also taken into account: 
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where Pi2000 and Di2000 are the observed stock price and dividend respectively in 
2000. 
 
For a descriptive convenience, it refers (4.10), (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13) to models A, 
B, C and D respectively in the discussion below. 
 
4.1.2 Data 
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Published empirical researches on the study of bubbles are based on time-series data 
of stock prices and dividends (e.g. Shiller, 1981; West, 1984; Campbell and Shiller, 
1987; Evans, 1991; and McQueen and Thorley, 1994 etc.). The stock price of a 
market is represented by stock price indices including Standard & Poor’s Index, the 
modified Dow-Jones Index, the Hang Seng Index and the Shanghai Stock Index. 20  
Real monthly returns for both equally and value-weighted portfolios of all New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks were also used (see McQueen and Thorley 1994). 
 
In contrast, the main dataset employed by this chapter is a panel pooled by 37 
countries from Datastream Global Indices21. The annual market value (MV) and 
dividend yield (DY) data from 1983 to 2002 are employed.22 The dividend (D) is 
worked out by the product of the market value and the dividend yield. This is an 
unbalanced panel set of 624 observations, since missing data exist in some markets 
uncoordinatedly. In order to control the effect arising from the different number of 
constituents amongst markets, the annual constituent number of each index (N) has 
been obtained. In addition, the annual data of the price index (PI), price/earning ratio 
(PE) and price/dividend ratio (PD) are also acquired to estimate the relationship 
between them and the estimated bubbles (BI). 
   
4.1.3 Empirical Estimation and Results 
 
In this section, with the assumption that bubbles exist generally, the stochastic cost 
frontier technique is applied in the estimation, which enables us to estimate bubbles 
and compare them across markets.  
 
                                                       
20
 The observed prices and dividends from Standard & Poor’s index are frequently adopted by researchers, such 
as Shiller (1981), West (1987), Froot and Obstfeld (1991), and Donaldson and Kamstra (1996). Flood and 
Hodrick (1986) developed a new empirical analysis using S&P and the modified Dow Jones Index respectively.  
21
 See Appendix 4.1 for the definition of Datastream Global Indices data. 
22
 In order to enlarge the dataset to achieve the unit root test in time series, the data were updated to the period of 
1965 to 2005. However, only model A was re-examined by the expanded dataset and the major bubble estimation 
remains unchanged, since it’s nothing more than a repetition if the new results are consistent with the initial ones. 
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Before moving into the estimation of bubbles, it is interesting to highlight some 
arguments made by previous studies, such as Diba and Grossman (1988b), Hamilton 
and Whiteman (1985) and Campbell and Shiller (1987). On the basis of a 
residual-based unit root test between stock prices and dividend payments, one 
argument is that the evidence that the first differences of stock prices are stationary 
and/or stock prices are co-integrated with dividends would be the evidence against 
the existence of rational bubbles. However, the failure of obtaining this evidence 
does not mean the existence of rational bubbles, since the non co-integration between 
stock prices and dividends could result from the non-stationarity of unobservable 
fundamental variables, such as the consideration of the future tax treatment of the 
dividend income.  
 
However, in our view, the evidence of co-integrated stock prices and dividends, 
which supports the view for the non-existence of bubbles, is only a result of the 
stationary combined error which is composed of the bubble and the statistical 
residual. Furthermore, the evidence on co-integration between dividends and stock 
prices is questionable. 
 
To verify our viewpoint, this study repeats the co-integration test using our new 
sample data. We randomly selected six markets (Australia, Hong Kong, the 
Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to apply the 
unit root test in a time series dataset.23 Before the test, in order to reduce the bias 
resulting from the accumulated market value (MV) and dividend data (D), two 
transformations were made to the data: the relative ratio with the fixed base (dMV 
and dD) and the logarithmic transformation (LMV and LD). The ADF test was 
applied for the study of variable stationarity, and the Augmented Engle-Granger test 
(Engle and Granger, 1987) was utilised for the co-integration analysis.  
                                                       
23
 In order to diversify, three countries were chosen with values of the estimated bubble of I(0), and another three 
with values of the estimated bubble of I(1). The results of the stationary test for the estimated bubble are shown in 
Table 4.4 B and C. 
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The results of the co-integration tests of bubbles are shown in Table 4.1, where six 
markets (Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom 
and the United States) are examined. In order to jointly analyse three strategies 
achieving the unit root test which are the regression with intercept, with intercept and 
trend, or with neither an intercept nor a time trend, these three strategies are applied 
to all tests. Argued by Elder and Kennedy (2001), all the strategy tests proposed by 
some experts, such as Perron (1988), Dolado, Jenkinson, and Sosvilla-Rivero (1990), 
Holden and Perman (1994), Enders (1995) and Ayat and Burridge (2000), are more 
complicated than they need to be. Therefore, no attempt is made here to test 
strategies. Instead, the simple graph plots of the data and the coefficient tests for the 
time trend and the intercept give the justification to the strategy. Meanwhile, as 
Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) mentioned, the strategy without the intercept is 
“extremely restrictive, so much so that it is hard to imagine ever using it with 
economic time series”. So, the results from the tests without trend and intercept are 
rarely analysed unless the data show that the consideration is necessary.   
 
The data show that among four variables, dMV, dD, LMV and LD, there are obvious 
trends in dMV and dD, and their first differences normally diminish the trend. 
Therefore, in stationary tests, the trend is likely to be considered at the level, not at 
the first difference for dMV and dD. Withstanding this, however, one should still 
keep in mind that, as explained by Thomas (1997), the trend does not always 
disappear after the first difference. As to LMV and LD, the trend is ignored at the 
level, since conducting the logarithmic form has already reduced the trend of the data. 
Only the significant coefficients of the trend or the intercept become the evidence of 
supporting the trend or intercept strategy. Based on the above principles, the 
strategies chosen are highlighted in bold in Table 4.1. The statistics of the stationary 
tests for the level variables cannot reject the unit root, but reject it at the first 
difference, i.e. dMV, dD, LMV and LD in these six markets are stationary to the first 
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order (I(1)) but not stationary at the level. 
 
[Table 4.1 is about here] 
 
Table 4.1 also shows the results from residual-based co-integration tests. 
Engle-Granger (1987) method is applied. No co-integration is concluded in South 
Africa and the United States, and the results among the other four markets are mixed 
(in Australia, Hong Kong, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the results are 
inconsistent between logarithmic model with LMV LD and the difference model with 
dMV dD). This inconsistency can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, the 
co-integration technique itself is inconclusive and the development of this technique 
is still a big area of research. Secondly, Campbell and Shiller’s argument is plausible. 
 
From the above mixed results, it is easy to see that the tests following Campbell and 
Shiller’s argument seems have nothing in relation to the support of EMH, in that the 
co-integration technique itself is still plausible to some extent. In addition, it is worth 
noting that the unobserved variables considered as the reason for no co-integration in 
their work are rather the reason of inflating bubbles than the elements of enriching 
the fundamental values. Furthermore, from the standpoint of econometrics, the 
co-integration between share prices and dividends only means a long-term 
relationship between these two variables, not evidence of the non-existence of 
bubbles, since bubbles may be stationary and mixed in the stationary residual set, so 
that it is weak to discuss the existence of bubbles on the basis of the co-integration 
test between stock prices and dividends.  
 
In summary, the blurry results in our tests verify that the previous co-integration test 
of bubbles is questionable. The evidence of co-integration of stock prices and 
dividends does not prove the non-existence of bubbles, since the bubble is a part of 
the residual and exists persistently. It can be stable over time so as to be stationary as 
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well.24 
 
Having identified the discrepancies in the co-integration test of bubbles by repeating 
the former test for our sample, we turn to the bubble measurement using the frontier 
estimation technique, which can help to prove the existence of bubbles as well as to 
identify the magnitudes of bubbles. Hausman’s specification test has been applied to 
prove that the fixed effects model is a better choice to ensure the optimal model for 
the sample data. In Table 4.2, the results of the Hausman test on models A, B, C and 
D significantly reject the null hypothesis of the random effect panel, i.e. the data 
have been verified to fit the fixed effects better than the random effects.  
 
[Table 4.2 is about here] 
 
After checking qualification of models, the estimations are conducted using the 
models A, B, C and D respectively. The parameters estimated from these four models 
are listed in Table 4.2. The estimated bubble itBI  is also measured out according to 
models A, B, C and D using the stochastic cost frontier technique, which provides a 
common ground for the later analysis. However, it’s still necessary to bear in mind 
the real meaning of the estimated bubble BI, which is the percentage deviation of the 
observed price from the value frontier, and it is a relative measure of bubbles. 
 
After plotting the values of itBI  derived from these four models, the four lines are 
perfectly co-moving with each other in all the sample markets (Figure 4.1), which 
shows that bubble results from models A, B, C and D are consistent. The average 
values of the estimated bubble are listed in Table 4.3. 
 
[Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1 are about here] 
                                                       
24
 Froot and Obstfeld (1991) stressed that for a given level of exogenous fundamentals, the bubble will remain 
constant over time. They name it the ‘intrinsic bubble’.  
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However, one may ask that, in the stock market analysis, does the bubble variable 
itBI  contain information which other variables cannot capture, such as price/earning 
ratio (PE) and price/dividend ratio (PD)? Furthermore, is it possible that the bubble 
variable is just a duplication of the price tendency? To answer these questions, the 
long-term and short-term relationship between the estimated bubble and PE, the 
estimated bubble and PD, and the estimated bubble and the price index PI have been 
investigated. The three groups of co-integration tests are employed respectively to 
examine their long-term relationship. Before testing the co-integration, stationary 
tests for these variables are conducted for 17 markets.25 The short-run relation can 
be tested by running three OLS regressions between the first difference of BI and the 
first difference of PI, PE and PD respectively. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the results from both the stationary and co-integration tests. The 
stationary tests on the panel data show that estimated bubbles are I(0) (Table 4.4A). 
The result may be inconclusive because of the strict precondition of cross-sectional 
independence imposed by the recent developed panel unit root testing technique. 
Thus, a major concern has been put on the results from the time-series tests. The 
values of the bubble variable in 17 markets that have time-series data over 33 years 
have been examined. Table 4.4 B and C respectively show the markets with the 
estimated bubbles of I(0) and of I(1). Only five out of the 17 markets show the 
estimated bubbles of I(1), and these are Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands 
and the United States. Since the test on the bubble variable shows I(1) in five 
markets, the stationary tests for PI, PE and PD are pursued only for these five 
markets. Table 4.4 D, E and F reveal that these three variables are non-stationary at 
level, but stationary in the first difference.  
 
                                                       
25
 The markets containing more than 33 years’ data are chosen (only the U.K. market embraces 41 years’ data in 
the sample. The data for the rest of chosen markets are all from 1973 to 2005). 
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[Table 4.4 is about here] 
 
The statistics exhibited in Table 4.4 G consistently fail to reject the null of no 
co-integration except for one number highlighted in bold in the table, which brings 
the conclusion that the estimated bubble has no long-term relationship with PI, PE 
and PD.  
 
In Table 4.5, the results from the short-term study are different. The results from the 
panel data regression demonstrate the significant relation between BI and PI, PE or 
PD in the short run. However, the results from the time-series-based regression show 
that the estimated bubble significantly correlated with PI in all of these five markets, 
but the significant correlation between BI and PE or PD are only shown in the 
Netherlands and the United Sates. 
 
[Table 4.5 is about here] 
 
From the above empirical analysis about the relationship between the estimated 
bubbles and PI, PE and PD, we can conclude that there is certainly a short-term 
correlated relationship to some extent, but the existence of a long-term relation is not 
supported by our empirical evidence.  
 
It is also worth stressing that the evidence of short-term correlation between prices 
and estimated bubbles validates the conjecture of overreacting investors. When good 
news comes out, the investors’ over-optimistic behaviours cause the price to climb 
sharply. The gap between the fundamental value and the real price is widened out as 
the real price fluctuates more heavily than the fundamental value. When bad news is 
exposed, over-pessimistic investors drag down the price hastily. The decreasing rate 
of the observed price is much higher than the fading of fundamental values, so that 
the bubbles are diminishing. Thus, it can be seen that the bubble path and the price 
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track probably run in the same direction if all news is known by investors. In the long 
run, accumulatively, the different magnitudes of overreaction can lead the two lines 
to move separately. Moreover, the effect of shocks from irrationality in the long run 
can be significant. Therefore, not only does the non-cointegration in the long run 
show the effect of uncertainty on investors’ decisions, but also implies the existence 
of significant irrationality. 
 
Having verified the unique feature of the estimated bubbles, the values of the 
estimated bubble in 37 markets are plotted against the sample average (Figure 4.2). 
Furthermore, based on the classification of the World Bank Indicator (WDI), the 
investigation about the economic and the regional variability of bubbles is carried out 
by examining the mean and variance of estimated bubbles for each year (figures 4.3 
and 4.4). With the bubble plots, additional attention has been drawn on some real 
world occurrences so as to support the legitimacy of the estimated bubbles specified 
by the value frontier theory. These will be detailed in sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
4.2 Examinations of Estimated Bubbles 
  
4.2.1 Interpretation of the Average Movement of Estimated Bubbles 
 
Table 4.6 shows the average value of the market price, dividend and the estimated 
bubble over the period of 1994 to 2002. The average values of the estimated bubble 
BI fluctuate between 1.121 and 1.125. As documented in Section 4.1.3, the estimated 
bubble BI measures the percentage deviation of the observed price from the value 
frontier, and it is a relative measure of bubbles. Thus, these values of BI in Table 4.6 
signify an approximate 12 per cent deviation of stock prices from fundamental values 
on average among sample markets, i.e. the worldwide average levels of bubbles over 
the period of 1994 to 2002 are persistently about 12 per cent higher than fundamental 
values.  
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[Table 4.6 is about here] 
 
Obviously, the average levels of bubbles do not change substantially over time, and 
they are far more stable than the estimated bubble of each individual market, which 
can be detected from Figure 4.2. This finding may be explained by the behaviour of 
the cross-market arbitrage. Bubbles of a market are stimulated by a huge capital 
inflow. The soaring bubble can no doubt produce a higher excess return so attracting 
arbitrageurs to alter their positions from the market with a lower return to this high 
bubble market. Certainly, the inflow of more funds will further enrich the soaring 
bubble of this market, which, however, is finally achieved by sacrificing the market 
value of other markets. Overall, the limited supply of funds will, on average, produce 
a stable level of stock bubbles worldwide, since the climbing bubbles in one market 
can always be offset by the falling bubbles in another market. 
 
[Figure 4.2 is about here]  
 
This finding can be further analyzed by the “sustainable bubble” documented by 
Binswanger (1999). He proposed that stock bubbles exist persistently, since 
fundamental values of stocks are uncertain. Moreover, a “sustainable bubble” can 
positively facilitate the growth of an economy, and the bubble is “sustainable” (no 
crash happens in a sudden) in a long run only if its movements are consistent with 
real economic activities. This implies that a “healthy” stock market, which benefits 
the economy, is expected to move with the real economy. To put this simply, bubbles 
which move with the real economy can facilitate economic growth. From Table 4.6, 
it is easy to see that although bubbles remain at 12% over the period of 1994 to 2002 
on average, it is argued that the bubble is not sustainable, since the movement of the 
sample average bubble is not consistent with the movement of GDP growth rates of 
both the sample average and the world, which, in the case of Binswanger (1999), 
- 111 -  
implies that the worldwide stock markets don’t function well on average in terms of 
facilitating economic growth, and average bubbles worldwide over the period of 
1994 to 2002 are not “sustainable”, though their fluctuation is very light.  
 
4.2.2 Bubble Movements in 37 Countries 
 
In this section, estimated bubbles in 37 countries over the period of 1994 to 2002 are 
plotted.26 First, the arithmetic average value of BI over the sample for every 
particular year is calculated and the comparison is conducted between each country’s 
BI and this average value. The bubble movements over time in every country are 
exhibited in Figure 4.2. 
 
Next, with the graphs in hand, the 37 countries are classified as rising, falling, 
fluctuating, high-level and low-level bubble countries according to their movement 
paths of bubbles between the periods of 1994 and 2002.  
 
The countries where the bubble levels are higher in most years than the average ones 
are put into the group of high-level bubble countries, and those with bubbles lower 
than the average make up the group of low-level bubble countries.  
 
The bubble levels of Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 
maintain under the average line in the observing period. Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Venezuela, Taiwan, Australia and Finland perform in the low bubble level most of 
the time, and only show the temperate sharp soar in certain years. Also, among the 
low-level bubble countries, European countries show similar patterns which are 
nearly in accordance with the sample average movement. By contrast, Hong Kong, 
Mexico, Switzerland and Thailand can be put into the high-level bubble group, where 
the bubbles generally move above the sample mean, though the short-term sudden 
                                                       
26
 Since no missing data exist from 1994 to 2002, only nine years’ results are examined. 
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breakthrough may appear in the graphs.  
 
Over the period of 1994 to 2002, markets that experience a switch from a low level 
to a high level of bubbles relative to the average are selected into a bubble rising 
group, which consists of Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Turkey, U.S, 
Norway and the Chinese B&H-share markets27. Among them, bubbles in U.S. show 
extremely obvious upward movements. Despite a gentle sway downward after the 
year 2000, the upward bubble path in Norway becomes the leading trend. The 
countries with the contrary bubble tendencies compose a bubble falling group which 
contains Argentina, Austria, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Africa and the Netherlands. It is worth noting that bubbles in the Netherlands 
decrease obviously in the early years, but rebound from 2000 and break through the 
average level in 2002. In addition, the bubbles of most East Asian countries in the 
sample have similar dropping tendencies. They all touch the bottom in 1998, which 
is obviously ascribed to the Asian Financial Crisis. 
 
Bubbles in South Korea, Portugal and Sweden fluctuate heavily, from which no trend 
can be discerned.  
 
4.2.3 Bubbles and Economic Conditions 
 
Having interpreted the worldwide average movements of the estimated bubbles in 
link with the global economic performance, the study goes further at a deeper level to 
verify the conjecture that the different levels of bubbles may be associated with 
                                                       
27
 The Chinese stock market is a segmented market. The A-share market is its main body which has 94% of total 
market values. Thus, the bubble results from the B&H-share sample hardly represent the bubble tendency of the 
whole Chinese stock market. However, the data of Chinese A-share wasn’t employed by Datastream Global 
Indices when we empirically computed the bubble index at market level. In our recent amendments, this problem 
is considered and solved by duplicating a market level regression while the data of A-share are available in the 
recently renewed Datastream Global Indices. The bubble tendencies of A-share and B&H-share from the new 
estimation can be viewed in Figure 4.4-1. These two figures provide a direct comparison of bubble movements 
between the A-share market and the B&H-share market, which in turn enables us to link the new bubble result of 
A-share market to the previous bubble results in Figure 4.2. The Chinese stock market and its bubble movements 
will be further analysed and examined in detail in 
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levels of economies or regions. Thus, what should be investigated next are the 
variability of bubbles in various economies and regions.  
 
According to the classification by the World Bank, 36 countries are classified by 
incomes and regions, as middle-income and high-income economies, and as East 
Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, and America.28 The average values and 
the variances of BI in each category per year from 1994 to 2002 are plotted and 
shown in Figure 4.3 and 4.4.  
 
[Figure 4.3 and 4.4 are about here] 
 
The first light shown is the comparisons between the high-income and 
middle-income countries in Figure 4.3. Binswanger (1999) documented that, in the 
long run, the development of a real economy can carry stock bubbles persistently, 
since the over-optimistic expectation is supported by the sustainable economic 
growth. Thus, it is expected that, in the long run, the more robust an economic 
growth is, the more likely stock bubbles are higher. The evidence of this argument 
can be detected in Figure 4.3, in which the average levels of bubbles in 
middle-income countries are higher than the high-income ones over the period of 
1994 to 1997. The gap between them has been shrinking since 1997. In fact, after a 
sudden increase and drop appeared respectively in middle-income and high-income 
countries in 1998, bubbles in these two groups of countries moved closer and finally 
overlapped each other in 2000. The soaring bubble of middle-income countries 
before 1997 is precisely correlated with the robust growth of some Asian countries in 
the first half of the 1990s, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea. 
The conversion after that is undoubtedly attributed to the Southeast Asian crisis 
which gave rise to a negative economic growth, on average, in middle-income 
                                                       
28
 See Appendix 4.3 for details. Taiwan is not included in the country classification of the World Bank. Since 
only China in the sample is classified into the low-income group, only the comparison between the 
middle-income and high-income countries is considered. 
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countries in 1998. The data in Table 4.7 clearly show that the economic decline 
reduced investors’ confidence so as to drag down the stock price, but didn’t diminish 
the dividend payment. As a result, after the crisis, the average value of estimated 
bubbles in middle-income countries landed on a level close to the bubble in 
high-income countries. 
 
[Table 4.7 is about here] 
 
Figure 4.3 also shows that bubbles’ variances in high-income countries are generally 
lower than the middle-income economies, which means that the countries contained 
in the middle-income category are more diversified in terms of bubbles than in the 
high-income countries. This reasonably shows a common sense that the developed 
markets are more integrated in terms of economic development. This opinion can 
also be proved by the variance of the GDP growth rate shown in Table 4.8, in which 
the variances of the GDP growth rate in high-income countries are far less than in 
middle-income countries. However, the increased variances of bubbles between 1997 
and 2000 signal the weakening and instable trend of this integration in high-income 
countries during this period of time, which is once again in accordance with the 
increasing variance of GDP growth rate in high-income countries over the period of 
1997 to 2000. 
 
[Table 4.8 is about here] 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the regional comparisons of bubbles in the period between 1994 
and 2002. The figure of bubble mean exhibits a bubble converging tendency among 
these three regions. The variances in East Asia may be considered regularly wavy 
from 1992 to 2002. Apart from the extreme behaviour of 1997, the bubble 
diversification of American countries is quite little. Compared with the other two 
areas above, it appears relatively stable among European countries, though from 
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1999 to 2002, a sudden heave becomes evident. Although the above characters are 
carefully drawn out by the regional comparative study, one can claim that bubbles do 
not seem to behave regionally. At least, the regional differences among countries 
produce lower variation in bubbles in comparison with the income level, which 
further verifies the close relationship between bubbles and real economies.  
 
Being aware of the relationship between bubbles and economies, one may expect to 
gain more support for the estimated bubble from the real world. In other words, the 
new bubble theory and its estimation methodology will be more convincible if the 
bubble performances pictured by the estimated bubble are conformable to the real 
world economic performance. Therefore, two real events are discussed in the section 
below.  
 
4.3 Bubbles and the Expectation of Economic Conditions: Case Study of Some 
Countries 
 
In the study of bubbles, it is expected that investors’ expectations are influenced by 
real economic events. Good news will make investors over-optimistic and bad news 
will lead them to be over-pessimistic. Therefore, intuitively, bubbles should be 
moving in accordance with changes in the expectation of economic conditions.  
 
To check this argument, in this section the bubble movements of some countries are 
discussed in connection with the changes in the expectation of their economic 
conditions in the late nineties, such as the dot-com bubbles in United States and the 
financial crisis in East Asia. The coherence between bubble movements and 
economic shocks are expected in our analysis below.  
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4.3.1 “Bull” of the 1990s in the United States 
 
In his book, Mahar (2003) documented the bull market in the United States during 
much of the 1990s, especially between 1998 and 2000, when the technology stocks 
were “fantastically expensive”, which is comprehensively accepted as the “new 
economy”. However, between 2000 and 2002, Americans suffered a decline in their 
stock market investments totalling $4.5 trillion on the New York Stock Exchange 
and NASDAQ alone.29 In fact, some financial analysts already claimed that share 
prices no longer reflected fundamental values. In 1997, Dudack, the chief market 
strategist at UBS Warburg, warned that the equity market was fairly valued until 
October 1996. Warren Buffett also stated in 2000 that the values of companies had 
been destroyed, not created.30  
Between 1997 and 2000, the high expectation of investors were boosted by the “New 
Economy” in which the technology innovation gave rise to a hasty increase of 
productivity, though the profitability of companies was diminished due to the 
problem of over-capacity. 
After the crash of the “New Economy” in 2000, the American economy ran in a 
slack manner. An economic report in 2003 from a U.S. senator, Dianne Feinstein, 
mentioned that the income of families in the middle of the income distribution 
declined in 2001 for the first time in a decade by 2.2 per cent. The median California 
family’s income fell by nearly $900 in 2001, and was flat in most other states in 2002. 
The number of unemployed workers increased from 5.7 million at the end of 2000 to 
more than 8.3 million, while the average length of time that people are without work 
increased to 18 weeks. Only 15 per cent of questionnaire respondents described 
economic conditions as “good.”31 Brenner (2002) reported that the problem of 
over-capacity in the era of the American “New Economy” chased  manufacturing 
                                                       
29
 Source: http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/yourmoney/a2003-06-25-timetogetback.html. 
30
 Source: Marhar (2003). 
31
 The report can be found in the website of http://feinstein.senate.gov/booklets/Nations_Econ_Book.pdf. 
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profit rates downward by 20 per cent between 1997 and 2000, and the lower 
productivity growth after the crash further squeezed the profitability of American 
manufacturing. Between the first half of 2000 and the first half of 2001, the fall of 
profits in manufacturing accounted for about 46 per cent. It was one disaster after 
another, and in 2001, after the “911-World Trade Center Attack”, people’s 
confidence in the American economy was almost scrubbed up. Without investors’ 
positive prospect of stock returns, the stock bubble is hardly sustainable. 
The effects of these changes in the expectation of economic conditions to the U.S. 
stock market were also addressed by Louis Rukeyser, an experienced American 
financial commentator, in 2003. He attributed the bear market of the early 2000s in 
the U.S. to several events, such as the bursting of the internet bubble with its 
"ludicrous" stock prices, the economic recession and the events of 9/11, among 
which the attack of 9/11 was believed to have the most lasting effect.32  
As shown in Figure 4.2, there was a smooth and stable increase in the bubble level of 
the United States in the 1990s. In 1997, the bubble level broke through the sample 
average line, hit its peak in 2000 and dropped after that. In this case, the bubble 
results match the real event. 
 
4.3.2 Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia 
 
Most analysts agree that the most serious economic crisis since the Second World 
War was the economic burst in Thailand from the period of 1997 to 1999. Many 
researchers, such as Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Flood and Marion (1999), 
Krugman (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Sachs, 
Tornell and Velasco (1996), have documented the causes and impact of this crisis.  
 
Indonesia and South Korea were severely affected. In addition, the “storm” also 
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 See http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/yourmoney/a2003-06-25-timetogetback.html. 
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spread to Hong Kong, Malaysia and Philippines. Although the rest of the economies 
in this region, such as China, India, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan, were relatively 
untouched by the crisis, they all went through their own economic recession at the 
end of 1990s.  
 
The era of crisis has reverberated through the bubble graphs in Figure 4.2. Bubbles in 
most of the relevant markets experienced a sudden crash between 1997 and 1998, 
and obtained the rebound in 1999.33 In order to have a deeper insight into the real 
occurrences, the three most severely affected countries - Thailand, South Korea and 
Indonesia - are discussed below. 
 
Thailand 
Thailand experienced high economic growth of 10% per year, on average, from 1987 
to 1995 (Fischer, 1998). In 1995, goods and wages in the real estate and financial 
sectors were highly overvalued, which seems to be a bubble waiting to burst 
(Bhaopichitr, 1997). Meanwhile, the stock price climbed to an extreme point. From 
then on, a shadow stealthily moved over what had been long praised as the “Asian 
Miracle”. In 1996, some signs of a weakening economy turned up. The total 
outstanding external debt of this year reached 94.3 billion US dollars (50.9% of 
GDP), and it was only 28.8 billion US dollars (33.8% of GDP) in 1990 (Sussangkarn, 
1998). In addition, some of Thailand’s newly established financial companies went 
bankrupt due to the accumulated large quantities of bad loans (Lai, 2000). 
Furthermore, Thailand’s government abandoned the currency policy of a dollar peg 
in order to promote exports when the US dollar appreciated. In 1997, with 
speculative attacks on the baht, the Thai government was forced to devaluate the baht, 
                                                       
33
 China uniquely shows a contrary trend. Because of the inconvertibility of Chinese currency, the shares counted 
for the Chinese stock market in Datastream Global Indices are B-share and H-share which are traded in US 
dollars or Hong Kong dollars. However, the A-share traded in Chinese Yuan, which accounts for the majority of 
the Chinese stock market (more than 90% of the total numbers of shares are A-share), is excluded from the data. 
Thus, the results here do not reflect the Chinese stock market bubble. The detailed investigation to Chinese stock 
market will be conducted in Chapter 7 by taking the A-share into account. 
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which almost drained its foreign reserves (Sussangkarn, 1998). These attacks on 
Thai’s stock market shook the confidence of its investors in Thai’s economy and 
bubbles sustained by investors’ expectations finally collapsed. Two months later, its 
stock market dropped 10 per cent in a week and the crash spread over Southeast Asia. 
The financial crisis began. In the first month of 1998, a new round of financial 
turmoil swept the stock market again and the plunge continued. The economy of 
Thailand only began recovery and showed signs of positive growth in 1999.34 
 
According to the course of the Thai economic crisis, the bubble path in the Thai 
stock market between the periods of 1995 and 1999 is examined. From Figure 4.2, 
one can clearly see the bubble fluctuation between 1995 and 1999. In 1995, bubbles 
reached a peak and then started to fall. In 1997, the bubble level fell below the 
average level of sample countries and landed at the bottom in 1998. A rebound 
emerged after 1998. In 1999, the bubble rushed to a new peak.  
 
South Korea 
In South Korea, despite the sound macroeconomics, the East Asian Crisis worsened 
the credit rating of South Korea in 1997, which eventually led to the bankruptcy of 
some Korean conglomerates, the so-called chaebols, such as Hanbo Iron and Steel, 
Kia Motor, Jinro, and Haitai (Koo and Kiser, 2001). After that, with extensive 
financial reforms, its economy bounced back quickly from the crisis, and won a 
growth rate of 10% in 1999 and 9% in 2000.35 However, the plaudits to the 
superficial recovery were immediately shadowed by the crash in the New York 
Exchange in 2000. Kirk (2000) mentioned that the decline in share prices on the New 
York Stock Exchange undermined the confidence in South Korea’s stock market. The 
shock from abroad once again drew investors’ attention to the fragile companies 
which hadn’t recovered from the crisis of 1997-98. Koo and Kiser (2001) addressed 
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 See Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/asian_financial_crisis. 
35
 Source: Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/asian_financial_crisis. 
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that in 1999; 18 of the 27 largest chaebols had financial expenses that exceeded 
operating profits and seven of those had not been profitable for three years. Thus, 
uncertainties clouded the Korean stock market soon after the short boom of 1999. 
 
In Figure 4.2, the bubble plot clearly pictures the economic shakes of South Korea at 
the end of 1990s. After the early 1990s, the bubble in the Korean stock market had 
persistently moved down until the crisis finally burst out, which suggests that a 
pessimistic expectation was already formed in this market earlier than the crisis. The 
bubble showed an extensive rebound in 1999, but soon after, it dropped back again in 
2000 due to the uncertainties in both the domestic market and abroad.      
 
Indonesia 
Following Thailand, Indonesia was entangled with the crisis as a result of a 
free-floating exchange rate arrangement in August 1997. The undermined confidence 
in the East Asian finance and economy led to the rupiah crash which brought the 
hyperinflation to erode the fundamental value of the economy (Radelet and Sachs, 
1998). Although the economy touched the bottom in mid-1999, the new political 
pattern and the structural economic reform targets successfully brought the 
confidence back.36  
 
However, unlike Thailand and South Korea which already underwent the bearish 
situation before the crisis, the bubble of Indonesia seemed to be carrying an 
optimistic economy before 1997. Radelet and Sachs (1998) reported that over the 
period of 1990 to 1996, Indonesia’s current account deficit remained basically 
unchanged relative to the earlier time when most Southeast Asian countries suffered 
from the increasing deficits. There was no sign of a crisis and the international credit 
ratings remained high and positive after they had cut back the loans to Thailand and 
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 See Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/asian_financial_crisis. 
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Korea in the early part of 1997. 
 
In Figure 4.2, the sudden crisis of Indonesia is reflected by the sharp drop of bubbles 
between 1997 and 1998, and a slight recovery in 1999 is shown, which is consistent 
with the real achievement of the new political and economic strategies which 
continued to take effect afterwards.  
 
The case discussions above illustrate that bubbles are influenced by changes in the 
expectation of economic conditions. Meanwhile, the consistent movement between 
the estimated bubbles and the well-known bubble events highlights a primary success 
of our new methodology of bubble measurement.  
 
4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
There are numerous ways of conducting empirical tests on bubbles which are 
time-series-based. However, the current studies do not estimate magnitudes of 
bubbles directly. This limitation calls for an alternative research on bubbles which is 
an aim of our study in this chapter.  
 
In this chapter, based on the theoretical discussion of the value frontier methodology 
in Chapter 3, the estimation technique of the stochastic cost frontier is applied to 
estimate the bubbles of each market relative to the value frontier. By innovatively 
applying the technique of stochastic frontier estimation to the bubble estimation, the 
comparative studies in bubble movements across countries become feasible. 
 
However, some considerable limitations of this chapter are highlighted as follows. 
Firstly, the fundamental valuation structure utilised in the market level estimation is a 
well-acknowledged basic framework, in which dividends are the only fundamental 
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variable to capture the fundamental value. It is expected that a more comprehensive 
fundamental valuation structure could be developed in the future to improve the 
market level model. Secondly, a recent progress on the frontier estimation technique 
provides a way to correct the heteroskedasticity of the inefficiency term and the 
statistical error as the heteroskedasticity problem can affect the parameters as well as 
the inefficiency term (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Apparently, it is a potential 
technique problem which should be handled in the future estimation. In addition, 
another technique matter also needs to be considered. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
documented that the maximum likelihood estimates of all parameters and the 
rankings of the inefficiency term tend to be consistent when a sample is large enough. 
Thus, it is worth trying the estimation in a bigger sample so as to further validate the 
bubble results.  
 
Being aware of the above limitation in the market level estimation, however, the 
success of estimating the bubble index could open a new path for academic research 
in finance. Specifically, the bubble index can help us to learn about the relationship 
between the real economy and bubbles (for example: the “stock bubble-inflation 
relation”), which will be investigated thoroughly in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 4.1: Definition of Variables
 
Dividend Yield (DY) 
Dividend yield is derived by
and expressing it as a percentage of the total market value for the constituents of that 
market. This provides an average of the individual yields of the constituents 
weighted by market value. It is ca
 
Where: 
 =aggregate dividend yield on day t
 =number of shares in issue on day t
 n = number of constituents in index
 
Market Value (MV) 
These market values are calculated from the constituents of the sector/market lists. 
Index market value on Datastream is the sum of share price multiplied by the number 
of ordinary shares in issue for each index constituent. 
For equity indices, the calculation used is:
 
Where: 
 =number of shares in issue on day t
 =unadjusted share price on day t
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 calculating the total amount of dividend for a market 
lculated as follows:  
;  =dividend per share on day t 
;  = unadjusted share price on day t
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Appendix 4.2: Stochastic Frontier Estimation: Normal-Truncated Normal 
Distribution 37  
 
The normal-truncated normal formulation was introduced by Stevenson (1980). 
Under the assumption of normal-truncated normal distribution, the stochastic 
production frontier model can be describe 
 
0>−++= uuxy νβα
           (1) 
(i) ν  ~ iid ( )2,0 νσΝ  
(ii) u ~ iid ( )2, µσµ+Ν  
(iii) u and ν  are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors. 
where ν  is the two-sided “noise” component, and u  is the nonnegative technical 
inefficiency component, of the error term.    
 
A maximum likelihood method is used to estimate three parameters: 
uσ , νσ  and µ . 
There is a two-step procedure, in which the first step involves the use of OLS to 
estimate the slope parameters, and the second step involves the use of maximum 
likelihood to estimate the intercept parameters and the variances of the two error 
components. The distributional assumption is used in the maximum likelihood 
estimation, which is the second step of the two-step procedure. 
 
The truncated normal distribution assumed for u  generalizes the one-parameter half 
normal distribution, by allowing the normal distribution, which is truncated below at 
zero, to have a non zero mode.  
 
The density function of ν  is 
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 Appendix II is abstracted from “Stochastic Frontier Analysis” by Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000 
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The truncated normal density function for 0≥u is given by 
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where µ  is the mode of the normal distribution, which is truncated below at zero, 
and ( )⋅Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Thus ( )uf  is the 
density of a normally distributed variable with possibly non zero mean µ , truncated 
below at zero.  
 
The joint density function of u  and ν  is the product of their individual density 
functions, and can be written 
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The joint density of u  and ε  is 
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where ε  is the composed error, which is u−ν  
 
The marginal density of ε  is  
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where ( ) 2/122 νσσσ += u , νσσλ /u=  , and ( )⋅φ  is the standard normal density 
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function. 
 
( )εf  is asymmetrically distributed, with mean and variance 
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respectively, where ( )[ ] 1/ −Φ= ua σµ  
 
The log likelihood function for a sample of I is 
 =Lln constant
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where 21/ λλσσ +=u . The log likelihood function can be maximized with respect 
to the parameters to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of all of the parameters. 
 
The conditional distribution ( )εuf  is given by 
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( )εuf
 is distributed as ( )2
*
,
~ σµi+Ν , where ( ) 222 /~ σµσεσµ ν+−= iui  and 
2222
*
/σσσσ νu= . Thus either the mean or the mode of ( )εuf  can be used to 
estimate the technical efficiency, and we have 
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and 
- 127 -  
 ( )
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if
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Point estimates of the technical efficiency of each producer can be obtained by 
substituting either ( )iiu εΕ  or ( )iiu εΜ  into following equation 
 
{ }( )iiuTE ε−Ε= exp  
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Appendix 4.3:  Country Code 
 
Countries Codes 
Argentina AR 
Australia AU 
Austria OE 
Belgium BG 
Canada CN 
Chile CL 
China CH 
Denmark DK 
Finland FN 
France FR 
Germany BD 
Greece GR 
Hong Kong HK 
Indonesia ID 
Ireland IR 
Italy IT 
Japan JP 
Korea KO 
Malaysia MY 
Mexico MX 
Netherlands NL 
New Zealand NZ 
Norway NW 
Philippines PH 
Poland PO 
Portugal PT 
Singapore SG 
South Africa SA 
Spain ES 
Sweden SD 
Switzerland SW 
Taiwan TA 
Thailand TH 
Turkey TK 
UK UK 
US US 
Venezuela VE 
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Appendix 4.4: World Bank Country Classification by Income and Region 
 
Income 
groups 
Subgroups Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East 
and North Africa 
America 
East and 
South Africa 
West Africa EastAsia 
and Pacific 
South Asia Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Rest of Europe MiddleEast NorthAfrica 
Low-income   Angola 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Rwanda 
Somali 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Chad 
Congo Rep. 
Cote d`Ivoire 
Eq. Guinea 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Liberia 
Mali 
Cambodia 
China 
Lao PDR 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Vietnam 
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
India 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Georgia 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Tajikistan 
  Yemen   Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
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Income 
groups 
Subgroups Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East 
and North Africa 
America 
East and 
South Africa 
West Africa EastAsia 
and Pacific 
South Asia Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Rest of Europe MiddleEast NorthAfrica 
Zimbabwe Mauritania 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 
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Income 
groups 
Subgroups Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East 
and North Africa 
America 
East and 
South Africa 
West Africa EastAsia 
and Pacific 
South Asia Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Rest of Europe MiddleEast NorthAfrica 
Middle- 
income 
Lower Botswana 
Djibouti 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
Swaziland 
Cape Verde Fiji 
Indonesia 
Kiribati 
Korea Dem. 
Marshall 
Islands 
Micronesia, 
Fed. Sts. 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Philippines 
Solomon 
Islands 
Thailand 
Tonga 
Vanuatu 
Western 
Samoa 
Maldives Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Estonia 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia, FYR* 
Moldova 
Poland 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Slovak Rep. 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Yugoslavia, Fed. 
Rep.** 
Turkey Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syrian Arab 
Rep. 
West Bank 
and 
Gaza 
Algeria 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Jamaica 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
St. Vincent  
Grenadines 
Suriname 
Venezuela 
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Income 
groups 
Subgroups Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East 
and North Africa 
America 
East and 
South Africa 
West Africa EastAsia 
and Pacific 
South Asia Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Rest of Europe MiddleEast NorthAfrica 
Upper Mauritius 
Mayotte 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
Gabon American 
Samoa 
Malaysia 
  Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Hungary 
Slovenia 
Greece 
Isle of Man 
Malta 
Bahrain 
Oman 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Libya Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Argentina 
Barbados 
Brazil 
Chile 
Guadeloupe 
Mexico 
Puerto Rico 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
St. Lucia 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
Uruguay 
- 133 -  
Income 
groups 
Subgroups Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East 
and North Africa 
America 
East and 
South Africa 
West Africa EastAsia 
and Pacific 
South Asia Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Rest of Europe MiddleEast NorthAfrica 
High- 
income 
OECD 
countries 
    Australia 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
New 
Zealand 
    Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
    Canada 
United 
States 
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Income 
groups 
Subgroups Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East 
and North Africa 
America 
East and 
South Africa 
West Africa EastAsia 
and Pacific 
South Asia Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
Rest of Europe MiddleEast NorthAfrica 
Non-OECD 
countries 
Reunion   Brunei 
French 
Polynesia 
Guam 
Hong Kong 
Macao 
New 
Caledonia 
N. Mariana 
Is. 
Singapore 
OAE *** 
    Andorra 
Channel Islands 
Cyprus 
Faeroe Islands 
Greenland 
Liechtenstein 
Monaco 
Israel 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
United Arab 
Emirates 
  Aruba 
Bahamas, 
The 
Bermuda 
Cayman 
Islands 
French 
Guiana 
Martinique 
Netherlands 
Antilles 
Virgin 
Islands(U. 
S.) 
Total 210 27 23 34 8 27 28 14 5 44 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 4.1 Test of Bubbles: Co-integration Test in Time Series  
 
Stationary Test—Australia 
 
ADF Tests dMV ∆(dMV) dD ∆(dD) 
NON 4.955442 
[1.0000] 
1.991779 
[0.9861] 
5.542432 
[1.0000] 
1.954092 
[0.9850] 
Trend & Intercept 3.321727 
[1.0000] 
-5.58424338 
[0.0006] 
2.497976 
[1.0000] 
-806631 
[0.0332] 
Intercept 4.989519 
[1.0000] 
0.584546 
[0.9861] 
5.271136 
[1.0000] 
-2.450266 
[0.1373] 
ADF Tests LMV ∆(LMV) LD ∆(LD) 
NON 4.315949 
[1.0000] 
-0.190455 
[0.6071] 
3.145275 
[0.9992] 
-2.713916 
[0.0083] 
Trend & Intercept -0.745429 
[0.9583] 
-3.315596 
[0.0867] 
-4.562066 
[0.0051] 
-4.672243 
[0.0041] 
Intercept -0.930515 
[0.7619] 
-5.598433 
[0.0001] 
-0.336473 
[0.9078] 
-4.786454 
[0.0006] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets 
 dMV=MVt/MV0; dD=Dt/D0 
 
 
   Residual-based Co-integration Test—Australia 
 
Dep. dMV Intercept dD R2 D-W Stat 
 -0.369342 1.110991 0.977191 0.604384 
AEG* test None Trend & Intercept Intercept 
Null: no cointegration -2.008602 -1.225286 -0.786318 
Dep. LMV Intercept LD R2 D-W Stat 
 2.547517 1.083374 0.984117 1.334859 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept 
Null: no cointegration -4.095546 -3.916203 -4.069849 
 
Note:  *AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test: the 5% critical value of the model with only intercept is -3.34 and with both  
intercept and trend is -3.78. (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, Table 20.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
38
 Fixed 3 legs are used in this test, since the optimal number of legs is 6 which seem too many for the 32 years’ 
data. 
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Stationary Test--HongKong 
 
ADF Tests dMV ∆(dMV) dD ∆(dD) 
NON 4.842815 
[1.0000] 
-0.296609 
[0.5698] 
4.503128 
[1.0000] 
0.954422 
[0.9043] 
Trend & Intercept 0.209758 
[0.9969] 
-7.915694 
[0.0000] 
-0.088848 
[0.9922] 
-6.607724 
[0.0001] 
Intercept 3.503895 
[1.0000] 
-5.449279 
[0.0001] 
4.159244 
[1.0000] 
-0.289998 
[0.9128] 
ADF Tests LMV ∆(LMV) LD ∆(LD) 
NON 2.767712 
[0.9979] 
-1.139054 
[0.2247] 
5.463646 
[1.0000] 
-2.657256 
[0.0096] 
Trend & Intercept -3.504734 
[0.0615] 
-6.848705 
[0.0000] 
-2.087410 
[0.5323] 
-4.323982 
[0.0091] 
Intercept -0.767412 
[0.8139] 
-6.875050 
[0.0000] 
-0.818934 
[0.8001] 
-4.367186 
[0.0017] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets 
dMV=MVt/MV0; dD=Dt/D0 
 
 
Residual-based Co-integration Test--HongKong 
 
Dep. dMV Intercept dD R2 D-W Stat 
No. of Obv.: 909 -1.214.60 0.961655 0.958500 1.273783 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept 
Null: no cointegration -4.33104 -4.189565 -4.243681 
Dep. LMV Intercept LD R2 D-W Stat 
 2.495026 1.101916 0.970103 1.564995 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept  
Null: no cointegration -4.603892 -3.098830 -4.518576 
 
Note:  *AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test: the 5% critical value of the model with only intercept is -3.34 and with both  
intercept and trend is -3.78. (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, Table 20.2) 
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Stationary Test—Netherland 
 
ADF Tests dMV ∆(dMV) dD ∆(dD) 
NON -1.449793 
[0.1343] 
-2.188273 
[0.0302] 
2.537294 
[0.9963] 
0.525368 
[0.8217] 
Trend & Intercept -2.222403 
[0.4597] 
-2.727093 
[0.2353] 
-2.869578 
[0.1887] 
-4.163971 
[0.0148] 
Intercept -1.871365 
[0.3402] 
-2.512762 
[0.1245] 
1.087882 
[0.9964] 
-1.126747 
[0.6870] 
ADF Tests LMV ∆(LMV) LD ∆(LD) 
NON 2.617557 
[0.9970] 
-3.389552 
[0.0014] 
3.375049 
[0.9996] 
-3.268737 
[0.0019] 
Trend & Intercept -1.031148 
[0.9246] 
-4.893631 
[0.0023] 
-1.542019 
[0.7932] 
-4.041178 
[0.0176] 
Intercept -1.599014 
[0.4711] 
-4.793075 
[0.0005] 
-0.888247 
[0.7789] 
-4.108051 
[0.0033] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets 
 dMV=MVt/MV0; dD=Dt/D0 
 
 
Residual-based Co-integration Test—Netherland 
 
Dep. dMV Intercept dD R2 D-W Stat 
 -2.009503 2.116741 0.879264 0.540798 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept 
Null: no cointegration -3.550773 -4.319481 -3.496172 
Dep. LMV Intercept LD R2 D-W Stat 
 0.632759 1.306722 0.977184 0.882627 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept  
Null: no cointegration -3.048080 -2.977328 -2.998699 
 
Note:  *AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test: the 5% critical value of the model with only intercept is -3.34 and with both  
intercept and trend is -3.78. (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, Table 20.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 138 -  
 
 
Stationary Test--South Africa 
 
ADF Tests dMV ∆(dMV) dD ∆(dD) 
NON 1.375551 
[0.9542] 
-1.932191 
[0.0522] 
1.943718 
[0.9855] 
-1.843129 
[0.0629] 
Trend & Intercept -2.615668 
[0.2765] 
-2.676996 
[0.2523] 
-0.883387 
[0.9454] 
-2.867173 
[0.1861] 
Intercept 0.520876 
[0.9847] 
-2.311107 
[0.1751] 
3.230577 
[1.0000] 
-2.342257 
[0.1659] 
ADF Tests LMV ∆(LMV) LD ∆(LD) 
NON 2.546075 
[0.9964] 
-3.762377 
[0.0005] 
2.294141 
[0.9931] 
-3.497157 
[0.0010] 
Trend & Intercept -2.001309 
[0.5785] 
-4.311483 
[0.0094] 
-3.748016 
[0.0348] 
-3.586927 
[0.0501] 
Intercept -0.601058 
[0.8568] 
-4.386252 
[0.0016] 
-1.557271 
[0.4900] 
-3.588414 
[0.0130] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets 
 dMV=MVt/MV0; dD=Dt/D0 
 
 
Residual-based Co-integration Test--South Africa 
 
Dep. dMV Intercept dD R2 D-W Stat 
 -1.449670 1.299695 0.911873 0.635061 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept 
Null: no cointegration -2.354144 -2.333938 -2.313477 
Dep. LMV Intercept LD R2 D-W Stat 
 1.257804 1.272889 0.930093 0.632476 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept 
Null: no cointegration -2.939216 -3.111956 -2.898854 
 
Note:  *AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test: the 5% critical value of the model with only intercept is -3.34 and with both  
intercept and trend is -3.78. (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, Table 20.2) 
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Stationary Test--United Kingdom 
 
ADF Tests dMV ∆(dMV) dD ∆(dD) 
NON 2.077596 
[0.9896] 
-3.579668 
[0.0007] 
5.021923 
[1.0000] 
-2.768270 
[0.0069] 
Trend & Intercept 2.413353 
[1.0000] 
-4.979322 
[0.0015] 
-0.494743 
[0.9796] 
-5.314876 
[0.0006] 
Intercept 1.157668 
[0.9973] 
-4.228931 
[0.0020] 
2.934745 
[1.0000] 
-3.638827 
[0.0094] 
ADF Tests LMV ∆(LMV) LD ∆(LD) 
NON 3.216113 
[0.9994] 
-0.722853 
[0.3956] 
4.215140 
[1.0000] 
-3.722065 
[0.0005] 
Trend & Intercept -2.057198 
[0.5526] 
-3.399089 
[0.0674] 
-2.179128 
[0.4877] 
-4.906709 
[0.0016] 
Intercept -0.286637 
[0.9178] 
-3.429239 
[0.0163] 
-0.107842 
[0.9416] 
-4.975921 
[0.0002] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets 
 dMV=MVt/MV0; dD=Dt/D0 
 
 
Residual-based Co-integration Test--United Kingdom 
 
Dep. dMV Intercept dD R2 D-W Stat 
 -3.334437 1.805698 0.952429 0.609264 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept  
Null: no cointegration 
Critical Value 
-2.420545 -5.253307 -2.386697 
Dep. LMV Intercept LD R2 D-W Stat 
 2.102478 1.111298 0.976809 1.065889 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept  
Null: no cointegration -3.070161 -3.658640 -3.026346 
 
Note:  *AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test: the 5% critical value of the model with only intercept is -3.34 and with both  
intercept and trend is -3.78. (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, Table 20.2) 
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Stationary Test--United States 
 
ADF Tests dMV ∆(dMV) dD ∆(dD) 
NON 1.456395 
[0.9605] 
-2.476673 
[0.0151] 
4.610090 
[1.0000] 
2.432630 
[0.9948] 
Trend & Intercept -2.273367 
[0.4347] 
-3.997706 
[0.0203] 
3.274724 
[1.0000] 
-4.032963 
[0.0197] 
Intercept 0.462944 
[0.9823] 
-3.698443 
[0.0096] 
4.686022 
[1.0000] 
-2.127156 
[0.2360] 
ADF Tests LMV ∆(LMV) LD ∆(LD) 
NON 3.650049 
[0.9998] 
-4.248578 
[0.0001] 
10.23155 
[1.0000] 
-0.704848 
[0.4030] 
Trend & Intercept -3.130867 
[0.1182] 
-6.460083 
[0.0000] 
-3.476749 
[0.0603] 
-4.638660 
[0.0043] 
Intercept 0.139972 
[0.9639] 
-6.655976 
[0.0000] 
-1.352394 
[0.5927] 
-4.622612 
[0.0009] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets; 
 dMV=MVt/MV0; dD=Dt/D0 
 
 
Residual-based Co-integration Test--United States 
 
Dep. dMV Intercept dD R2 D-W Stat 
 -4.417682 2.372268 0.909886 0.307513 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept  
Null: no cointegration -3.048040 -2.915756 -2.978946 
 
Dep. LMV Intercept LD R2 D-W Stat 
 -2.430578 1.539374 0.946897 0.349807 
AEG test* None Trend & Intercept Intercept 
Null: no cointegration -2.868672 -3.067469 -2.848755 
 
Note:  *AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test: the 5% critical value of the model with only intercept is -3.34 and with both  
intercept and trend is -3.78. (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, Table 20.2) 
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Table 4.2 Estimation of Market-Level Bubbles 
 
Dep. Variable pit Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Indep. Variable  
Intercept 4.085 
(11.722) 
4.079 
(13.292) 
3.242 
(16.670) 
-0.2837 
 (-1.621) 
dit 0.673 
(26.904) 
0.671 
(27.096) 
0.627 
(22.695) 
0.9833 
(49.297) 
Nit / 0.236E03 (0.659) / / 
Statistics 
Number of Obs. 624 624 624 624 
R2 0.97524 0.97526 0.91335 0.90874 
Lagrange Multiplier [H0: No 
Group Effects] 
1187.99 
[0.0000] 
639.17 
[0.0000] 
903.69 
[0.0000] 
762.34 
[0.0000] 
Hausman [H0: Random 
Effects] 
10.19 
[0.0014] 
36.92 
[0.0000] 
11.19 
[0.0008] 
5.84 
[0.0156] 
AR ( t test   H0: 
Non-Autocorrelation) 
0.4554 
(12.737) 
0.4571 
(12.747) 
0.3906 
(10.902) 
0.3838 
(11.472) 
HET [Breusch-Pagan LM 
Test H0  : Homoscedasticity] 
x2  d.f.=58 
373.1307 367.7684 329.8392 553.8903 
λ= σu/ σv 0.6277 0.6287 0.9438 1.6762 
σ=( σu2 + σv2)1/2 0.3131 0.3136 0.3397 0.5045 
σy 1.8113 1.8112 0.9556 1.103 
LOGL -100.9348 -100.8065 -91.502 -188.8268 
µ/σu -0.0567 -0.1463 -0.2287 -0.9224 
 
Note: t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
Time and country dummies are not reported in the table; 
Model A: p=lnP  d=lnD;   
Model B: p=lnP d=lnD;   
Model C: p=ln(P/N)  d=ln(D/N) ;   
Model D: p=ln(Pt/P2000)  d=ln(Dt/D2000) 
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Table 4.3 Worldwide Average Values of the Estimated Bubble  
 
Year Model A Model B Model C Model D 
1994 1.124483784 1.10070541 1.14657838 1.19934595 
1995 1.124543243 1.10071622 1.14274324 1.18636486 
1996 1.121540541 1.09813514 1.1364027 1.17377838 
1997 1.121875676 1.09845405 1.1377027 1.18883243 
1998 1.125805405 1.10165405 1.14996216 1.19428919 
1999 1.123175676 1.09954865 1.14101892 1.21608108 
2000 1.125394595 1.10155946 1.14877297 1.35963514 
2001 1.123786486 1.10007838 1.14408649 1.21951892 
2002 1.123518919 1.09973514 1.14135676 1.20728649 
 
 
Table 4.4 Long-term Relationships between BI and PI, PE, PD 
 
Stage 1: Stationary Tests  
 
A. Stationary Test for B in Panel 
 
N=37 Obv.=909 BI ∆BI 
Unit Root Tests None Intercept Trend & 
Intercept 
None Intercept Trend & 
Intercept 
LLC t-statistics 
Null: Common unit root 
-1.49382 
[0.0676] 
-8.16025 
[0.0000] 
-4.73101 
[0.0000] 
-26.4435 
[0.0000] 
-33.4588 
[0.0000] 
-22.5041 
[0.0000] 
Breitung t-statistics 
Null: Common unit root 
-0.60376 
[0.2730] 
-4.60080 
[0.0000] 
-1.65471 
[0.0490] 
-11.0856 
[0.0000] 
-26.9110 
[0.0000] 
-11.6807 
[0.0000] 
IPS  W- statistics 
Null: Individual unit root 
- -7.93045 
[0.0000] 
-6.03260 
[0.0000] 
-25.4369 
[0.0000] 
- -19.5853 
[0.0000] 
ADF-Fisher x2-statistics 
Null: Individual unit root 
62.6859 
[0.8229] 
202.150 
[0.0000] 
165.327 
[0.0000] 
631.854 
[0.0000] 
1019.81 
[0.0000] 
544.638 
[0.0000] 
PP-Fisher x2-statistics 
Null: Individual unit root 
57.0684 
[0.9277] 
214.387 
[0.0000] 
175.417 
[0.0000] 
990.625 
[0.0000] 
1723.37 
[0.0000] 
1478.57 
[0.0000] 
Hadri Z statistics 
Null: Common no unit 
root 
- 7.08988 
[0.0000] 
9.07221 
[0.0000] 
4.00365 
[0.0000] 
- 14.0062 
[0.0000] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets; 
 LLC: Levin, Lin & Chu t statistics; IPS: Im, Pesaran and Shin W-statistics.  
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B. Stationary Test for BI in Time Series (BG DM FR GM HK IT IR SA SW OE UK) 
 
Countries Unit Root Tests BI None Intercept Trend & Intercept 
Belgium ADF Null: unit root -1.003612 -3.969836 -3.734598 
[0.2763] [0.0045] [0.0342] 
PP Null: unit root -1.246302 -3.969836 -3.734598 
[0.1909] [0.0045] [0.0342] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.300149 0.121743 
Denmark ADF Null: unit root -0.277546 
[0.5781] 
-3.629178 
[0.0106] 
-3.555761 
[0.0502] 
PP Null: unit root -0.072852 
[0.6508] 
-3.688411 
[0.0092] 
-3.618566 
[0.0440] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.116507 0.125640 
France ADF Null: unit root -0.110027 
[0.6381] 
-2.389943 
[0.1524] 
-5.976503 
[0.0003] 
PP Null: unit root -0.107318 
[0.6390] 
-2.533809 
[0.1173] 
-2.446847 
[0.3504] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.353042 0.054738 
Germany ADF Null: unit root -0.236993 
[0.5929] 
-3.421712 
[0.0175] 
-4.045334 
[0.0171] 
PP Null: unit root 0.028659 
[0.6846] 
-3.376540 
[0.0195] 
-4.979966 
[0.0018] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.362406 0.081061 
HongKong ADF Null: unit root -0.173415 
[0.6150] 
-3.997483 
[0.0043] 
-5.047381 
[0.0015] 
PP Null: unit root -1.296688 
[0.1757] 
-5.223262 
[0.0002] 
-5.020429 
[0.0016] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.204711 0.102303 
Italy ADF Null: unit root -0.504573 
[0.4898] 
-3.352836 
[0.0206] 
-3.458630 
[0.0614] 
PP Null: unit root -0.248820 
[0.5886] 
-3.215045 
[0.0283] 
-3.258696 
[0.0915] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.183607 0.102404 
Ireland ADF Null: unit root 0.315170 
[0.7704] 
-2.616295 
[0.1002] 
-4.280238 
[0.7704] 
PP Null: unit root 0.132726 
[0.7175] 
-2.670191 
[0.0902] 
-4.280980 
[0.0098] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.523560 0.104728 
South Africa ADF Null: unit root -0.816309 
[0.3539] 
-1.874766 
[0.3391] 
-4.410174 
[0.0072] 
PP Null: unit root -0.625747 
[0.4383] 
-3.724478 
[0.0084] 
-4.432481 
[0.0068] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.450313 0.135554 
Swizerland ADF Null: unit root -0.071538 
[0.6513] 
-2.872432 
[0.0598] 
-3.315245 
[0.0819] 
PP Null: unit root 0.233062 
[0.7475] 
-2.872432 
[0.0598] 
-3.315245 
[0.0819] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.378097 0.137165 
 
 
 
 
    
- 144 -  
Stationary Test for BI in Time Series (BG DM FR GM HK IT IR SA SW OE UK)-Continuance 
 
Austria ADF Null: unit root 0.304142 
[0.7674] 
-2.736852 
[0.0790] 
-2.850849 
[0.1909] 
PP Null: unit root 0.930026 
[0.9021] 
-2.831534 
[0.0651] 
-2.876065 
[0.1830] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.185572 0.081739 
United Kingdom ADF Null: unit root -0.195046 
[0.6095] 
-3.248245 
[0.0244] 
-3.463918 
[0.0573] 
PP Null: unit root -0.119056 
[0.6365] 
-3.238541 
[0.0250] 
-3.460983 
[0.0577] 
KPSS Null: stationary - 0.231373 0.136011 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets  
KPSS (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin): the 5% critical value of the model with trend is 0.463000 and with both  
intercept and trend is 0.146000. 
 
 
C. Stationary Tests for BI in Time Series (AU CA JP NL US) 
 
 Unit Root Tests 
BI ∆BI 
None Intercept Trend& 
Intercept 
None Intercept Trend& 
Intercept 
AU 
 
ADF 
Null: unit root 
-0.384015 
[0.5373] 
-1.373645 
[0.5816] 
-1.605606 
[0.7667] 
-5.725424 
[0.0000] 
-6.349871 
[0.0000] 
-6.233243 
[0.0001] 
 
PP  
Null: unit root 
-0.602072 
[0.4486] 
-2.255470 
[0.1919] 
-2.612573 
[0.2776] 
-5.842289 
[0.0000] 
-5.755620 
[0.0000] 
-5.706487 
[0.0003] 
 
KPSS  
Null: stationary - 0.438250 0.102106 - 0.083383 0.064879 
CA ADF  
Null: unit root 
0.209893 
[0.7405] 
-2.462106 
[0.1341] 
-3.350258 
[0.0764] 
-7.930415 
[0.0000] 
-7.828179 
[0.0000] 
-7.761317 
[0.0000] 
 PP 
Null: unit root 
0.315627 
[0.7708] 
-3.241640 
[0.0266] 
-3.276911 
[0.0883] 
-8.074409 
[0.0000] 
-7.966683 
[0.0000] 
-7.812465 
[0.0000] 
 
KPSS  
Null: stationary - 0.135642 0.104468 - 0.154684 0.139869 
JP ADF  
Null: unit root 
-0.567471 
[0.4632] 
-1.980375 
[0.2934] 
-2.000737 
[0.5781] 
-3.669138 
[0.0006] 
-3.607492 
[0.0114] 
-3.651942 
[0.0415] 
 
PP  
Null: unit root 
-0.454861 
[0.5100] 
-1.636483 
[0.4529] 
-1.517758 
[0.8022] 
-3.661617 
[0.0006] 
-3.599630 
[0.0116] 
-3.698418 
[0.0375] 
 
KPSS 
Null: stationary - 0.158300 0.153450 - 0.180625 0.100146 
NL ADF 
Null: unit root 
-0.286840 
[0.5746] 
-2.174795 
[0.2188] 
-2.149245 
[0.5002] 
-4.869458 
[0.0000] 
-4.787129 
[0.0006] 
-4.760179 
[0.0032] 
 
PP  
Null: unit root 
-0.288888 
[0.5739] 
-2.174795 
[0.2188] 
-2.149245 
[0.5002] 
-4.872482 
[0.0000] 
-4.790453 
[0.0005] 
-4.766334 
[0.0031] 
 
KPSS  
Null: stationary - 0.066785 0.064280 - 0.066498 0.057229 
US ADF  
Null: unit root 
-0.596132 
[0.4512] 
-2.460824 
[0.1342] 
-2.433954 
[0.3564] 
-7.150998 
[0.0000] 
-7.042423 
[0.0000] 
-6.977473 
[0.0000] 
 
PP  
Null: unit root 
-0.627344 
[0.4376] 
-2.488019 
[0.1277] 
-2.371486 
[0.3864] 
-7.132127 
[0.0000] 
-7.025016 
[0.0000] 
-6.979508 
[0.0000] 
 KPSS  
Null: stationary - 0.160757 0.160773 - 0.144504 0.064106 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets  
KPSS (Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin): the 5% critical value of the model with trend is 0.463000 and with both  
intercept and trend is 0.146000. 
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D. Stationary Tests for PI in Time Series (AU CA JP NL US) 
 
ADF  
Null: unit root 
PI ∆PI 
None Intercept Trend&Intercept None Intercept Trend&Intercept 
Australia 4.395183 
[1.0000] 
3.774865 
[1.0000] 
-0.172852 
[0.9900] 
-4.239794 
[0.0001] 
-4.865406 
[0.0004] 
-4.117246 
[0.0174] 
Canada 3.763600 
[0.9999] 
4.192948 
[1.0000] 
3.310906 
[1.0000] 
-2.683230 
[0.0090] 
-3.178294 
[0.0311] 
-4.106398 
[0.0155] 
Japan -0.154115 
[0.6226] 
-1.496495 
[0.5225] 
-1.925326 
[0.6182] 
-4.600838 
[0.0000] 
-4.620419 
[0.0009] 
-4.549371 
[0.0053] 
Netherland 1.100697 
[0.9256] 
-0.164075 
[0.9329] 
-3.617983 
[0.0445] 
-4.120001 
[0.0002] 
-4.600775 
[0.0009] 
-4.586487 
[0.0050] 
United States 1.067468 
[0.9214] 
-0.007718 
[0.9506] 
-2.738523 
[0.2292] 
-2.746677 
[0.0077] 
-3.787140 
[0.0075] 
-3.286969 
[0.0934] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets  
 
 
E. Stationary Tests for PE in Time Series (AU CA JP NL US) 
 
ADF  
Null: unit root 
PE ∆PE 
None Intercept Trend&Intercept None Intercept Trend&Intercept 
Australia -0.098546 
[0.6420] 
1.437552 
[0.5516] 
-3.087082 
[0.1264] 
-6.109169 
[0.0000] 
-6.101287 
[0.0000] 
-4.253221 
[0.0117] 
Canada -0.436969 
[0.5171] 
-2.320239 
[0.1720] 
-4.031188 
[0.0176] 
-6.462921 
[0.0000] 
-6.455286 
[0.0000] 
-6.355160 
[0.0001] 
Japan -0.582725 
[0.4570] 
-2.103010 
[0.2448] 
-1.987496 
[0.5858] 
-6.007026 
[0.0000] 
-5.920777 
[0.0000] 
-6.005701 
[0.0001] 
Netherland -0.486939 
[0.4971] 
-1.592387 
[0.4748] 
-2.258993 
[0.4429] 
-6.230048 
[0.0000] 
-6.160359 
[0.0000] 
-6.160633 
[0.0001] 
United States -0.433292 
[0.5185] 
-1.290118 
[0.6219] 
-3.524074 
[0.0536] 
-7.696839 
[0.0000] 
-7.660858 
[0.0000] 
-7.439806 
[0.0000] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets  
 
 
 
F. Stationary Tests for PD in Time Series (AU CA JP NL US) 
 
ADF 
Null: unit root 
PD ∆PD 
None Intercept Trend&Intercept None Intercept Trend&Intercept 
Australia -0.468827 
[0.5044] 
-2.940867 
[0.0518] 
-3.247062 
[0.0954]39 
-7.852919 
[0.0000] 
-7.764672 
[0.0000] 
-7.654031 
[0.0000] 
Canada 0.214732 
[0.7421] 
-0.923280 
[0.7676] 
-2.250208 
[0.4475] 
-5.295365 
[0.0000] 
-5.354042 
[0.0001] 
-5.241515 
[0.0010] 
Japan -0.400144 
[0.5316] 
-1.829768 
[0.3599] 
-1.672714 
[0.7400] 
-5.294904 
[0.0000] 
-5.238399 
[0.0002] 
-5.275352 
[0.0009] 
Netherland 0.027842 
[0.6844] 
-1.321203 
[0.6075] 
-2.680773 
[0.2507] 
-4.642475 
[0.0000] 
-4.647984 
[0.0008] 
-4.593371 
[0.0048] 
United States 0.189302 
[0.7344] 
-1.266599 
[0.6322] 
-1.999617 
[0.5787] 
-4.057412 
[0.0002] 
-4.135751 
[0.0030] 
-3.996565 
[0.0195] 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets  
                                                       
39
 Since the optimal number of lags are 8 which are too many for the 33 years’ data, 3 lags are specified in the 
regression.  
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Stage 2: Residual-based Co-integration Tests in Time Series (AU CA JP NL US) 
 
G. 
AEG*  
Null: No 
co-integration 
BI and PI BI and PE BI and PD 
None Intercept Trend 
&Intercept 
None Intercept Trend 
&Intercept 
None Intercept Trend 
&Intercept 
Australia  
-2.619 -2.575 -1.326 -3.208 -3.157 -1.966 -1.469 -1.448 -1.662 
Canada 
-2.502 -2.482 -3.329 -3.430 -3.389 -3.386 -3.384 -3.335 -3.329 
Japan 
-1.044 -1.011 -1.652 -1.466 -1.440 -1.683 -1.751 -1.715 -2.474 
Netherland 
-2.125 -2.083 -2.210 -2.171 -2.131 -2.380 -2.181 -2.137 -2.486 
U.S. 
-2.718 -2.677 -2.585 -2.371 -2.337 -2.227 -2.729 -2.689 -2.611 
 
Note: p values are in square brackets  
AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test: the 5% critical value of the model with intercept only is -3.34 and with both 
intercept and trend is -3.78. (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1993, Table 20.2) 
 
 
Table 4.5 Short-term Relations between BI and PI, PE, PD 
 
A. Three GLS Regressions with Individual and Time Dummies in Panel Data 
 
No. of Obv.:160 ∆PI ∆PE ∆PD 
Dep. ∆BI 0.1931873 
(5.13) 
0.0691497 
(2.43) 
0.1626923 
(3.22) 
Breusch-Pagan Test x2 
Null: constant variance 
10.77 
[0.0000] 
14.05 
[0.0002] 
12.71 
[0.0004] 
Modified D-W Test 
Null: no autocorrelation 
2.1851936 2.0620999 2.2025153 
 
Note: t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
The specification test results in the table are calculated before correcting the error terms.  
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B. OLS Regressions in Time Series Data (AU CA JP NL US) 
 
Countries T=32 ∆PI ∆PE ∆PD 
Australia Dep. ∆BI 0.110980* 
(9.578329) 
0.049739 
(0.722351)** 
0.042310 
(0.563945)** 
 D-W Test (dU =1.5) 
Null: no autocorrelation 2.327121 2.137871 2.173317 
 
White Test 
Null: no heteroskedasiticity 
12.47671 
[0.001953] 
3.064325 
[0.216068] 
3.450854 
[0.178097] 
Canada Dep. ∆BI 0.082038 
(0.976714)** 
0.060768 
(1.290348)** 
0.167035* 
(1.205757)** 
 
D-W Test (dU =1.5) 
Null: no autocorrelation 2.491715 2.678799 2.567321 
 
White Test 
Null: no heteroskedasiticity 
0.642248 
[0.725333] 
2.590204 
[0.273870] 
7.817639 
[0.020064] 
Japan  Dep. ∆BI 0.126596 
(1.948099) 
0.038849 
(0.440756)** 
0.157655 
(1.631572)** 
 
D-W Test (dU =1.5) 
Null: no autocorrelation 1.884862 1.451468 1.853241 
 
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test 
Null: no autocorrelation 
- 2.409775 
[0.120580] 
- 
 
White Test 
Null: no heteroskedasiticity 
1.572062 
[0.455650] 
0.248226 
[0.883280] 
1.056491 
[0.589639] 
Netherland Dep. ∆BI 0.139812* 
(11.60581) 
0.075749 
(2.186589) 
0.124864 
(2.520896) 
 D-W Test (dU =1.5) 
Null: no autocorrelation 1.754459 1.874701 2.130727 
 
White Test ( nR2) 
Null: no heteroskedasiticity 
9.504841 
[0.008631] 
2.469071 
[0.290970] 
0.992016 
[0.608957] 
United States Dep. ∆BI 0.165862 
(1.878220) 
0.207002 
(3.066637) 
0.173084 
(1.901955) 
 
D-W Test (dU =1.5) 
Null: no autocorrelation 2.469616 2.588673 2.648888 
 
White Test 
Null: no heteroskedasiticity 
0.061484 
[0.969726] 
0.875553 
[0.645470] 
1.080991 
[0.582460] 
 
Note: t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
The specification test results in the table are calculated before correcting the error terms;  
 * Applied White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 
 ** Insignificant at 10% level. 
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Table 4.6 Worldwide Average Market Values, Dividends, Estimated Bubbles 
and Economic Growth 
 
Year LMV LD BI GDP Growth Rate (Sample Average) 
GDP Growth Rate 
(World) 
1994 10.65467547 6.738231612 1.124483784 3.99475 3.301172 
1995 10.84977542 7.084566958 1.124543243 4.2642 2.805135 
1996 11.05551748 7.213057028 1.121540541 4.41135 3.427737 
1997 11.26653578 7.254373764 1.121875676 4.6707 3.676077 
1998 11.23986157 7.258380650 1.125805405 1.9717 2.416643 
1999 11.52229870 7.395129755 1.123175676 2.5381 3.102582 
2000 11.67734860 7.516775734 1.125394595 4.61755 4.00198 
2001 11.52723514 7.628831797 1.123786486 1.3463 1.381966 
2002 11.37189143 7.633756263 1.123518919 1.74645 1.842704 
Note: 1.values of B are measured by model A; 2.Data Source: WDI and Datastream Global Indices. 
 
Table 4.7 Economic Growth and Stock Bubbles (Mean) 
 
year GDP Growth Rate Dividend Yield Stock Price Index Estimated Bubble 
HI MI HI MI HI MI HI MI 
1994 4.0333 3.9562 2.0474 1.8655 579.0952 747.2955 1.1132 1.1544 
1995 3.7675 4.7609 2.5726 2.2133 565.0230 523.6308 1.1148 1.1537 
1996 3.2436 5.5791 2.5996 1.9617 672.8178 596.3067 1.1131 1.1508 
1997 3.9179 5.4235 2.2304 1.9408 770.3791 642.9792 1.1128 1.1391 
1998 2.3643 -0.3926 2.0396 2.1908 894.0026 560.7242 1.1331 1.1087 
1999 3.9407 1.1355 2.0870 2.6900 962.1987 443.7317 1.1220 1.1273 
2000 4.5091 4.7260 1.7239 1.7550 1160.0200 689.6350 1.1262 1.1253 
2001 1.5986 1.0940 1.9278 1.9533 1030.1896 489.3358 1.1232 1.1243 
2002 2.0493 1.4436 2.4126 2.2517 803.7961 369.8175 1.1248 1.1147 
Note:  1.Values of the estimated bubble are measured by model A; 2. Data Source: WDI and Datastream Global Indices. 
 
Table 4.8 Economic Growth and Stock Bubbles (Variance) 
 
year GDP Growth Rate Dividend Yield Stock Price Index Estimated Bubble 
HI MI HI MI HI MI HI MI 
1994 5.9888 20.5440 0.7871 1.1315 147620.5467 450717.5911 0.000676 0.001725 
1995 6.1635 26.5428 1.3278 2.3106 125133.8090 147439.5335 0.000282 0.003469 
1996 4.7886 6.8307 1.2375 1.3553 180370.8312 218748.4719 0.00023 0.001775 
1997 5.3899 7.3965 0.7901 0.9483 239617.8432 246467.9526 0.000304 0.003473 
1998 11.2718 41.5843 0.9458 1.1305 389265.1317 346877.5841 0.001355 0.001193 
1999 6.0206 16.3882 0.8055 2.6012 429185.3654 195677.2821 0.000951 0.003428 
2000 6.1587 5.5536 0.7584 2.3370 526171.8457 482916.0472 0.001947 0.00313 
2001 2.6020 12.8806 0.8583 0.9000 520599.7258 250399.1074 0.00052 0.004592 
2002 3.6821 31.8789 0.6105 1.0198 296081.5238 145325.2659 0.000446 0.001964 
Note:  1.Values of the estimated bubble are measured by model A; 2. Data Source: WDI and Datastream Global Indices. 
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Figure 4.1 Values of the Bubble Index Estimated from Four Models 
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Figure 4.2 Bubbles of Each Individual Country and the Sample Mean 
 
United States
1
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
Mo d elA M od elB Mo d elC Mo delD
Argentina
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
M odelA
Sample
M ean
Austral ia
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
ModelA
Samp le
Mean
Austria
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo delA
Samp le
Mean
Belgium
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
Canada
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
Chile
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.2
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Sample
Mean
- 156 -  
China (B&H Share)
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
ModelA
Sample
Mean
Denmark
1.08
1.085
1.09
1.095
1.1
1.105
1.11
1.115
1.12
1.125
1.13
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
Finland
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
1.24
1.26
1.28
1.3
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo delA
Samp le
Mean
France
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mod elA
Samp le
Mean
Germany
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
Greece
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Sample
Mean
HongKong
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
M od elA
Sample
M ean
Indonetia
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mod elA
Sample
Mean
Ireland
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mod elA
Sample
Mean
- 157 -  
    
Italy
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo delA
Sample
Mean
Japan
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
Korea
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
ModelA
Samp le
Mean
Malaysia
1.06
1.08
1.1
1.12
1.14
1.16
1.18
1.2
1.22
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
ModelA
Samp le
Mean
Mexico
1.11
1.115
1.12
1.125
1.13
1.135
1.14
1.145
1.15
1.155
1.16
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo delA
Sample
Mean
Norway
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
M odelA
Samp le
M ean
Netherlands
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
ModelA
Sample
Mean
New Zealand
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
Philippines
1.05
1.07
1.09
1.11
1.13
1.15
1.17
1.19
1.21
1.23
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
- 158 -  
  
Porland
1.05
1.07
1.09
1.11
1.13
1.15
1.17
1.19
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo delA
Sample
Mean
Portugal
1.07
1.09
1.11
1.13
1.15
1.17
1.19
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
Singapore
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mod elA
Sample
Mean
South Africa
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
M o d elA
Samp le
M ean
Spain
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
ModelA
Samp le
Mean
Sweden
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo delA
Samp le
Mean
Swizerland
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mod elA
Sample
Mean
Taiwan
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.1
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
ModelA
Sample
Mean
Thailand
1.05
1.07
1.09
1.11
1.13
1.15
1.17
1.19
1.21
1.23
1.25
1.27
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Mo d elA
Samp le
Mean
- 159 -  
 
Figure 4.2-1  Comparison of Bubbles between A-Share Group and 
B&H-Share Group (the Chinese Stock Markets)40 
                                                       
40
 The results are from a new duplicated estimation at the market level. See footnote 27 for details. 
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Figure 4.3 Bubbles in High-Income and Middle-Income Countries 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Comparisons of Bubbles among Three Regions  
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Chapter 5  Bubbles and the “Share Price-Inflation Puzzle” 
 
As referred to in the previous chapter, stock bubbles are influenced by changes in 
economic conditions. In fact, the interaction between the stock market and the 
economy has been broadly documented. Some topics in this area in particular, such 
as the “share price-inflation puzzle”, become more and more popular due to the 
development of the stock market theory and an increasingly capricious fluctuation of 
stock prices. However, explanations of the interaction between the stock market and 
the economy are still very limited, since most of the examination is based on EMH 
which itself has been strongly argued recently by researchers from the perspective of  
behavioural finance (For example, Shleifer, 2000). To overcome this problem, this 
chapter aims to investigate the relationship between the stock market and the 
economy within a framework of stock bubbles. The study intends to add its own 
view to the longstanding argument of “share price-inflation puzzle” through the 
application of our bubble measurement. Meanwhile the relations between other 
economic factors and stock prices, fundamental values and bubbles will also be 
discussed. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.1 introduces current 
influential theoretical explanations to the “share price-inflation puzzle”; Section 5.2 
theoretically derives the relation between share prices and inflation based on a 
bubble framework; Section 5.3 deals with the empirical estimation, in which the 
theoretical solution is verified; and Section 5.4 reaches the conclusion. 
 
5.1 Current Influential Theoretical Explanations to the “Share Price-Inflation 
Puzzle”  
 
The relationship between the common goods market and the stock market has been 
an interesting research topic. In particular, the inverse relationship between price 
movements in both asset and goods markets and the causality between stock 
 - 162 - 
behaviours and real economic activities are the focus of researches. As described in 
the literature survey of Chapter 2, the reversed relationship between stock prices and 
inflation, the so-called “economic enigma” is a big puzzle which is well documented 
but still a great topic of issue. The research can be divided into two divisions. Some 
financial economists have been trying to “dig out” the reasons by looking into some 
accounting evidences (for example, Modigliani and Cohn, 1979 and Feldstein, 1980 
etc.), while others try to solve it following the macroeconomic route (for example, 
Fama, 1981 and Geske and Roll, 1983).  
 
The earliest well-acknowledged explanation from the macro standpoint is the “proxy 
effect” devised by Fama and Schwert (1977). His theory has been treated as a supply 
side explanation to the issue. Meanwhile, some researchers, such as Danthine and 
Donaldson (1986), Stulz (1986) and Marshall (1992), have looked into the demand 
side explanation. By summarising the opinions of others, Hess and Lee (1999) 
mathematically explain the “puzzle” by combining the macro supply and demand 
shocks together.  
 
Another well-known explanation is the Modigliani and Cohn hypothesis (M-C) 
which identifies a mistake in the way that investors make evaluations – “money 
illusion in investors’ valuation”. This idea sheds light on the bubble research, since 
the bubble theory stems from a belief that investors rationally misevaluate stocks. 
From then on, more and more researchers, such as Gordon (1983) and Cohn and 
Lessard (1981), have examined this topic by admitting the truth that there are 
expectation distortions in the stock market. However, their theoretical works always 
concentrate on renewing the traditional valuation model with the inflation effect and 
neglect the relationship between expectation distortions and inflation.  
 
After several decades of investigation, theories and empirical works give rise to some 
answers to this topic. However, nearly all the research done ignored an increasingly 
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obvious truth that stock price movements deviate from their fundamental values, and 
markets are far from efficient. Therefore, stock market researchers should not only be 
concerned with the movement of stock price/return but also should be attentive to the 
idea of bubbles and fundamental values. Being aware of this issue, our attention is 
not only put on the stock price, but also on its components: the fundamental values 
and bubbles. Based on the ongoing bubble theory, we systematically examine the 
effects of inflation on bubbles embedded in share prices, and the examination enables 
us to distinguish the relationships between fundamental values and inflation and 
between bubbles and inflation. In order to highlight the distinction of our theory from 
others, some current major theoretical explanations to the “share price-inflation 
puzzle” are reviewed below, in which some are reconsidered in Section 5.2.2 from 
the viewpoint of our theory.  
 
5.1.1 Proxy Effect (Fama, 1981) 
 
Fama explains the negative relation between real stock returns and inflation as the 
consequence of “proxy effects”. Stock returns are determined by forecasts of relevant 
economic activity, and the negative “stock return-inflation” relation is induced by the 
negative relation between inflation and real economic activities. 
 
The first step of his work is to document the negative relation between inflation and 
real economic activity by a model derived from money demand theory and quantity 
money theory. Its empirical model is obtained, as: 
 
ttttt MbRbAbbp η+∆+∆−∆−−=∆ lnlnlnln 3210      (a-1) 
 
where b1>0, b2<0 and b3=1.0 ; P is the price level, A is a measure of anticipated real 
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economic activity, R is one plus the nominal interest rate, M is the quantities of 
nominal money, and ∆ indicates the difference of the relevant variables. 
 
The second step is to identify the economic variables affecting the stock returns from 
the capital investment process. In a rational expectation framework, stock market 
returns respond to new information from the investment process. An increase in the 
general level of real economic activity puts pressure on the existing capital stock, 
raising the average return on the existing stock and thus inducing increased capital 
expenditure. Therefore, the models embrace three explanatory variables: capital 
expenditures, the average real rate of return on capital and output. The empirical tests 
show that real stock returns are positively related to the above measures of real 
economic activity. 
 
The above two-step examination suggests that the real activity is involved between 
inflation and real stock returns as an exogenous proxy. The negative relationship 
between stock prices and inflation is formed by the combined effect of the positive 
relationship between stock prices and economic activities, and the negative 
“inflation-economy” relationship.    
 
5.1.2 The Combined Effect of Demand and Supply Shocks (Hess and 
Lee,1999) 
 
The purpose of Hess and Lee’s research (1999) was to explore whether the observed 
relation between stock returns and inflation can be explained as a combination of 
demand and supply shocks by a mathematical method. Their supply and demand 
models are based on the models of Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
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With the assumption that the demand shock εd is mainly due to monetary shocks, and 
the supply shock is due to productivity shocks εs, the growth in output (∆y) and 
inflation (pi) are given by: 
 
d
t
d
t
s
tttt aayyy 11 −− −+=−=∆ εεε          (b-1) 
d
t
d
t
s
ttt app 11 −− ++−=−= εεεpi              (b-2) 
 
After employing Hansen and Sargent’s (1980) prediction formulae and present value 
model of stock prices, they conclude that supply shocks have a positive effect on 
stock returns, but a negative effect on inflation, which means supply shocks cause a 
negative relation between stock returns and inflation. In contrast, demand shocks 
have positive effects on both stock returns and inflation, which results in a positive 
relation between stock returns and inflation. The final conclusion is that the stock 
return-inflation relation varies over time and across countries, depending on the 
relative importance of the two types of shocks. 
 
5.1.3 Money Illusion: M-C Hypothesis (Modigliani and Cohn, 1979) 
 
Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that stock market investors suffer from money 
illusion due to the difficulty of estimating long-term future growth rates of cash 
flows. They argue that the stock value could be counted either by the nominal 
dividends and nominal interest rate, or by the real dividends and real interest rate. If 
investors mistakenly discount the real future cash flow at the nominal interest rate, 
they will push the value of the stock market down. This “real” versus “nominal” 
confusion may be the reason for the negative share price - inflation relationship. 
They also point out that inflation only has a minor effect on market values. The 
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above situation may appear only at times of especially high or especially low 
inflation. 
 
Overall, the relationship between stock performances and inflation has been studied 
and explained by researchers from the viewpoint of both macro and micro levels. The 
opposite effects between demand shocks and supply shocks on the stock return 
offered a compromised explanation to an instable sign in the empirical estimation of 
the “share price-inflation relation”. Meanwhile, the opinion of “money illusion” gave 
rise to a well-acknowledged micro answer to the negative relationship between share 
prices and inflation. However, no researchers have ever mentioned the existence of 
bubbles in stock markets when studying this topic. Thus, it is considered that the idea 
of stock bubbles may contribute a more sound explanation to the “share 
price-inflation puzzle”. The use of bubbles in examining the relationship between the 
price movements in both goods and the stock market is the central issue for the next 
discussion. However, before discovering the main issue, it is worth noting that the 
causality problem mentioned in antecedent work is the primary thought of our theory. 
 
5.1.4 The Question of Causality 
 
Does the movement in the stock market foretell the real activity or is it just an 
outcome of investors’ expectation in response to the economic signal? Are the two 
markets linked with a strict causality? These questions embody the long lasting 
debate plaguing the research.   
 
The researches on the issue of causality are conducted in two directions: one is to 
answer how economic factors shape investors’ expectations, and the other deals with 
how the volatility of the stock price remodels the economy. There is a huge amount 
of literature documenting the effect of economic factors, such as inflation, 
unemployment, and output on the stock market. For example, Bosworth (1975) 
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addressed the fact that the stock market reflects investors’ attempts to forecast 
economic trends. Gertler and Grinols (1982) examined the effect of unemployment 
and inflation on stock returns. Fama (1981) concluded that in an efficient market, 
real variables, such as output or earnings growth, are the primary determinants of 
stock returns. Also, many literatures about the inflationary impact on the stock 
market have been reviewed in Chapter 2. Meanwhile, the performance of a stock 
market can also affect the real economy. Levine (1991) shows that the existence of a 
stock market tends to raise economic growth by making individuals more willing to 
invest the given amount of available savings in risky, more productive technology 
rather than in riskless storage. In contrast, Mauro (1995) incorporated the element of 
precautionary savings into an endogenous growth model and concluded that a stock 
market may slower the economic growth by reducing the precautionary motive for 
savings. Arestis et al (2001) argued that the contribution by the stock market on 
economic growth has been exaggerated by former studies. Furthermore, Lee (1992) 
pointed out that there is no causal linkage between stock returns and money supply 
growth, hence inflation.  
 
In our bubble framework, the stock price is composed of fundamental values and 
bubbles. The real economy affects the stock market through investors’ expectations 
and judgments to the shares’ fundamental values. Also, we believe that a soaring 
stock market enhances investors’ nominal income (although some gains in the stock 
market haven’t been realised yet), which boosts demand and consumption. Therefore, 
the stock market and the economy simultaneously affect each other. A strict 
definition of causality is simply a unilateral assumption that naturally results in 
contestable conclusions. For the ease of understanding, we summarise the above 
analysis in Box I. Our investigation in this chapter will go with the first line of 
thought attempting to decipher the impact of economic elements, especially inflation, 
on the stock market under the framework of the bubble theory. 
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5.2 Refining the “Share Price-Inflation Relation” in the Account of Bubbles: A 
Theoretical Discussion  
 
The rational bubble advocators commonly define a stock price as the sum of 
fundamental values and rational bubbles. Standing along with this classical bubble 
opinion, two issues are reconsidered here.  
 
First, it is easy to see that not all investors react to information (e.g. inflation) so as to 
affect the size of bubbles. Therefore, the study on the bubble-inflation relation calls 
for a separate examination on the information-based bubble and 
non-information-based bubble. Thus, we identify the stock price as:  
 
BPP f +=
   with irr BBB +=         (5.1) 
 
where fP is the fundamental value, and B  denotes bubbles which are composed of 
an information-based bubble ( rB ) and the non-information-based bubble ( irB ). 
 
Box I. 
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Stock Prices 
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Second, theoretically, the fundamental value ftP  should be identified by the present 
discounted value of the expected subsequent dividends:  
 
∑
∞
= +
+
=
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jttf
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DE
P
             (5.2) 
 
where Dt is the nominal dividend paid in the period of t, and r is the nominal interest 
rate. As demonstrated in Section 4.1.1 (Eq. 4.7), the fundamental value is defined as 
a result of a neutral expectation so that (5.2) can also be shown as a function of 
dividends and interest rate, ),( rDfP f = . 
 
M-C (1979) and Fama (1981) argue that the inflation may influence the stock market 
through the dividend and the interest rate. If inflation pi  is considered to influence 
the fundamental value by affecting the dividend and interest rate, the function of fP  
can be accordingly rewritten as: 
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pi
pi
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 (5.3) 
 
In order to understand the inflationary impact on the fundamental value, based on 
(5.3), the differentiation is taken to the fundamental value fP  with respect to 
inflation pi : 
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Since a rise in inflation is usually responded to by increasing the nominal interest 
 - 170 - 
rate, i.e. 0)( >
∂
∂
pi
pir
, then an inflationary effect on fundamental value will be 
determined by a sign of the marginal inflationary effect on dividends.  
   
Fama (1981) explains the negative movement of a stock price in response to inflation 
by the “proxy effect”. He highlights that inflation may damage the real economy, and 
that firms in a declining economy will operate in a slack manner. In this situation, the 
overall profitability of industry falls, so does the dividend. Based on this expectation, 
we have: 
 
0)( <
∂
∂
pi
piD
               (5.5) 
 
Under this condition, it is straight to get 0<
∂
∂
pi
fP
 in (5.4), i.e. the fundamental 
value fP  is negatively correlated with inflation pi . 
   
However, in the face of high inflation, it is unlikely that every firm will make losses. 
If inflation is a result of demand shocks, the firms are able to raise prices in response 
to the increased demand so as to earn more profits and distribute more dividends. 
Furthermore, firms with a high debt leverage ratio can benefit from high inflation, 
which can help them to reduce debts in a real term. Nichols (1968) advanced this by 
showing that the firms with small monetary liabilities but high levels of depreciable 
assets will perform worst in a situation of inflation. Thus, some firms can be more 
profitable under inflation, at least in the short term. In this circumstance, the 
“dividend-inflation” relation can be argued as: 
 
0)( >
∂
∂
pi
piD
              (5.6) 
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and accordingly the relationship between fundamental values and inflation is obscure 
in (5.4). 
 
Hence, theoretically, inflation can affect stock fundamental values via dividends. It is 
likely that in the long run, the inflationary effect on dividends is negative, but in the 
short term, it can be opposite. For industries, the two possibilities above may occur 
simultaneously, which may also lead to an overall zero effect of inflation on 
dividends (i.e. 0)(
)(
=
∂
∂
pi
piD ), or only one or two of them may occur at one time (i.e. 
0)(
)(
>
∂
∂
pi
piD
 or 0)(
)(
<
∂
∂
pi
piD ). Therefore, the relationship between inflation and stock 
fundamental value depends on which situation above is utterly predominant. 
 
The bubble, another component of stock prices, can also affect stock prices. As 
explained above, bubbles can be divided into information-based and 
non-information-based bubbles. The non-information-based bubble, which is 
irrelevant to the information, is formed by the market manipulation and noise trading. 
The optimistic expectation to the fundamental values and speculation give rise to the 
information-based bubbles.  
 
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) grouped three areas in which people deviate from the 
standard decision-making model: attitudes toward risk; non-Bayesian expectation 
formation; and sensitivity of decision-making to the framing of problems. To be 
consistent with but simplifying their opinion, we are concerned that the degree of 
rB caused by the optimism effect and speculation can be formulated by two elements: 
the “expectation distortion” and the “risk aversion”. Obviously, this distortion can be 
caused by two reasons: one is an unconscious mistake made by investors due to the 
deviation of fundamental valuation from the fundamental value determined by the 
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neutral expectation; another one is speculative behaviours. The risk aversion 
represents investors’ attitudes towards the risk. With a certain amount to a gamble 
with the same expected value, risk-averse investors prefer less risk to more, or at 
least an equivalent amount (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995). The higher the risk 
aversion the more conservative the investor is. In our study, we interpret this 
conservation as subjectively conscious behaviour by the investors, which means 
investors intend to lower their expectation to the fundamental value since they are 
risk-averse. The opinion explained above can be expressed mathematically as: 
 
irirr BRAA
hBBB +=+= )(
)(
pi
pi
           (5.7) 
 
where h  denotes the expectation distortion, and RAA represents the risk aversion. 
Inflation is considered to influence both of them. Since Bir in (5.7) is unlikely to be 
associated with economic influences, such as economic growth and inflation, we take 
the first order condition of B with respect to inflation pi  in (5.7), and it gives: 
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(5.8) shows how bubbles can be affected by inflation. According to Fama (1981), 
investors see inflation as bad news for the economy and firms’ performances, so that 
a rise in inflation can decrease their expectation for future stock returns. This means 
that the expectation distortion is lower in the face of a relatively high inflation than in 
a low inflation circumstance, which brings an argument of 0)( <
∂
∂
pi
pih
. 
 
Furthermore, bubbles are generated not only from expectation but also from the 
investors’ opinions toward the risk; i.e. even if two investors have exactly the same 
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opinions about the moving tendency of stock prices, their decisions may still be 
different due to their distinctive risk aversion. Brandt and Wang (2003) modelled the 
change in risk attitudes in relation to inflation and found evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that risk aversion varies in response to the news of inflation. Following 
Campbell and Cochrane’s (1999) “habit formation model”, they explained that bad 
news about inflation raises aggregate risk aversion. and good news about inflation 
lowers it. Thus, it is expected that inflation will increase investors’ caution to future 
stock returns which drives investors to be more risk averse, i.e. 0)( >
∂
∂
pi
piRAA
. 
 
From the discussion above, combining (5.7) and (5.8) with 0<
∂
∂
pi
h
and 0>
∂
∂
pi
RAA
, 
the negative relation of bubble-inflation becomes clear in theory. This means that in 
the long run, the higher inflation there is, the lower bubbles are expected. Meanwhile, 
the irregular non-information-based bubbles weaken the dependence of bubbles on 
inflation and other economic factors. That is to say, it is possible to have a very weak 
link between bubbles and inflation when non-information-based bubbles become 
dominant in determining stock prices. 
 
From the above line of analysis, the fundamental value and information-based 
bubbles are expected to change with the news of inflation. However, how does the 
observed price of a stock fluctuate with the changes of inflation? To answer this 
question, a joint examination on fundamental values and bubbles is required.  
 
Combining (5.1), (5.3) and (5.7), it gives the observed stock price as a function of 
inflation as follows: 
 
irBRAA
h
r
DP ++= )(
)(
)(
)(
pi
pi
pi
pi
             (5.9) 
 - 174 - 
 
In order to decipher the “share price-inflation puzzle”, P is differentiated with respect 
topi  in (5.9): 
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Therefore, the relationship between the share price and inflation can be identified by 
the sign of 
pi∂
∂P
 in (5.10). According to the above analysis about “fundamental 
value-inflation” and “bubble-inflation” relations, the signs of three terms in (5.10) 
have been verified, that is: 0)( >
∂
∂
pi
pir
, 0)( <
∂
∂
pi
pih
, and 0)( >
∂
∂
pi
piRAA
. Thus, the 
“puzzle” of the relation between stock price and inflation will depend on the sign of 
the 
pi∂
∂D
 term: 
 
If 0)( <
∂
∂
pi
piD
, then 0<
∂
∂
pi
P
, i.e. the “share price-inflation” relation is negative; 
 
If 0)( >
∂
∂
pi
piD
, then the sign of 
pi∂
∂P
 is unclear, i.e. the “share price-inflation” 
relation is obscure; 
 
If 0)( =
∂
∂
pi
piD
, then the sign of 0<
∂
∂
pi
P
, i.e. the “share price-inflation” is negative. 
 
Apparently, the above solution is intriguing in that it provides us with a theoretical 
explanation to mixed antecedent empirical findings about the “share price-inflation” 
relation. 
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It is worth noting that the above factors influencing fundamental values, bubbles and 
so prices are also documented by Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005), in which the 
risk-free rate of interest, the expected rate of growth of earnings and dividends (or 
growth expectations), and the equity risk premium are primitive factors determining 
stock prices. These factors are to be contained in the information of 
unemployment/inflation. They found that bad labour market news (inflation goes 
down when unemployment goes up) causes expected future interest rates to decline 
so as to inflate stock prices during expansions, but this need not be the case, since the 
growth expectation and risk premium are affecting stock prices also. The lower 
growth expectation caused by higher unemployment (or lower inflation) may be a 
force driving the stock prices down. 
 
In summary, if taking the efficient market hypothesis for granted, the “proxy effect” 
raised by Fama (1981) gives a reasonable macro explanation for the empirical 
evidence of the negative relation between the share price and inflation. However, 
from the viewpoint of the demand-shock-driven bubbles, the “proxy effect” is only 
able to reveal a part of the impact of inflation on the observed stock price. Another 
part of the inflationary influence on the price, which is embedded in bubbles, should 
also be taken into account, since investors are not able to control the fundamental 
value of an asset; they can however affect bubbles by changing their expectations in 
response to various economic conditions.  
  
5.3 Empirical Estimation 
 
Following the line of discussion above, we are concerned that inflation should bear a 
direct resemblance to the volatility of stock prices, bubbles and fundamental values. 
Thus, the following study will focus on the estimation of the inflationary effect on 
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stock prices, bubbles and dividends respectively. The empirical work is designed to 
test the argument developed by our theoretical analysis in the last section. In 
particular, the test will focus on three theoretical expectations: 
 
(1) a negative relationship between stock prices and inflation if the dividend is 
negatively or not related to inflation; 
(2) a negative, positive or non-relationship between the dividend (a proxy of 
fundamental values) and inflation;  
(3) a negative relationship between the bubble and inflation. 
 
5.3.1 Models 
 
In accordance with our specified tests above, empirical models are designed to 
examine the relationship between three dependent variables of the observed stock 
prices, dividends and bubbles, and explanatory variable of inflation respectively. 
Apart from the major explanatory variable, inflation, several other controlling 
variables should also be inserted in the model to capture other macro effects. GDP 
growth rate is consistently used to capture the economic growth by many researchers 
so that it is included in the model. Following Beck and Levine (2004), the turnover 
ratio, which is a measure of stock market liquidity and speculation, and the market 
capitalisation indicating the stock market size, are also included in the model. To 
measure the bank development, the domestic credit from banking is applied, which is 
similar to the variable of the bank credit used in Beck and Levine (2004) and Levine 
and Zervos (1998a)41. In addition, since it’s expected that the stock market is 
influenced not only by the economic growth but also by the efficiency of the 
economy, we first apply the variable of the production efficiency in modelling the 
relationship between macro factors and stock performances.  
 
                                                       
41
 The bank credit defined in Beck and Levine (2002) and Levine and Zervos (1998a) equals the bank claims on 
the private sector by deposit money banks divided by GDP 
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As explained by the theory, inflation pi  should be negatively related to the stock 
price and bubbles, but its influence on dividends is not assured.  
 
The economic growth Q is expected to be positively correlated with the stock price 
because the economic growth can stimulate bubbles so as to drive up the 
fundamental values of stocks. 
 
The productivity U is expected to be positively related to the dividend since U can 
affect the fundamental value of an industry in generating dividends in the long run. 
Moreover, the effect of U on the stock price can be also made through bubbles. If 
investors are aware of productivity when forming their expectation to the 
fundamental value, i.e. U and B are positively correlated, the productivity will then 
affect bubbles and so positively influence the stock price.  
 
As the proxy of stock market development, the market capitalisation Z should have a 
positive relation with bubbles; as documented by Durham (2002), Levine and Zervos 
(1998a, b) and Henry (2000a, b), the development of a stock market is expected to 
enhance the economic growth and decrease the cost of equity capital in the long run, 
and these effects will boost the optimism of investors to raise their expectations to 
the fundamental value, hence bubbles are stirred up. In addition, we are concerned 
that there are two issues affecting the relationship between market capitalisation and 
dividends. First, their positive relation can reveal the capital allocation efficiency of a 
market. If the capital of a market is allocated efficiently, the expanded market size 
can offer more funds for companies which are most efficient in production to 
produce more profits, so finally increasing dividends. Second, facing a developed 
stock market, a company may have the intention to pay fewer dividends, since they 
know that the lesser risk aversion in a relatively developed stock market can offset 
the impact of lesser dividends. The overall effect of market capitalisation on 
dividends may depend on which one of the above two is dominant. 
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The signal of a stock market speculation VO is also certainly related to bubbles, since 
bubbles are formed and further inflated by speculative behaviours in a market.  
 
The bank development is represented by the variable of domestic credit from 
banking DC, which is documented to positively influence economic growth (Beck 
and Levine, 2004). However, we are concerned that it is still possible that domestic 
credit can be negatively related to bubbles, since bank development may relatively 
reduce the interests and willingness of investment in the stock market. For example, 
if firms can get enough loans from banks, or individuals can raise as large a mortgage 
as they like, the speculation in the stock market will be less significant, because there 
is no need for individuals to risk more in the stock market to cope with their normal 
living demands. Therefore, the stock market may be less exuberant.  
 
These controlling variables and their expected impact on stock prices, bubbles and 
dividends are listed below (the definitions of variables are detailed in Appendix 5.1): 
  
(1) economic growth: GDP growth rate (Q), which is expected to influence 
bubbles, dividends and therefore prices; 
(2) stock market size relative to GDP: capitalisation over GDP (Z), which is 
expected to positively influence bubbles, and its impact on dividends is 
uncertain; 
(3) degree of market speculation: turnover ratio (VO) which is expected to 
positively affect bubbles;  
(4) bank development: domestic credit from banking over GDP (DC), which is 
expected to negatively affect bubbles; 
(5) real economic fundamental: production efficiency (U) (estimated from the 
production frontier model), which is expected to positively influence a 
company’s fundamental value (the dividend is its proxy), and if investors 
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attend the productivity of an industry, it is expected to also positively 
influence bubbles and therefore prices. 
 
The studies in the next section will test these expectations econometrically. 
Accordingly, the models of estimation are derived by specifying stock prices P as a 
general function of dividend D and bubbles B: 
 
],[ BDfP =  with ),,,,,( UDCVOZQDD pi=  ),,,,,( UDCVOZQBB pi=  
                  (5.11) 
 
In addition, time and country dummies are inserted into the models to capture the 
time shocks and the countries’ specific characteristics. In the models, economic 
growth rate and production efficiency function as the form of their lags, because, as 
commonly admitted, the expectations dominate the stock market. The lags of the two 
variables represent the investors’ expectations to the economy. In other words, 
investors make the decisions according to past economic performances. Since stock 
markets are strongly time-dependent, the dynamic models may perform better than 
the static ones. Thus, a lagged dependent variable is included in our model. Each 
model is estimated using panel data in a logarithm form: 
 
Model I-A (the reduced form of the stock price model): 
 itititititititititit dcvozuqpATp εβββpiββββ ++++′+++++= −−− 7654131211  
                  (5.12) 
Model II-A (the reduced form of the bubble model):  
 itititititititititit dcvozuqbATb εαααpiαααα ++++′+++++= −−− 7654131211  
                  (5.13) 
Model III-A (the reduced form of dividend model): 
ititititititititit dcvozudATd εγγγpiγγγ ++++′++++= −− 65431211     
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                  (5.14) 
 
where the lower-case letters represent the logarithmic form. p denotes stock prices, b 
is bubbles and d is dividends as a proxy of fundamental values. For explanatory 
variables, q is the economic growth rate; u is the production efficiency; pi ′  is 
inflation; z is the capitalisation of a market; vo is the turnover ratio; dc is domestic 
credit from banking; and T and A are the time and country dummies. It is worth 
noting that in model III-A, the lag of GDP growth rate is dropped off due to an 
obviously strong correlation between the lags of the dividend and the GDP growth 
rate.  
 
As a robustness check, the production efficiency is removed from the three models. 
The new models are exhibited as: 
 
Model I-B: 
ititititititititit dcvozqpATp εβββpiβββ ++++′++++= −− 76541211    
                  (5.15) 
Model II-B: 
ititititititititit dcvozqbATb εβββpiβββ ++++′++++= −− 76541211    
(5.16) 
Model III-B: 
itititititititit dcvozdATd εγγγpiγγ ++++′+++= − 654311      (5.17) 
 
Another transformation for the robust check is to remove the variables of inflation 
and the lag of economic growth rate instead of the production efficiency. These three 
models can be shown as: 
 
Model I-C: 
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 itititititititit dcvozupATp εβββββ +++++++= −− 7651311     (5.18) 
Model II-C: 
itititititititit dcvozubATb εααααα +++++++= −− 7651311     (5.19) 
Model III-C: 
 itititititititit dcvozudATd εγγγγγ +++++++= −− 6541211     (5.20) 
 
Having studied the individual impact of economic factors on the stock price, the 
dividend and the bubble, the estimated bubble is inserted in the price models of (5.12) 
and (5.15) to identify the inflationary effect on stock prices after controlling the 
influence of bubbles. The models can be written as: 
 
Model IV-A: 
ititititititititititit bdcvozuqpATp εββββpiββββ +++++′+++++= −−− 87654131211
                  (5.21) 
Model IV-B: 
  itititititititititit bdcvozqpATp εββββpiβββ +++++′++++= −− 876541211   
(5.22) 
 
(5.21) and (5.22) enable us to answer one question: does inflation affect stock prices 
by influencing investors’ expectation of fundamental values? In other words, the 
examination of the “stock prices-inflation relationship” with a participation of 
bubbles can clarify one doubt that the “stock price- inflation puzzle” may be a puzzle 
between bubbles and inflation.    
  
5.3.2 Data and Variables 
 
The major dataset employed in this part is the World Bank Development Indicators 
from which most of the variables are obtained over the years of 1960 to 2002 for 36 
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countries.42 The variable of production efficiency cannot be obtained directly from 
the data source, and is estimated by the stochastic frontier production function. 43  
 
[Table 5.1 is about here] 
 
In order to expand the panel size, we estimate the bubble for the same 37 countries 
again using the estimation methodology described in Chapter 4 but with a different 
time period. Data was collected for each country from the year of inception of a 
country’s stock market trading until 2004.44  The definitions of variables employed 
by this part are listed in Appendix 5.1. 
 
5.3.3 Estimation and Interpretation 
 
First of all, the fixed effect panel regressions are applied for these three models. The 
autocorrelation in the dynamic models may cause biases in the estimation. In 
addition, the GDP growth rate may be correlated with production efficiency, and the 
turnover ratio is not strictly exogenous because bubbles and turnover ratio influence 
each other, i.e. the active behaviours in the market drives up prices, and in the 
meantime investors are also stirred up by the soaring market. Therefore, the GMM 
estimation is employed to mitigate the effect of the colinearity and endogenerity 
problems on estimation. 
 
From tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, it is evident that the GMM results in these four 
tables are consistent. More importantly, the results are consistent with the hypothesis 
and expectation defined in sections 5.2 and 5.3. Stock prices and inflation are 
                                                       
42
 There is no data for Taiwan in WDI online data.  
43
 See Appendix 5.2 for the model and estimation procedure of the production efficiency. The results are shown 
in Table 5.1. 
44
 Following Ritter and Simar (1997) we preferred the relatively simple distribution (such as half normal or 
exponential) to a flexible distribution (such as truncated normal or gamma), the half normal distribution is 
assumed in the bubble estimation model instead of truncated normal distributional assumption for the inefficiency 
error, which is different from my previous estimation. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) concluded that the choice 
amongst the four assumptions is largely immaterial. 
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significantly correlated with each other negatively, which is in accordance with most 
of the previous empirical results in analysing time-series data for an individual 
country, such as the findings by Cohn and Lessard (1981), Gordon (1983) and Fama 
(1981). In contrast, dividends show a weak relation with inflation. A weak effect of 
inflation on dividends implies that inflation could play a neutral role in influencing 
the overall profitability of the industry. This result perfectly supports our expectation 
which is consistent with the argument of Nichols (1968) that the “inflation hedge” is 
not true for all stocks and firms with small monetary liabilities but high levels of 
depreciable assets will perform worst. Besides, the t value of inflation in the bubble 
regression is -1.34 which shows a weak negative relation between bubbles and 
inflation. This result implies that inflation does affect the investors’ decision, but this 
negative relation could be weakened by the impact of noise trading. The implication 
of the significant irrationality in stock markets strongly challenges the efficient 
market theory in which the impact of irrationality on prices can cancel each other out 
(Shleifer, 2000). It shows the evidence to the opinions of behavioural researchers that 
many investors react to irrelevant information in forming their demand for securities, 
i.e. they trade on noise rather than information (Shleifer, 2000; Black, 1986). Hence, 
the estimated results are consistent with our theoretical expectation in (5.10) that the 
price impact of inflation can be made through changing a discount rate (i.e. nominal 
interest rate) if the effect of inflation on both bubbles and dividends is absent, i.e. 
they are not related to inflation ( 0=
∂
∂
pi
D
, 0=
∂
∂
pi
B ). This conclusion can be further 
proved by the results in Table 5.5, in which the negative inflationary effect on stock 
prices remains significant after taking into account bubbles. This implies that the 
inflationary effect on stock prices is irrelevant to bubbles.  
 
[Table 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 are about here] 
 
In addition, it is worth noting that, from tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, the production 
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efficiency affects dividends significantly, but not prices and bubbles. This implies 
that investors pay more attention to the profitability of an industry than the 
productivity, i.e. the information of productivity is scarcely embedded in the bubble. 
As a result, a non-significant link between bubbles and productivity weakens the 
relationship between the stock price and productivity.  
 
The results for other controlling variables in models also appear to be expected. In 
tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, the capitalisation (z), turnover ratio (vo) and domestic credit 
(dc) show the significant relationship with both prices and bubbles. This result 
supports our expectation that a large stock market and the heavy speculation in this 
market will stimulate and sustain bubbles. In fact, a high turnover ratio implies 
significant behaviours of irrationality. The negative impact of domestic credit on 
bubbles verifies an argument that the bank development may relatively reduce or 
diversify demand for investment funds from the stock market.  
 
However, for explaining dividends, it shows a different story. The stock market 
capitalisation and turnover ratio negatively affect dividends, and the bank 
development (dc) has no significant relationship with dividends. These findings 
imply that the link between stock market development and the goods market is very 
weak. The weak link suggests that worldwide markets are averagely inefficient in 
directing funds to invest in most efficient projects or places. The negative signs 
highlight the company’s intention of distributing fewer dividends in a relatively more 
active and advanced stock market, since fewer dividends in an active market may not 
substantially change investors’ confidence in their investment. 
 
5.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The investigation for the interaction between the stock market and the real economy 
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has been seen in previous studies but their findings are not clear-cut, since the 
existing researches have failed to study a role of bubbles in link with the stock 
market and the goods market. The study in this chapter applies the bubble theory and 
the estimated bubbles to explain the relationship between stock markets and real 
economic activities, especially the relationship between stock prices and inflation 
when bubbles are taken into account. 
  
Comparing our research with the existing research in this area, our study adds a new 
contribution to the issue by examining the economic impact on stock bubbles using 
the estimated bubble. Meanwhile, the long lasting topic of the “share price-inflation 
puzzle” is theoretically and empirically explained on the basis of the theoretical 
framework of bubbles. One major finding is that inflation negatively affects stock 
prices, but not by influencing investors’ expectation of stock values which forms 
bubbles. Bubbles are neither very much influenced by inflation nor by industry 
productivity. Rather, they are influenced by the expected economic growth, market 
speculation and stock market size relative to GDP. 
 
The explanation for the “share price-inflation puzzle” within a bubble framework in 
this chapter intends to make an example for our argument that the ongoing topics 
about the relationship between stock markets and real economies may be reexamined 
under the hypothesis of market inefficiency. Therefore, one should view the findings 
of this chapter being provisional since it just gives a preliminary look at the 
relationship between stock bubbles and real economic factors. The results from 
several regressions for a sample in this chapter are not sufficient to tie up the 
relationship between bubbles and the real economy. Future attention could focus on 
developing a strictly derived theoretical model based on the current theories of 
economics to direct the empirical modeling. Certainly, the bubble index computed 
from the value frontier model will no doubt make the future empirical estimation 
more straightforward. 
 Appendices 
 
Appendix 5.1 Data 
 
A. Definition of Datastream Global Indices data
 
Dividend Yield (DY) 
Dividend yield is derived by 
expressing it as a percentage of the total market value for the constituents of that 
sector. This provides an average of the individual yields of the constituents weighted 
by market value. It is calcul
 
Where: 
 =aggregate dividend yield on day t
 =dividend per share on day t
 =number of shares in issue on day t
  = unadjusted share price on day t
 n = number of constituents in index
 
Market Value (MV) 
These market values are calcul
Index market value on Datastream is the sum of share price multiplied by the number 
of ordinary shares in issue for each index constituent. 
 
For equity indices, the calculation used is:
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calculating the total dividend amount for a sector and 
ated as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
ated from the constituents of the sector/market lists. 
 
 
  
Where: 
 =number of shares in issue on day t
 =unadjusted share price on day t
 
B. Definition of WDI Online Variables
 
GDP per capita growth (annual %)
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. 
GDP per capita is gross domest
sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors 
on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. 
The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well 
as other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do 
not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings 
deposits). Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan 
institutions and building and loan associations. 
 
Stocks traded, turnover ratio (%)
Turnover ratio is the total valu
average market capitalization for the period. Average market capitalization is 
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ic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
 
 
 
 
e of shares traded during the period divided by the 
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calculated as the average of the end-of-period values for the current period and the 
previous period. 
 
Gross capital formation (constant LCU) 
Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays on 
additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of 
inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so 
on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, 
railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods 
held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, 
and "work in progress." According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are 
also considered capital formation. Data are in constant local currency. 
 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and 
services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The 
Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
 
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the 
number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the domestically 
incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
 
Labor force, total 
Total labor force comprises people who meet the International Labour Organization 
definition of the economically active population: all people who supply labor for the 
production of goods and services during a specified period. It includes both the 
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employed and the unemployed. While national practices vary in the treatment of such 
groups as the armed forces and seasonal or part-time workers, in general the labor 
force includes the armed forces, the unemployed, and first-time job-seekers, but 
excludes homemakers and other unpaid caregivers and workers in the informal 
sector. 
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Appendix 5.2 Estimations of Production Efficiency 
 
A. Estimations of Capital Stocks—Perpetual Inventory Calculation Method 
 
Step 1: To initialise the capital stock (the initial year is 1960): 
 
))1(/(00 φλλ +−+= wqqIk  
 
k : capital stock; 
I: fixed investment constant 1995;  
q: GDP growth rate. 
qw =4% per year: the average world growth rate;  
λ=0.25: a measure of mean reversion in the growth rates following Easterly et 
al.(1993); 
φ=0.05, is the assumed depreciation rate;   
 
Step 2: To estimate the capital stock: 
 
1)1( −−+= ttt kIk φ  
 
B. Estimations of Production Efficiency: Stochastic Frontier Estimation — 
Normal-Half Normal Distribution 
 
Model: 
 
ititititititit ulkqATq να +−++++= − lnlnlnlnln 11  
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(i)    ν  ~ iid ( )2,0 νσΝ  
(ii)    u ~ iid ( )2,0 µσ+Ν  
(iii)   u and ν  are distributed independently of each other, and of the 
regressors. 
where q  is GDP growth rate; k  is capital stock; l  is labor force;ν  is the 
two-sided “noise” component, and u  is the nonnegative technical inefficiency 
component, of the error term.    
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Tables  
 
Table 5.1 Estimation of Production Efficiency 
 
Dep.Variable q Coefficient Standard error t statistics 
1−itq  0.4208 0.0167 25.13** 
itk  0.2017 0.0121 16.64** 
itl  0.3684 0.0324 11.38** 
Statistics    
Number of Obsv. 1269   
Wald Test 2χ   184881.47 
[0.0000] 
  
υσσλ /u=  1.8674   
uσ  0.1419   
υσ  0.0760   
2σ  0.0259   
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Note:   1. t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
   2. Time and country dummies are not reported in the table; 
  3. * Significance of the individual coefficients at the 10% level; 
    ** Significance of the individual coefficients at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 Stock Market and Economy: Model I-A, II-A and III-A 
 
 Price (pit) Bubbles(bit) Dividends(dit) 
 LSDV GMM LSDV GMM LSDV GMM 
pit-1 0.5248 
(7.04)** 
0.9520 
(50.4)** 
- - - - 
bit-1 - - 0.3342 
(5.11)** 
0.5940 
(11.8)** 
- - 
dit-1 - - - - 0.4958 
(7.88)** 
0.7345 
(15.3)** 
pi’it-1 -0.0758 
(-1.64)* 
-0.0976 
(-5.32)** 
-0.0325 
(-2.33) 
-0.0153 
(-1.34) 
0.0477 
(1.87)* 
0.0206 
(1.08) 
qit-1 0.0541 
(2.01)** 
-0.0073 
(-0.439) 
0.0320 
(1.72)* 
0.0249 
(2.65)** 
- - 
uit-1 2.1677 
(1.93)* 
-0.2986 
(-0.977) 
0.6904 
(1.59) 
-0.1472 
(-0.627) 
1.0245 
(0.706) 
0.8919 
(1.87)* 
zit 0.2334 
(4.28)** 
0.0649 
(2.79)** 
0.1721 
(4.88)** 
0.0294 
(2.51)** 
-0.2124 
(-4.43)** 
-0.0475 
(-1.79)* 
voit 0.1202 
(3.39)** 
0.0514 
(3.21)** 
0.0501 
(1.90)* 
0.0190 
(2.30)** 
-0.0516 
(-1.29) 
-0.0319 
(-2.16)** 
dcit 0.1420 
(1.74)* 
-0.1129 
(-3.12)** 
0.1206 
(1.72)* 
-0.0479 
(-2.79)** 
-0.1970 
(-0.948) 
0.0682 
(1.21) 
Statistics 
No. of Obv. 289 289 289 287 311 311 
R2 0.9592 - 0.6561 - 0.7570 - 
Log Likelihood 982.4457   
Likelihood Ratio Test 
H0: 0=uσ  
33.93 
[0.000] 
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Wald test 2χ  433.8 
[0.000] 
5822 
[0.000] 
286.9 
[0.000] 
438.1 
[0.000] 
212.8 
[0.000] 
275.3 
[0.000] 
2σ  0.0529 0.0772 0.0196 0.0269 0.0944 0.1132 
Sargan Test - 
 
16.25 
[1.000] 
- 17.17 
[1.000] 
- 11.43 
[1.000] 
AR(1) -2.511 
[0.012] 
-0.0425 
[0.966] 
-1.362 
[0.173] 
-0.4821 
[0.630] 
0.6482 
[0.517] 
-0.0407 
[0.968] 
AR(2) 1.998 
[0.046] 
0.4358 
[0.663] 
-0.1112 
[0.911] 
-0.5198 
[0.603] 
0.5383 
[0.590] 
1.034 
[0.301] 
Instrument Set - pit-3 ~  ; voit-2 
~  ; qrit-3 ~ 
- bit-3~; uit-3 
~ ; qrit-3 ~  ; 
voit-2 ~ 
- dit-3~; zit-2 ~ ; 
uit-3~  ; rit-2~ ; 
voit-2  
 
Note:  1. t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
 2. All the statistical tests proceed from the estimations are using robust standard errors; 
 3. Two-step GMM estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991) are applied. 
 4. * Significance of the individual coefficients at the 10% level; 
   ** Significance of the individual coefficients at the 5% level. 
  5. Time and country dummies are not reported in the table。 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Stock Market and Economy: Model I-B, II-B and III-B 
 
 Price (pit) Bubbles(bit) Dividends(dit) 
 LSDV LSDV GMM LSDV LSDV GMM LSDV GMM 
pit-1 0.5991 
(11.9)** 
0.5767 
(8.97)** 
0.9539 
(54.6)** 
- - - - - 
bit-1 - - - 0.3967 
(7.82)** 
0.3507 
(16.07)** 
0.5815 
(11.3)** 
- - 
dit-1 - - - - - - 0.4834 
(7.86)** 
0.7351 
(15.4)** 
pi’it-1 -0.0501 
(-1.41)** 
-0.0782 
(-1.71)* 
-0.0922 
(-5.58)** 
-0.0157 
(-1.48)** 
-0.0309 
[-2.23]** 
-0.0114 
(-0.895) 
0.0503 
(1.97)** 
0.0123 
(0.648) 
qit-1 0.0436 
(2.87)** 
0.0657 
(2.87)** 
-0.0202 
(-1.23) 
0.0138 
(1.11) 
0.0372 
(1.97)** 
0.0182 
(2.14)** 
- - 
zit 0.3070 
(7.05)** 
0.2309 
(4.83)** 
0.0638 
(2.86)** 
0.1906 
(5.43)** 
0.1683 
(4.89)** 
0.0339 
(2.81)** 
-0.2038 
(-4.47)** 
-0.0446 
(-1.66)* 
voit - 0.1153 
(3.41)** 
0.0438 
(2.14)** 
- 0.0510 
(1.87)* 
0.0176 
(1.96)** 
-0.0601 
(-1.53) 
-0.0308 
(-1.94)* 
dcit - 0.1200 
(1.29) 
-0.1154 
(-3.11)** 
- 0.1207 
(1.67)* 
-0.0562 
(-2.88)** 
-0.2096 
(-1.05) 
0.0770 
(1.36) 
Statistics         
Obv. 408 296 296 408 296 296 318 318 
R2 0.9576 0.9589 - 0.6348 0.6526 - 0.7545 - 
Wald test 
2χ  
572.4 
[0.000] 
478.1 
[0.000] 
6528 
[0.000] 
190.2 
[0.000] 
288.2 
[0.000] 
234.3 
[0.000] 
167.8 
[0.000] 
256.8 
[0.000] 
2σ  0.0450 0.0530 0.0784 0.0170 0.0192 0.0264 0.0928 0.1129 
 - 195 - 
Sargan 
Test 
- - 16.21 
[1.000] 
  14.46 
[1.000] 
- 14.09 
[0.000] 
AR(1) -2.487 
[0.013] 
-2.682 
[0.007] 
-0.7795 
[0.436] 
-0.7417 
[0.458] 
-1.143 
[0.253] 
-0.2939 
[0.769] 
0.8568 
[0.392] 
-0.1151 
[0.908] 
AR(2) 1.324 
[0.186] 
1.879 
[0.060] 
1.007 
[0.314] 
0.2137 
[0.831] 
-0.0280 
[0.978] 
0.7983 
[0.425] 
0.5179 
[0.605] 
0.3676 
[0.713] 
Instrument 
Set 
- - pit-3 ~ ; qrit-2 
~ ; voit-3 ~ 
- - qrit-2~; 
voit-2~; 
bit-3~ 
- 
dyit-3~; zit-3 
~  ; rit-2~  ; 
voit-2 ~ 
 
Note:  1. t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
 2. All the statistical tests proceed from the estimations are using robust standard errors; 
 3. Two-step GMM estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991) are applied. 
 4. * Significance of the individual coefficients at the 10% level; 
   ** Significance of the individual coefficients at the 5% level. 
  5. Time and country dummies are not reported in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Stock Market and Economy: Model I-C, II-C and III-C 
 
 Price (pit) Bubbles(bit) Dividends(dit) 
 LSDV GMM LSDV GMM LSDV GMM 
pit-1 0.5368 
(8.14) ** 
0.9627 
(44.7)** 
- - - - 
bit-1 - - 0.4143 
(5.80) ** 
0.6165 
(12.4)** 
- - 
dit-1 - - - - 0.4851 
(8.08)** 
0.7548 
(15.4)** 
uit-1 1.8604 
(1.65)* 
-0.2191 
(-0.864) 
0.1731 
(0.213) 
-0.1853 
(-0.838) 
0.0503 
(1.97)** 
0.0123 
(0.648) 
zit 0.2572 
(5.63) ** 
0.0833 
(2.80)** 
0.1653 
(5.12) ** 
0.0313 
(2.68)** 
-0.2038 
(-4.47)** 
-0.0446 
(-1.66)* 
voit 0.1288 
(3.62)** 
0.0673 
(4.78)** 
0.0493 
(1.82)* 
0.0323 
(4.83)** 
-0.0601 
(-1.53) 
-0.0308 
(-1.94)* 
dcit 0.0488 
(0.567) 
-0.0666 
(-2.16)** 
0.0952 
(1.02) 
-0.0489 
(-3.03)** 
-0.2096 
(-1.05) 
0.0770 
(1.36) 
Statistics       
No. of Obv. 333 333 333 333 333 333 
R2 0.9508 - 0.6096 - - - 
Wald test 
2χ  
451.8 
[0.000] 
3000 
[0.000] 
1676 
[0.000] 
356.5 
[0.026] 
176.2 
[0.000] 
306.3 
[0.000] 
2σ  0.0618 0.0865 0.0224 0.0271 0.0907 0.1108 
Sargan Test  24.02 
[1.000] 
- 18.16 
[1.000] 
- 17.59 
[1.000] 
AR(1) -2.000 -0.4053 -0.2918 -0.3382 0.9887 -0.6190 
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[0.046] [0.685] [0.770] [0.735] [0.323] [0.536] 
AR(2) -1.495 
[0.135] 
0.8192 
[0.413] 
-0.6523 
[0.514] 
0.3347 
[0.738] 
-0.2534 
[0.800] 
-0.4112 
[0.681] 
Instrument 
Set 
- uit-3 ~ ; voit-2 ~  ; 
pit-3 ~ 
 bit-3~; uit-3 ~  ; 
voit-2~  
- voit-2~; uit-3~  ; 
zit-2 ~; dyit-3~ 
 
Note:  1. t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
 2. All the statistical tests proceed from the estimations are using robust standard errors; 
 3. Two-step GMM estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991) are applied. 
 4. * Significance of the individual coefficients at the 10% level; 
   ** Significance of the individual coefficients at the 5% level. 
  5. Time and country dummies are not reported in the table; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5 Stock Price and Economy: Model IV-A and B 
 
 Model IV-A Model IV-B 
Dep.  Price (pit) LSDV GMM LSDV GMM 
pit-1 0.4161 
(9.63)** 
0.9465 
(46.4)** 
0.4399 
(10.5) 
0.9448 
(50.4)** 
bit 0.8350 
(6.51)** 
0.3899 
(3.31)** 
0.8773 
(6.49)** 
0.4036 
(3.37)** 
pi’it-1 -0.0493 
(-1.13)* 
-0.1076 
(-5.16)** 
-0.0390 
(-1.00) 
-0.1002 
(-4.86)** 
qit-1 0.0339 
(1.77)* 
-0.0037 
(-0.199) 
0.0390 
(2.16)** 
-0.0248 
(-1.33) 
uit-1 1.8692 
(1.93)* 
-0.5778 
(-1.51) 
- - 
zit 0.1322 
(3.13)** 
0.0619 
(2.27)** 
0.1378 
(3.61)** 
0.0625 
(2.24)** 
voit 0.0855 
(2.44)** 
0.0536 
(2.84)** 
0.0767 
(2.25)** 
0.0425 
(1.92)* 
dcit 0.0237 
(0.303) 
-0.1094 
(-2.32)** 
-0.0339 
(-0.341) 
-0.1098 
(-2.20)** 
Statistics     
No. of Obv. 289 289 296 296 
R2 0.9590 - 0.958585 - 
Wald test 2χ  606.3 
[0.000] 
1228 
[0.000] 
549.5 
[0.000] 
5260 
[0.000] 
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2σ  0.0504 0.06816823 0.05066753 0.06911174 
Sargan Test - 
 
18.31 
[1.000] 
- 15.60 
[1.000] 
AR(1) -1.134 
[0.257] 
-0.2324 
[0.816] 
-1.043 
[0.297] 
-0.6073 
[0.544] 
AR(2) 0.4968 
[0.619] 
0.2698 
[0.787] 
-0.7024 
[0.482] 
-0.6427 
[0.520] 
Instrument Set - pit-3 ~  ; bit-2 ~; voit-2 
~  ; qrit-3 ~ 
- pit-3 ~  bit-3~; qrit-3 
~  ; voit-2 ~ 
  
Note: 1. t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
 2. All the statistical tests proceed from the estimations are using robust standard errors; 
 3. Two-step GMM estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991) are applied. 
 4. * Significance of the individual coefficients at the 10% level; 
   ** Significance of the individual coefficients at the 5% level. 
  5. Time and country dummies are not reported in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6  Application of the Value Frontier Methodology II: 
Estimation of Firm-level Bubbles in Developed Markets  
 
The new approach to estimating bubbles enlarges the research area from verifying 
the existence of bubbles to quantifying bubbles. In this chapter, we apply the value 
frontier theory and the cost frontier estimation technique to estimate and analyse firm 
level bubbles. Estimation of bubbles at the firm level requires particular attention to 
defining fundamental values, since the dividend used as a proxy to capture 
fundamental values in the estimation of market level bubbles is not sufficient to 
capture the performance of each individual firm in the estimation of firm level 
bubbles. Therefore, the major objective of this chapter is to refine the fundamental 
valuation through a detailed discussion on how to derive variables related to the 
fundamental value for the firm level study of bubbles. Having refined the model, the 
firm level data from the U.S. and U.K. markets are employed for the empirical study 
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of bubbles. The bubble level of every single company in the sample is hence 
measured out. 
 
The arrangement of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.1 is devoted to discussing 
the framework of the residual income valuation model for the firm level modelling. 
This is followed by the empirical work for U.S. and U.K. companies in section 6.2, 
and results are discussed in section 6.3. Section 6.4 is the summary and conclusion. 
 
6.1 Modelling Value Frontier in the Firm level Approach 
 
In the firm level modelling, a key attention is to look for new variables that enable 
the capture of fundamental value, since the sparse fundamental variable applied in 
the market level estimation can hardly work out a convincible result in the firm level 
application. The inspiration comes from the ongoing market-based accounting 
research (MBAR) which has been dedicated to relating the accounting numbers of a 
company with its market value. In this section, the residual income valuation 
framework is partially employed to model the fundamental value not only because of 
its parsimony, but also for the reason of its accuracy concluded by some empirical 
researchers, for example, Francis, Olsson and Oswald (2000).  
 
6.1.1 A Critical Review of Residual Income Valuation Model: 
Feltham-Ohlson Framework (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1995) (F-O 
Framework) 45 
 
Ohlson’s (1995) model successfully constructs a framework connecting accounting 
numbers, such as earnings, book value and dividends, with the market values. In this 
                                                       
45
 Residual income is the earnings left after reducing the capital cost. Feltham and Ohlson (1995) devised a 
valuation model by employing the idea of residual income, and since then the F-O framework has become the 
foundation of the residual income valuation research. See section 2.2.2 of Chapter 2 for more details. 
 - 199 - 
framework, the following principles are formulated.  
 
Firstly, the accounting data satisfy the clean surplus relation which states that the 
change in book value equals earnings minus dividends (net of capital contribution); 
 
tttt DKK −Π+= −1              (6.1) 
 
K represents the book value, Π  is the earnings and Dt is the real dividend paid in 
the period of t. 
 
Secondly, a linear model frames the stochastic time-series behaviour of abnormal 
earnings, i.e. abnormal earnings at the time of t+1 are the linear equation of its one 
lag plus an information variable which satisfies an autoregressive process. Abnormal 
earnings (or residual income) are defined as: 
 
1ˆ −−Π= ttt rKpi               (6.2) 
10ˆˆ 11 <≤++= − aa tttt ευpipi  1021 <≤+= − γεγυυ ttt      
 
where pi  is abnormal earnings; υ  represents the information other than the 
abnormal earnings. r is investor’s required rate of return and rK measures the cost of 
capital. Based on the above assumptions, the model started from a present value of 
expected dividends (PVED), formally represented as: 
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tP is the stock price in an efficient market, i.e. the fundamental value at the 
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beginning of period t. ( )⋅Ε  is the market’s expectation. jti +  is the discount rate. 
 
When the clean surplus relation is applied (Eq.6.1) in (6.3), and the discount rate is 
assumed to be constant, the formula of Ohlson (1995) is reached: 
 
t
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Combining (6.4) and (6.2), (6.4) gives: 
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(6.5) is the foundation of the F-O model, which interprets the fundamental value as a 
function of its book value K adjusted by the present value of anticipated abnormal 
earningspi . To make the model practical, (6.5) can be conduced with the assumption 
of (6.2) to: 
 
0)1)(1/()1(
0)1/(
ˆ
2
1
321
>+−+−+=
≥+−=
+++=
rrar
raa
KP ttttt
γα
α
ευαpiα
             (6.6) 
 
A modified version of (6.6) postulates the current abnormal earnings suffice in the 
prediction of future abnormal earnings, i.e. 0≡υ . 
 
tttt KP 31 ˆ εpiα ++=
                 (6.7) 
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As demonstrated by Ohlson (1995), this model and its important assumptions satisfy 
a number of additional, intuitively appealing properties which coincide with the 
former theories and the intuition about the real world. In fact, the assumption about 
the less one and non-negative parameter, a, reconciles with the economic rule of 
decay of abnormal earnings. The clean surplus relation wipes off the effects of 
accounting principles, because the book value and earnings under aggressive 
accounting are high at present but low in the future, and a conservative accounting 
method sets the other way round. Therefore, the low/high forecast number offsets the 
high/low present number.  
 
Ohlson’s (1995) residual income model focuses directly on forecasting future 
abnormal earnings and avoids having to forecast the timing of future dividend 
payments, i.e. the research focuses on forecasting future abnormal earnings, rather 
than on forecasting its components, which embodies the notion that dividend policy 
is irrelevant to the extent that reinvested earnings generate the cost of capital 
(Dechow et al, 1999b). Dechow et al (1999a) summarised that existing comments 
about this model broke new ground on two fronts. First, the model predicts and 
explains stock prices better than the value predicted by models based on discounting 
short-term forecasts of dividends and cash flows. Secondly, this model provides a 
more complete valuation approach than the dividend-discounting model. However, at 
the same time, they pointed out that the existing empirical applications of the 
residual income valuation model with the omission of Ohlson’s information 
dynamics are generally similar to the application of the dividend-discounting model 
in the past. Thus, they conveyed an improved empirical method to cover a gap of 
ignoring information dynamics in empirical applications of the F-O model. They 
concluded that Ohlson’s model provides a parsimonious guiding framework for 
future valuation research by incorporating information in earnings, book value and 
earnings forecasts. 
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From a practical viewpoint, the F-O model is only the first step and not yet a fully 
developed theoretical framework: “It is only a point of departure, not where near a 
complete structure, but then, getting off to the right start can be crucial” (Bernard, 
1995). Frankel and Lee (1998) used I/B/E/S consensus of earning forecast as a proxy 
for the market expectation of future earnings. Furthermore, by investigating the 
reliability of long-term I/B/E/S consensus earning forecasts, they found some 
evidence of over-optimism in the analysts’ forecast and developed a prediction model 
for long-term analyst forecast errors.  
 
The F-O model and its inessential transformation have been active for a long time 
around the forecast. All improvements contribute to the earning forecast so as to 
estimate the relatively accurate parameters for the use of firm valuation. As many 
adherents such as Bernard (1995) acknowledged, the F-O framework “leads us away 
from an emphasis on explaining stock price behavior and towards a focus on 
predicting future earnings and growth in book value… How observable data are used 
to form expectations about future abnormal earnings becomes a key step in the 
research design and, ultimately, the step that distinguishes one study from another.” 
 
6.1.2 Application of the F-O Framework to the Value Frontier Model 
 
To apply (6.5) to the value frontier model, we need to take into account the excess 
value that results from the irrationality and over-optimistic or irregular expectation of 
future returns by abstracting a third term of bubbles from the second term in the 
equation, which makes (6.5) become: 
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where B, the so-called “bubble”, captures the excess value to reflect the irrationality, 
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speculation and optimistic responses to the fundamental information K and Π . To 
make (6.8) estimable, we need to transform the term of abnormal returns to a current 
value by assuming that the abnormal earnings follow a growth rate g, i.e. 
1ˆ)1(ˆ −+= tt g pipi . Hence, (6.8) becomes: 
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Set )1(
ig
g
r
−
+
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where 1−−=∆ ttt KKK , the whole term of ])1()
1[( ttt KKgi
g ∆−++Π
−
+ λλ  
represents the fundamental value in (6.10), and any excess value that cannot be 
explained by the fundamental variables are kept in B which is interpreted as bubbles.  
 
Furthermore, if the risk premium r is considered, and r in (6.9) is replaced with 
ttt Rir
~β+= , where β  is a measure of a stock's volatility relative to the overall 
market and it reflects the risk of a stock, and R~  is the market risk premium, it then 
has:  
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where i  is the discount rate and it is supposed that the discount rate is a 
time-invariant non-risk interest rate. 
 
Therefore, by taking into account the investment risk of a stock, we can have two 
versions of fundamental value fitP : one is the fundamental value with account of the 
full risk of investment on stock i  at the time t: 
 
1
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−
−
+
+∆′−′++Π
−
+
= itittititit
f
it KRig
gKK
gi
gP βλλ     (6.13) 
 
And another is the fundamental value with only account of the market risk of 
investment on stock i  at the time t, i.e. 1=β  
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6.2 Estimation of Firm Level Bubbles for the United States and the United 
Kingdom  
 
6.2.1 Models 
 
In Section 6.1.2, the residual income valuation model is extended in the firm level 
value frontier model. However, it’s still necessary to make some adjustments in order 
to make (6.12) empirically estimable.  
 
First, due to the belief that the investors’ expectation to the change in the book value 
is formed on the basis of information provided in the past, itK∆  is substituted by 
the change made last year, denoted by 1−∆ itK , in the econometric version of the 
model (6.12) (see 6.16 below). Second, in order to capture the firm-specific 
characters in the information-revealing process and to ensure the process is identical 
among the companies in the sample, we introduce firm dummies to control specific 
effects on the revealing process of each stock. Moreover, we take two approaches to 
capture the effect of the term 1
~
−ititt KR β  on the stock price. One is to assume that
1=itβ , so that the term can be simplified to 1~ −itt KR . To avoid the multicollineary 
problem of 1−itK  with itK  in the estimation, we drop 1−itK  and further simplify 
the term of 1
~
−ititt KR β  to tR~ . Since tR~  is a premium rate at the market level, we 
can take time or year dummies to capture the market effect of tR
~
 which is common 
on all stocks at a point of time. Another approach is to control the term of 1
~
−ititt KR β  
in estimation by separating it into two components tR
~
 and 1−itit Kβ  respectively. 
tR
~
 is estimated by the year dummies and 1−itit Kβ  is estimated as a combined new 
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variable. Thus (6.12) becomes model A with the assumption of 1=itβ  and model B 
with full account of risk effects on the price forming: 
 
Model A:  
itititittiit KKTDP ςγγγα +∆+Π++++= −1321              
with 1321ˆ −∆+Π+= ititit
f
it KKP γγγ  ititit B ες +=      (6.15) 
 
Model B: 
itititititittiit KKKTDP ςβγγγγα ++∆+Π++++= −− 141321        
with 141321ˆ −− +∆+Π+= ititititit
f
it KKKP βγγγγ   ititit B ες +=   (6.16) 
 
where fitPˆ  is the proxy of the fundamental value, itε  is the statistical disturbance 
term with normal distribution of ),0(~ 2σN , iD  is a firm dummy variable 
capturing the company-specific characters, and tT  represents the time dummy 
variable to capture all market-specific risks and shocks on all stocks at a particular 
time. 
 
In order to take a robust check for the model B, the beta value is separated from 
1−itit Kβ  of model B and 1−itK  is dropped to avoid the collinearity with 1−∆ itK  and
itK . Model C is also achieved:  
 
Model C: 
ititititittiit KKTDP ςβγγγγα ++∆+Π++++= − 41321            
itititit
f
it KKP βγγγγ 41321ˆ +∆+Π+= −   ititit B ες +=     (6.17) 
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In (6.15), (1.16) and (6.17), the bubble term is denoted by variable itB  with 0>itB .  
 
In the estimation, using the cost frontier technique, itBI  is estimated on the basis of:  
 
1)exp()exp( ≥⋅== itfit
it
itit P
PbBI
ν
  with 0≥b       (6.18) 
 
itP  is defined as )exp( bPP itfitit +×= ν  by the frontier technique. Where ν  is the 
random disturbance which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
as N (0, σ2), empirically, itBI  is a bubble index to measure bubbles itB  relative to 
the proxy of fundamental value fP in a sample. 
 
By taking into account both firm and time dummies, (6.18) can be written into a 
logarithmic form that is: 
  
itit
f
ittiit bPYAP νβα +++++= lnln 1         (6.19) 
 
6.2.2 Data 
 
In the ongoing studies of companies’ valuation, such as Penman (1996), Dechow et 
al (1998), Frankle and Lee (1998), Dechow et al (1999a,b) and Francis et al (2000), 
the data utilised includes the CRSP dataset (Center for Research in Security Prices), 
Compustat and I/B/E/S consensus forecasts. The stock price or return are normally 
acquired from CRSP, and the historical accounting data, such as annual data of book 
value of an owner’s equity, earnings and dividends are obtained from the Compustat 
Annual File and Research File. The I/B/E/S database provides the forecast data over 
a long horizon, such as future earnings or future returns on average equity (ROEs). 
However, the datasets of Compustat confine the research within North America. 
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Moreover, it produces more work to match stock market data and accounting data 
from separate sources. To overcome these problems, the whole dataset applied to our 
empirical estimation is obtained from Datastream Global Indices List data. The U.S. 
and U.K. markets are processed respectively. Under the U.S. Datastream Index, 950 
domestic listed companies are pooled from 1991 to 2003, and the U.K. sample is 
composed of 461 British listed companies under the Datastream Index of U.K. from 
1995 to 2003. The annual data of prices (P), the book value per share (K) and 
earnings per share ( Π ) are employed in the unbalanced panel (see Appendix 6.1 for 
the definition of variables). 
  
In addition, in order to highlight that the bubble index estimated from our estimation 
is not identical to the price earning ratio (PE) and the price dividend ratio (PD), the 
annual data of PE and PD of each individual share over the period of 1995 to 2003 
are employed to draw the graph together with the estimated bubbles.46 
 
For analytical convenience, all the companies in the sample are classified into several 
sectors. In the U.S. sample, the companies are grouped according to the Dow Jones 
Global Classification Standard.47  The U.K. company classification follows the 
London Stock Exchange sector division.48 
 
The beta value is cited from the Datastream monthly data of beta value. The monthly 
data are transformed into annual data by averaging them year by year, and the 
                                                       
46
 PE data are provided by Datastream directly, but Datastream doesn’t provide the PD data directly. Thus, PD 
data are calculated from the data of the price and the dividend per share. 
47
 There is a four-level classification under Dow Jones Global Classification Standard. The first level is the 
Economic Sector, the second level is the Market Sector, the third is the Industry Group and the sub-group of the 
Industry Group is the lowest level (http://www.nyse.com/listed/industry.shtml). Only the first and third levels are 
listed in Appendix 6.3. 
48
 31 sectors are included in our U.K. sample. Because of the limitation of the sample, some sector samples are 
too small to reflect the character of their group. I sum up the 31 sectors into 12 which are listed in Appendix 6.3. 
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average yearly data are applied. 
 
The data applied in this chapter are the firm level sample, so that bubbles of each 
stock or firm will be estimated using the cost-frontier estimation technique. 
Therefore, the estimated firm level bubbles will enable us to draw the trend of bubble 
movement over time in terms of an industry or even a particular company.  
 
6.2.3 A Two-Stage Estimation 
 
In order to be consistent with the non-linear Cobb-Douglas function, which is applied 
in the empirical estimation, the cost-frontier model used in technical efficiency 
estimation is a logarithmic linear model. One problem in using (6.19) to estimate itb  
is that the value frontier function fP is linearly defined in (6.15), (6.16) and (6.17), 
which makes it inapplicable to estimate (6.19) directly. In order to solve this problem, 
this study sets two stages of estimation. At the first stage, the proxy of fundamental 
value fPˆ  is estimated by running a panel regression on the basis of models A, B 
and C respectively. The second stage is to replace fP  with the proxy of 
fundamental value fP
)
 which is predicted from models A, B or C.  
 
The crux of the two-stage method is that the value of fP
)
is composed of estimated 
parameters of independent variables, which are estimated from the first stage 
regressions. The relatively big difference between the observed price and the proxy 
of fundamental value fP
)
 allows us to detect the bubbles at the second stage of 
estimation.  
 
Based on the two-stage value frontier estimation method above, at the first stage, the 
basic tests for panel data are employed to acquire the unbiased coefficients from the 
prediction. Since firm dummies in models have their meaning with the descriptions 
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of firm-specific characters, it must exist in each regression. Consequently, to some 
extent, the choice between the fixed and random effect loses its function, as each 
regression with firm dummies can be treated as fixed effects. However, the 
significant result from the hausman test is still expected to validate the fixed effect 
model. The effort is mainly put on the test and correction of the group-wise 
heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation within the panel. The final decision is 
located on the GLS with the assumption of AR (1) error.  
 
6.2.4 Results of Estimation 
 
At the first stage, the significant results of the Breusch-Pagan test and the Modified 
DW test show the problems of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (see tables 
6.1-A and 6.2-A). In order to get unbiased coefficients, a GLS regression with the 
assumption of AR (1), which controls heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation, is 
pursued. It is easy to see from the results shown in Table 6.1-A and 6.2-A, that the 
coefficients and standard errors do not change significantly among the three models 
after correcting the two problems of the error. 
 
[Table 6.1-A and 6.2-A are about here] 
 
In the U.K., the marginal effect of earnings on a stock price is around 0.7429, which 
is less than 1.1366 of the U.S. However, the marginal effect of the book value of 
equity on the price is similar between the U.S. and the U.K and is 0.7459 and 0.7256 
respectively. In addition, the coefficient of earnings in the U.S. is 1.1366, which is far 
bigger than 0.7459 of the book value variable. Therefore, loosely speaking, in the 
U.S. market, the stock price is less sensitive in response to the book value and keener 
to react to the information of earnings than in the U.K. market. This finding is 
consistent with the result of Dechow et al (1998), in which the asymmetric effect of 
the book value and earnings on the stock price is 0.4 and 3.88 respectively in the US 
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market. 
   
In our first stage of the estimation, attention is drawn to the risk premium variable. In 
Table 6.1-A and 6.2-A, the coefficients of beta value are negatively associated with 
stock prices, which can be explained from the standpoints of fundamental values and 
bubbles. First, from the viewpoint of bubbles, the negative effect of risk on stock 
prices can be explained by Easton and Zmijewski’s (1989) opinion. They addressed 
the fact that greater risk implies a larger discount rate which reduces the discounted 
present value of the revisions in expected future earnings. To the extent of stock 
bubbles, the reduced expectation on the fundamental element, earnings, will shrink 
bubbles. Second, the risk can influence fundamental values by changing the cost of 
capital. A higher risk means more capital cost, which reduces the abnormal earnings 
of a company so as to diminish the fundamental value. Therefore, the risk can 
negatively influence stock prices by restoring fundamental values and bubbles. 
 
The first stage estimation is just a half of the estimation, and the frontier technique is 
then employed to complete the final estimation. Tables 6.1.-B and 6.2.-B list the 
second stage results of the U.K. and the U.S. respectively. The frontier technique 
intriguingly measures the relative values of the estimated bubbles that enable us to 
pursue through further analysis.  
 
[Table 6.1-B and 6.2-B are about here] 
 
Before analyzing the bubble movement, one question appearing is that between 
model A and model B, which one will bring us a more robust result? The original 
residual income valuation model is introduced with an assumption of risk neutral 
investors, and therefore, the risk premium is ignored in the model. However, in the 
value frontier model, the risk-neutral assumption for investors is relaxed. Moreover, 
the fact that risk premiums that compensate for risk is a core concern. However, 
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graphs exhibited in Figure 6.1 imply no significant distinction between models A and 
B, though there is a short inconsistency in the U.K. graph in 2000. The support also 
comes from the sector figures. In the graphs under Figure 6.4, the bubble movements 
estimated from models A, B and C are highly consistent. This means that taking into 
account the risk in the modelling does not substantially affect the result of bubble 
movement.   
 
[Figure 6.1 and 6.4 are about here] 
 
One robust check is made by employing the results of the market level bubble. 
Certainly, due to the statistical bias, the inconsistency is acceptable when the 
averaged firm level results are compared with the market level ones. However, the 
deviation between them is still expected to be minor. Comparing Figure 6.1 with 6.3, 
our confidence is located on model A, since the moving path of the firm level bubble 
from model A is most similar to the market level figures in both of the U.K. and the 
U.S. market. Thus, the estimated bubbles from model A are employed to show 
bubble movements over time across industrial sectors. 
 
[Figure 6.3 is about here] 
 
In addition, it’s possible to make a further comparison between the bubble path and 
the price tendency so as to enforce the argument that the estimated values of bubbles 
are different from stock prices in terms of their moving trends. The comparison of 
the estimated bubbles with actual prices is presented in Figure 6.5 for every 
industrial sector. It is easy to see that bubble figures may move with the price 
sometimes, but appear independent movements often, which proves that estimated 
values of bubbles are not identical to stock prices.49  
 
                                                       
49
 The estimated values of bubbles used are from model B. 
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[Figure 6.5 is about here] 
 
In order to highlight the fact that the estimated bubble is not identical to the 
price/earnings ratio and the price/dividend ratio which have been marking the stock 
overpricing, these two groups of values are concerned jointly with the estimated 
bubble on the graph. In Figure 6.2, obviously, the estimated bubbles are independent 
of the PE and PD. It is worth noting that the same sample is used for all three 
variables in the plots to ensure a uniform comparison. In pursuit of this aim, this 
study suffers the loss of all observations with a zero-dividend value which in turn 
causes a bias in bubble graph plots. However, it is important to note that the aim of 
this comparison is to investigate the co-movement of bubbles with either the PE or 
PD and not the movements of the bubble itself.  
 
[Figure 6.2 is about here] 
 
6.3 Interpretation of the Bubble Movement in the U.S. and the U.K. Markets 
 
Our examination of bubbles starts from plotting the bubble index over time for the 
U.S. and the U.K. markets. However, it is too cumbersome to do graph plots for 
every single company in these two markets. Instead, all the sample companies have 
been grouped in their corresponding industrial sectors. In Figure 6.6, the level of 
bubbles in each industrial sector is plotted against the mean of estimated bubbles of 
all sample companies.  
 
[Figure 6.6 is about here] 
 
6.3.1 The U.K. Market 
 
In Figure 6.6 and Table 6.3-A, the average bubble of the U.K. market is quite stable 
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over time which is almost 30% above the fundamental value. We are concerned that 
the light fluctuation of average bubbles in the UK market attributes to a stable 
economic growth, a relative high inflation and a large number of institutional 
investors.  
 
[Table 6.3-A is about here] 
 
Through the second half of the 1990s, the UK economy (as measured by GDP) has 
grown at around 2.5% per annum, and over the half century from 1949 to 1999, 
income per capita rose by approximately 2% per annum. Compared with the 
“boom-recession-boom” between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s, the UK economy over the period of 1995 to 2003 was relatively steady, while 
during this period, most other developed countries were achieving faster growth than 
the UK (Sawyer, 2001). This stable and sustainable macro economy supports a lesser 
variation in expectation of the stock value, which gives rise to a stable bubble path. 
 
Meanwhile, the relative high inflation rate is another reason for the low level of 
bubbles. Over the period of 1989 to 1999, the average annual inflation rate in UK is 
4.1% which is higher than 3.2% of the US and around 2% of most other developed 
markets. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, inflation negatively affects stock bubbles by 
reducing the investors’ expectation of the economic fundamental value and raising 
the risk aversion of investors. The high inflation in the UK economy helped to form a 
relatively low level of bubbles. After 1999, the inflation rates are often under 3%,50 
and a slight increase of bubbles can be accordingly observed in Figure 6.1.  
 
In addition, the institutional investors, such as pension funds, life insurance 
companies and mutual funds, dominate the UK stock market. In the UK, the 
institutional intermediation ratio reached 0.40 in 1998, i.e. the institutional investors’ 
                                                       
50
 Source: Sawyer (2001) 
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share of intermediation is 40%. The value of institutional assets (life insurance, 
pension funds and mutual funds) in 1998 is indicated to be 2,742 billion US dollars 
which is 197% of GDP.51 Davis and Steil (2001) mentioned that institutional 
investors have a major influence on the behaviour of capital markets, because 
institutional investors may be more diversified and have a lower risk aversion in their 
investment than households would. Also, according to Merton and Bodie (1995), one 
of the key functions of institutional investors is to manage uncertainty and control 
risk. Thus, by setting up a portfolio to diversify risk, a large number of institutional 
investors keep the average bubble fluctuating lightly in the UK market.  
 
In contrast to the market average bubble, sector bubbles have shown their fluctuation 
around the market average line (Figure 6.6). Our attention will mainly focus on the 
sectors of manufacturing, financial services, telecommunication and energy, since the 
structure of the British economy has been changing over time and the changes of 
these sectors are most apparent.  
 
Sawyer (2001) reported that the share of manufacturing in total output in the UK is 
declining, though the absolute amount of it continues to rise. The British economy 
has a more pronounced decline in the relative importance of manufacturing than 
many other industrialised economies.52 The decline of manufacturing occurs with an 
increase of services, especially financial services which have increased substantially 
from 1.69% of total consumers’ expenditure in 1970 to 4.09% in 1998. This rapid 
growth was more apparent during the 1990s. Thus, Sawyer (2001) concluded that the 
British economy is now largely a service economy. In Figure 6.6, bubbles in the 
sectors of engineering and electronics show the declining trends, and, in contrast, the 
bubble in the financial sector keeps going upward most years and remains higher 
                                                       
51
 Source: Davis and Steil (2001) 
52
 ‘Manufacturing’ is a broad category of output covering production of textiles, wood and metal products, paper, 
plastics, rubber, electricals, vehicles, machinery and equipment, and a host of other produced goods (Sawyer, 
2001). 
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than the average level of bubbles since 2000. Obviously, these findings are consistent 
with the common argument that investors’ expectation will be variable according to 
the changes in fundamental values. 
 
In Figure 6.6, there is an extraordinary bubble movement in telecommunication and 
technology, which climbed sharply over the period of 1997 to 2000, and dropped 
afterwards. In 2002, the bubble of this sector was shown to be lower than the average 
level of the market. Obviously, this trend followed the dot-com fad in the US market. 
The technology, media and telecoms were three magic words to excite every 
investor's heart before the end of the 1990s.53 However, with the crash of NASDAQ, 
the UK stock market was turned from a boom to a tremendous decline after 2000.  
 
Bubbles of the energy sector have been shown with a growing tendency since 1999 
and a more rapid increase occurs in 2002. Indeed, in 1999 and 2000 with rising world 
demand and some restriction of OPEC output, oil prices rose sharply. The bubble 
graph of the energy sector appropriately reflects a higher expectation of a rise in 
world demand, particularly by Asian economies, such as China, for the international 
supply of energies, such as oil.  
 
6.3.2 The U.S. Market 
 
In Figure 6.6 and Table 6.3-B, bubbles in the US market fluctuate periodically before 
1997 and a constant increase of bubbles is shown between 1997 and 2000. The 
bubble burst at 2000 and keep at a low level afterwards. The market average line of 
bubbles reflects the American economic changes in the whole 1990s and the early 
2000s. As a result of successive interest reduction, the American economy turned up 
a slow recovery in the early 1990s, and after 1993, the economy began to experience 
robust growth. However, after 1997, the gain of dramatically increased productivity 
                                                       
53
 Source: ‘Is the dot.com bubble bursting? (a report of BBC News , 11 April, 2000) 
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caused by the improved technology was offset by the reduced profitability due to the 
excess supply. The “New Economy” built on a technology-boost productivity 
revolution stirred up the optimistic expectation of the economy. However, 
“…productivity can have very little to do with profits…”54 Therefore, bubbles were 
inflated by the high expectation of the “productivity miracle” with a descending 
profitability. The final crash of TMTs (Technology, Media and Telecommunication 
companies) happened in 2000. Mahar (2003) name 1997 the year of the turning point 
for profits. From Figure 6.1, bubbles started to increase in 1997, which perfectly 
reflected the reduction of profits in the real world; i.e. the profit of companies fell 
which led to a shrinking of the fundamental value to inflate bubbles.  
 
The changes in the American economy are achieved by the common development in 
its industrial sectors, such as the manufacturing sector (such as the industrial sector, 
consumer, and telecommunication and technology), service sectors (such as the 
financial sector and investment products) and other non-manufacturing industrial 
sectors (such as utilities and energy etc.). Bubble movements in sectors can also be 
detected in Figure 6.6.  
 
The American economy was mainly driven by the performance of the manufacturing 
sector in the 1990s. Brenner (2002) reported that, in the early 1990s, a major increase 
in US international competitiveness and a dramatically increased orientation of the 
US manufacturing sector toward exports was thereby facilitated, which enabled US 
manufacturers to launch an extended and decisive process of profitability recovery 
and the economy as a whole expanded with it. From the fourth quarter of 1993 
through 1997, the investment jumped ahead at an average annual pace of 9.5 per cent, 
which opened the way to the growth in manufacturing output and productivity, 
averaging 5.7 and 4.4 per cent per annum respectively, and an average of 33 per cent 
increase of manufacturing profit rate. However, profit rates of manufacturers 
                                                       
54
 Said by Jeremy Grantham, the Boston-based money manager. Source: Mahar, 2003 
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remained flat in both 1996 and 1997 due to their reduced export prices caused by the 
ascending dollar. In addition, over-capacity in international manufacturing at that 
time worsened the profitability further. In terms of manufacturing profitability, 
Brenner (2002) define 1997 as a peak year for the 1990s’ economic recovery in US. 
After that, the real increase in the manufacturing profit rate was replaced by the 
“miracle” of productivity achieved by the huge investment in technology. The bubble 
in the sector of high-tech manufacturing, such as the internet and computers, 
dramatically ran up, since the excess capacity made supply swamp demand which in 
turn devastated profits. The dramatic performance of the American manufacturing 
sector is reflected in the sector-level graphs of the estimated bubble. In Figure 6.6, 
the sector of consumer (cyclical and non-cyclical) and industry perform in the 
low-bubble position. Their bubbles are moving on or below the average line in the 
most of the observed years. Before 1997, bubbles in these three sectors all kept 
moving downwards, but experienced sharp increases in 1997, which reflects the 
manufacturing recovery in the first half of the 1990s and the decreasing profitability 
after the profit turning point of 1997. The sector of high-tech manufacture (the 
telecommunication and technology) shows a sharp increase over the period of 1997 
to 2000, which perfectly reflects the delusive boom in the era of the “New 
Economy”.  
 
Unlike the manufacturing sector, the non-manufacturing sector had been undergoing 
a steady increase in productivity and profitability since 1970s. However, the rapid 
growth occurred after 1995 with a further 17.5 per cent increase of profits during the 
next two years.55 The steadily ascending profits gave rise to a sound explanation of 
the constant declining bubbles in the sector of utilities and energy in Figure 6.6: 
fattened fundamental values swamped the price increase so shrinking the level of 
bubbles.  
 
                                                       
55
 Source: Brenner (2002) 
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The financial sector had a parallel growth with the real economy. The reduction in 
the short-term interest rate at the beginning of the 1990s enabled banks to win an 
extra gain from the gap between the short-term borrowing and the long-term lending. 
Consequently, during the 1990s, US commercial banks achieved their highest rates of 
return on equity and assets in the post-war era, and the financial sector profits were 
higher than at any pervious time in post-war history (Brenner, 2002). In Figure 6.5, 
the bubble in the financial sector reached its peak in 1998 and dropped back to a low 
in 2000. This tendency was obviously achieved by the faster increase of fundamental 
values relative to the stock price in the financial sector during the period of “bull”.  
 
6.3.3 Summary 
 
Table 6.3 and Figure 6.6 show that the market average bubble remains about 30% 
and 40% above the fundamental value in the UK and the US market during the 
period of observation. This reveals a movement of bubbles that is more stable at the 
market level than the industry level.   
  
Since the industry-level graphs of estimated bubbles (Figure 6.6) exhibit higher 
volatility than market average plots (Figure 6.1), this enables us to further examine 
the origin of bubbles in link with the performance of individual economic sectors 
during a certain period of time. In this section, bubbles in two developed markets, the 
US and the UK markets, are interpreted at the industry-level by their respective 
economic activities, since the economic performance is the trigger to stir up (or break 
down) investors’ expectation and fundamental values so as to drive the movement of 
stock bubbles. This close relationship between stock bubbles and economic 
performances is soundly summarised by Brenner (2002): “the boom thus opens the 
way to the bubble; the bubble blows up the boom a good deal further; and the 
explosion of the bubble under its own pressure ultimately put an end to the boom.”   
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6.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
Based on the value frontier theory, the study makes a breakthrough by identifying 
bubbles at the firm level at a point in time. Moreover, it is concerned that the lesser 
volatility of market level bubbles may be a reason of the failure in testing the 
existence of bubbles in current researches. To this extent, a deeper level study of 
stock bubbles at the firm level is in a priority which can bring more evidence in 
support of the argument that bubbles persist in stock markets. Thus, compared with 
the market level study in a previous chapter, the firm level estimation is much more 
comprehensive and interesting. 
 
This chapter identified bubbles of every single sample company over the period of 
1991 to 2003 in the U.S. market, and 1995 to 2003 in the U.K. market, which enables 
us to draw a movement of bubbles over time in terms of each industrial sector or a 
company. There are two progresses obtained in the estimation of this chapter. Firstly, 
in the value frontier modeling, a well-acknowledged accounting model, F-O model, 
is utilised to construct the fundamental valuation model. It is concerned that the F-O 
model is superior to other fundamental valuation models in the value frontier 
modeling in that its starting point is the dividend discount model which is exactly the 
valuation model used in our market level modeling. This guarantees a consistency for 
the value frontier modeling between the market level and the firm level estimation. 
Furthermore, in the F-O model, several accounting variables rather than a single 
fundamental variable of dividends are employed, which enables us to give a more 
comprehensive and in-depth view on the fundamental valuation at the firm level. 
Secondly, to make the value frontier model of (6.19) applicable for the estimation of 
bubbles, we design a two-stage procedure for the value frontier estimation. This trial 
provides us with more degrees of freedom to build the fundamental valuation 
structure in the future, i.e. the fundamental valuation structure is not necessarily a 
non-linear function, instead it is allowed to be a linear approach. In summary, the 
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important contribution of this chapter not only relies on its empirical findings, but 
also on its innovative estimation method to identify firm level bubbles, which is a 
significant breakthrough for the methodology of bubble studies. 
 
However, it is worth highlighting a significant limitation in the newly developed 
two-stage estimation procedure, which is that any biases in parameters estimated 
from the first stage estimation will affect the frontier value and so the bubble results. 
Thus, an extra effort should be put on the justification for the first step estimation. 
The veracity of the estimated parameters is a weak part which is most likely to be 
challenged. 
 
In the next chapter, we will extend our new approach to estimate bubbles of China’s 
listed companies, which operate in a closed emerging market when compared with 
the U.K. and U.S. market that are open and mature. 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 6.1 Definition of Datastream Global Indices List Data 
 
 
Book Value Per Share (K) represents the book value of equity (proportioned common 
equity divided by outstanding shares) at the company’s fiscal year end for non-U.S. 
corporations and at the end of the last calendar quarter for U.S. corporations.  
 
Preference stock has been included in equity and the calculation of book value per 
share where it participates with common/ordinary shares in the profits of the 
company. It is excluded in all other cases, deducted at liquidation value for U.S. 
companies and at par value for all others. For U.S. corporations, common and 
common equivalent and fully diluted book values are shown, when available. 
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For companies with more than one type of common/ordinary share, the book value is 
based on combined shares adjusted for the par value of the share type identified in 
field 06005-Type of Share (Datastream). 
 
Earnings Per Share (V) represents the earnings for the 12months ended the last 
calendar quarter of the year for U.S. corporations and the fiscal year for non-U.S. 
corporations. It is as reported by the company.  
 
Preference stock has been included in the share base where it participates with the 
common/ordinary shares in the profits of the company.  
 
United Kingdom represents profit after tax, minority interest, and preferred dividends 
(except where preferred is included in share base), generally including pretax 
extraordinary items. United Kingdom earnings per share exclude extraordinary items 
prior to 1993. However with the adoption of FRS3 they are now included.Where 
corporation tax is not reported it has been estimated. U.S. bases earning per share on 
profit after tax, minority interest and preferred dividends, but before extraordinary 
items. 
 
For companies with more than one type of common/ordinary share, earnings per 
share are based on combined shares adjusted to reflect the par value of the share type 
identified in field 06005-Type of Share (Datastream). 
 
 
Prices (P) are generally based on 'last trade' or an official price fix from the main 
exchange. 
 
U.K.: For shares traded on the London Stock Exchange’s electronic trading system 
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(SETS), the default price, as of the introduction of SETS on 20/10/97, is the last 
automated trade generated from the order book. From 31/12/98 the closing price 
generated by SETS is a volume-weighted average derived from all automated trades 
in the 10 minutes before market close. For shares not traded on the electronic trading 
system, the default price continues to be the mid of the closing bid and ask prices 
generated from the exchange’s automatic quotation system. 
 
U.S.: For listed US shares prices are “composite” in that they reflect the last trade on 
either the New York or American exchanges or one of five other main regional 
exchanges. The average of closing bid and ask quotations is used when a stock does 
not trade. 
 
Price/earnings ratio (P/E) is the price divided by the earnings rate per share at the 
required date. 
 
Price/dividend ratio (P/D) is the price divided by the dividend per share at the 
required date. Dividend per share is rolling 12 month dividend per share. 
 
Datastream beta calculations (β) The derivation of Datastream betas is based on the 
method described in 'Predictability of British Stock Market prices' by S. Cunningham, 
Journal of Royal Statistical Society Series C (1973). 
 
Note 
For the purpose of this explanation, exceptional conditions (such as stocks traded for less than 2½, large price 
changes and so on) are ignored. 
 
This method assumes that movements in the market and in an individual equity are 
inter-related and that the relationship is of the form: 
βαxy =  
Where  y = movement in equity (price) 
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  x = movement in market (index)  
 
The calculation can be broken up into three stages: 
 
Step1 
The four-weekly prices for the past 58 months are converted to a series of 
logarithmic  
index changes, using the following formula for each stock: 
][log )1(
i
i
price
price +
  
Similarly, the four-weekly price indices are converted for each market. These values 
are used in the calculations described in Step 2.  
 
Step 2 
For each equity, the alpha and beta coefficients α  and β  are calculated as 
follows: 
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The average alpha and beta for the markets are derived as the sum of equity values 
over the number of equities, and the variance of the market beta can then be 
calculated thus: 
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Where E = logarithmic index change for a stock 
  M  = logarithmic index change for a market 
  N  = number of periods -1 
 
Step 3 
Finally, the estimator, forecast beta and correlation are calculated for each stock: 
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Appendix 6.2 The Cross-section Frontier Technique- Normal-Truncated 
Normal Distribution 56 
 
The normal-truncated normal formulation was introduced by Stevenson (1980). 
Under the assumption of normal-truncated normal distribution, the stochastic 
production frontier model can be describe 
 
0>−++= uuxy νβα
           (1) 
(i) ν  ~ iid ( )2,0 νσΝ  
(ii) u ~ iid ( )2, µσµ+Ν  
(iii)u and ν  are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors. 
                                                       
56
 Appendix 6.2 is abstracted from “Stochastic Frontier Analysis” by Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000 
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where ν  is the two-sided “noise” component, and u  is the nonnegative technical 
inefficiency component of the error term.  
   
A maximum likelihood method is used to estimate three parameters: uσ , νσ  and µ . 
There is a two-step procedure, in which the first step involves the use of OLS to 
estimate the slope parameters, and the second step involves the use of maximum 
likelihood to estimate the intercept parameters and the variances of the two error 
components. The distributional assumption is used in the maximum likelihood 
estimation, which is the second step of the two-step procedure. 
 
The truncated normal distribution assumed for u  generalizes the one-parameter half 
normal distribution, by allowing the normal distribution, which is truncated below at 
zero, to have a non zero mode.  
 
The density function of ν  is 
 
( )






−⋅= 2
2
2
exp
2
1
νν σ
ν
σpi
νf            (2) 
The truncated normal density function for 0≥u is given by 
( ) ( )
( )





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−
−⋅
Φ
= 2
2
2
exp
/2
1
uuu
u
uf
σ
µ
σµσpi
        (3) 
where µ  is the mode of the normal distribution, which is truncated below at zero, 
and ( )⋅Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Thus ( )uf  is the 
density of a normally distributed variable with possibly non zero mean µ , truncated 
below at zero.  
 
The joint density function of u  and ν  is the product of their individual density 
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functions, and can be written 
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The joint density of u  and ε  is 
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where ε  is the composed error, which is u+ν  
 
The marginal density of ε  is  
( ) ( )duuff ∫∞= 0 ,εε  
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where ( ) 2/122 νσσσ += u , νσσλ /u=  , and ( )⋅φ  is the standard normal density 
function. 
 
( )εf  is asymmetrically distributed, with mean and variance 
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













−⋅−−=Ε−=Ε
2
2
1
exp
22 u
uaau
σ
µ
pi
σµ
ε
       (7) 
( ) 222
22
1
2 ν
σσ
pi
piµε +




 −
+





−= u
aaaaV         (8) 
respectively, where ( )[ ] 1/ −Φ= ua σµ  
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The log likelihood function for a sample of I is 
 =Lln constant
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where 21/ λλσσ +=u . The log likelihood function can be maximized with respect 
to the parameters to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of all of the parameters. 
 
The conditional distribution ( )εuf  is given by 
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( )






−
−⋅
−Φ−
== 2
*
2
**
2
~
exp
/~12
1,
σ
µ
σµσpiε
ε
ε
u
f
uf
uf      (10) 
 
( )εuf
 is distributed as ( )2
*
,
~ σµi+Ν , where ( ) 222 /~ σµσεσµ ν+−= iui  and 
2222
*
/σσσσ νu= . Thus either the mean or the mode of ( )εuf  can be used to 
estimate the technical efficiency, and we have 
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Point estimates of the technical efficiency of each producer can be obtained by 
substituting either ( )iiu εΕ  or ( )iiu εΜ  into following Eq. 
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Appendix 6.3 Sector Code 
The U.K. Market 
1 Financial Banks 5 Entertainment Leisure Entertainment & Hotel 
  Life Assurance   Media & Photography 
  Insurance 6 Construction Real Estate  
  Investment Companies   Construction & Building Materials 
  Specialty & Other Finance 7 Electronics Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
2 Engineering Aerospace & Defense   
Household Goods and 
Textile-Consumer Electronics 
  Automobiles & Parts  8 Healthcare Health 
  Engineering   Pharmaceuticals  
3 Food and Tobacco Beverages   Chemicals 
  Food & Drug Retailers 9 Support Service Support Service 
  Food Producers & Processors 10 General Retailer General Retailer 
  Tobacco 11 Transport Transport 
4 Energy Electricity 12 Telecommunication Information Technology Hardware 
  Mining   Software & Computer Service 
  Oil & Gas   Telecommunication Services 
  Utilities Others    
 
The U.S. Market 
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1 Basic Materials Forest Products&Paper   Aerospace 
Mining&Metals   Containers&Packaging 
Chemicals   Electric Components&Equipment 
2 Consumer, Cyclical Auto Parts&Tires   Industrial,Diversified 
  Automobile Manufacturers   Industrial Equipment 
  Airlines   Advanced Industrial Equipment 
  Leisure Goods &Services   General Industrial Services 
 
 Home Construction 
&Furnishings  
 Industrial Transportation 
  Textiles&Apparel 7 Investment Products Investment Products 
  Advertising 8 Consumer,  
Non-Cyclical 
Beverage 
  Broadcasting  Consumer Services 
  Entertainment   Food Retailers&Wholesalers 
 
 Publishing 
 
 
 Household Products 
  Retail Tabacco 
3 Energy Energy   Food 
4 Financial Banks   Cosmetics 
  Diversified Financial 9  Technology Software 
  Real Estate   Technology Services 
  Securities Brokers   Communications Technology 
  Insurance   Semiconductors 
5 Healthcare Biotechnology   Technology Hardware&Equipment 
  Pharmaceuticals 10 Telecommunications Wireless Communications 
  Healthcare Providers   Fixed-Line Communications 
 
 Medical Products 11 Utilities Electric Utilities 
6 Industrial Building Materials   Gas Utilities 
  Heavy Construction   Water Utilities 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 6.1 Firm-level Estimation of Bubbles: the U.K. Market 
A. The First Stage Estimation: Estimating Fundamental Values 
 
Dependent Var.    P Model A Model B Model C 
Independent Var.    
Intercept 1.2418 
(1.37) 
1.4231 
(1.56) 
1.5797 
(1.73) 
itΠ  0.7429 (5.85) 
0.7043 
(5.50) 
0.6779 
(5.32) 
Kit 0.7256 
(16.77) 
0.7544 
(16.74) 
0.7312 
(16.41) 
∆Kit-1 0.2237 
(5.33) 
0.2514 
(5.76) 
0.2138 
(5.01) 
βitKit-1 
- 
-0.0867 
(-2.28) - 
βit 
-  
-0.4609 
(-4.55) 
Statistics of Estimations  
Numbers of Obv. 3162 3162 3047 
2R  within 
between 
0.3120 
0.9965 
0.3118 
0.9965 
0.3025 
0.9963 
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overall 0.8147 0.8147 0.8122 
F0.05 statistics 
H0: non of Tt influence P 
33.8865 
c.v.1.94 
34.0656 
c.v.1.94 
32.5336 
c.v.1.94 
Wald Test 2χ  5501.02 
[0.0000] 
5491.80 
[0.0000] 
5233.82 
[0.0000] 
AR1 0.4457 0.4473 0.4513 
eσ
 1.2261 1.2250 1.2211 
Statistical Tests    
Hausman Test 2χ  
H0: Random Effects 
184.77 
[0.0000] 
233.73 
[0.0000] 
240.02 
[0.0000] 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
Test for Heteroskedasticity 2χ  
H0: Constant Variance 
14558.54 
[0.0000] 
14425.94 
[0.0000] 
13989.16 
[0.0000] 
Modified Bhargava DW 1.1591 1.1575 1.1550 
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.4892 1.4871 1.4780 
 
Note: 1. t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
2. 2R  values reported in the table are correlations squared which are from the second –round regression 
itit pp
∧
= γ  ; 
 3. Firm and time dummies are not reported in the table; 
     4. All the statistical tests proceed from the estimation before controlling autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  Second Stage Estimation of Rational Bubbles Using the Frontier Model 
 
Dependent Var. 
Pp ln=  
Predicted Fundamental 
Value from Model A 
Predicted Fundamental 
Value from Model B 
Predicted Fundamental 
Value from Model C 
Independent Var.   
Intercept 
0.3681 
(2.43) 
0.5791 
(4.19) 
0.8823 
(7.89) 
∧∧
= Pp ln
f 0.5672 
(18.96) 
0.4105 
(30.74) 
0.3325 
(23.52) 
1996T  0.0754 
(2.63) 
0.2468 
(9.67) 
0.1644 
(6.65) 
1997T  0.1161 
(3.90) 
0.3156 
(12.10) 
0.1892 
(7.60) 
1998T  0.1391 
(4.26) 
0.4693 
(18.14) 
0.3402 
(13.63) 
1999T  0.1426 
(4.43) 
0.3847 
(14.78) 
0.2435 
(9.69) 
2000T  0.1130 
(3.57) 
0.3101 
(11.98) 
0.1211 
(4.81) 
2001T  0.1613 
(4.82) 
0.4453 
(17.22) 
0.2827 
(11.09) 
2002T  0.1697 
(5.10) 
0.4591 
(17.82) 
0.3581 
(14.19) 
2003T  0.0748 
(2.46) 
0.0910 
(3.21) 
0.0362 
(1.32) 
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Note:  t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
 Firm dummies are not reported in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 Firm-level Estimation of Bubbles: the U.S. Market 
 
A. The First Stage Estimation: Estimating Fundamental Values 
  
Dependent Var.    P Model A Model B Model C 
Independent Var.    
Intercept -7.9904 
(-1.75) 
-7.5650 
(-1.65) 
-5.1129 
(-1.11) 
itΠ  1.1366 (13.94) 
1.1045 
(13.51) 
1.1233 
(13.82) 
Kit 0.7459 
(22.25) 
0.7647 
(22.59) 
0.7427 
(22.20) 
∆Kit-1 0.3024 
(9.04) 
0.3314 
(9.71) 
0.3017 
(9.05) 
βitKit-1 
- 
-0.0722 
(-4.13) - 
βit 
-  
-1.5477 
(-6.96) 
Statistics of Estimations 
 
Numbers of Obv. 9237 9237 9237 
2R  within 
between 
overall 
0.5279 
0.9942 
0.7435 
0.5273 
0.9941 
0.7432 
0.5292 
0.9941 
0.7442 
F0.05 statistics 
H0: non of Tt influence P 
1.5605 
c.v.1.75 
1.0420 
c.v.1.75 
1.5641 
c.v.1.75 
Wald Test 2χ  10017.54 9984.59 10065.23 
Statistics of Estimations 
Number of Obsv. 3019 3071 2275 
Wald Test 2χ  
13091.13 
[0.0000] 
18628.43 
[0.0000] 
13878.5 
[0.0000] 
υσσλ /b=  1.3662 1.5870 1.5756 
bσ  0.3370 0.3587 0.2821 
υσ  0.2467 0.2261 0.1791 
2σ  0.1745 0.1798 0.1117 
Log Likelihood -822.3433 -758.1663 -25.3866 
Likelihood Ratio Test 
H0: 0=bσ  
9.62 
[0.001] 
20.79 
[0.000] 
6.95 
[0.004] 
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[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
AR1 0.4994 0.5018 0.5014 
eσ
 8.5135 8.5049 8.4888 
Statistical Tests    
Hausman Test 2χ  
H0: Random Effects 
272.15 
[0.0000] 
72.74 
[0.0000] 
61.23 
[0.0000] 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
Test for Heteroskedasticity 2χ  
H0: Constant Variance 
18499.52 
[0.0000] 
18451.19 
[0.0000] 
18454.79 
[0.0000] 
Modified Bhargava DW 1.0656 1.0642 1.0615 
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.2785 1.2772 1.2739 
 
Note: 1. t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
     2. 2R  values reported in the table are correlations squared which are from the second –round regression  
itit pp
∧
= γ  ; 
     3. Firm and time dummies are not reported in the table; 
     4. All the statistical tests proceed from the estimation before controlling autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Second Stage Estimation of Bubbles Using the Frontier Model 
 
Dependent Var. 
 Pp ln=  
Predicted Fundamental 
Value from Model A 
Predicted Fundamental 
Value from Model B 
Predicted Fundamental 
Value from Model C 
Independent 
Var. 
  
Intercept 
-0.2862 
(-1.86) 
-0.4072 
(-4.17) 
0.7459 
(4.70) 
∧∧
= Pp ln  0.6070 
(32.85) 
0.6497 
(70.79) 
0.2905 
(44.13) 
1995T  0.2225 
(8.76) 
0.3330 
(17.01) 
0.3204 
(15.62) 
1996T  0.2848 
(10.28) 
0.4819 
(23.42) 
0.4212 
(19.78) 
1997T  0.3546 
(12.03) 
0.6325 
(30.44) 
0.6065 
(28.89) 
1998T  0.3886 
(12.78) 
0.7526 
(38.04) 
0.7745 
(38.42) 
1999T  0.4369 (13.98) 
0.7451 
(37.14) 
0.7811 
(38.66) 
2000T  0.3867 
(11.79) 
0.6018 
(29.62) 
0.7059 
(34.40) 
2001T  0.4936 (15.20) 
0.7508 
(36.60) 
0.8200 
(39.94) 
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Note:  t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
 Firm dummies are not reported in the table. 
 
Table 6.3 Market Average Values of Stock Prices, Fundamental Values and 
Bubbles: the UK and the US Markets57 
 
A. The U.K. Market 
Year Price Proxy of Fundamental Value Bubble Index 
1995 1.037835 0.544911632 1.360866044 
1996 1.136793 0.657233751 1.341041537 
1997 1.138179 0.702280268 1.326281876 
1998 1.254638 0.798345685 1.328384246 
1999 1.198094 0.784448299 1.308135246 
2000 1.106582 0.748843872 1.307144462 
2001 1.212835 0.816582371 1.320528061 
2002 1.24546 0.810808063 1.334464409 
2003 1.02646 0.654498788 1.368532431 
 
 
B. The U.S. Market 
Year Price Proxy of Fundamental Value Bubble Index 
                                                       
57
 The values of price in the table are logarithmic values. The proxy of fundamental values is the predicted value 
of the second stage value-frontier estimation. The proxy of fundamental values and bubble index is estimated by 
model A. 
2002T  0.4783 (14.84) 
0.7308 
(35.13) 
0.8420 
(41.11) 
2003T  0.4899 (15.27) 
0.6307 
(29.79) 
0.7864 
(37.76) 
Statistics of Estimations 
  
Number of 
Obsv. 9052 
9061 8154 
Wald Test 2χ   23277.84 
[0.0000] 
54129.37 
[0.0000] 
28169.46 
[0.0000] 
υσσλ /b=  1.3914 
2.5805 1.1270 
bσ  0.4190 0.4771 0.2916 
υσ  0.3011 0.1849 0.2587 
2σ  0.2662 0.2619 0.1520 
Log Likelihood -4332.6221 -2823.4942 -2069.2838 
Likelihood 
Ratio Test 
H0: 0=bσ  
24.69 
[0.000] 
310 
[0.000] 
22.68 
[0.000] 
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1991 2.516521 1.988029 1.487703 
1992 2.611425 2.028376 1.483356 
1993 2.674678 2.123587 1.472957 
1994 2.732661 2.176645 1.438828 
1995 2.807588 2.303548 1.414799 
1996 2.990235 2.479942 1.407286 
1997 3.203464 2.697999 1.399125 
1998 3.453962 2.836239 1.428523 
1999 3.545988 2.926835 1.426242 
2000 3.398568 2.90131 1.543488 
2001 3.147952 3.007444 1.442585 
2002 3.074297 2.992566 1.443197 
2003 3.098344 2.995737 1.452446 
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Figure 6.2 Comparisons between Bubble Index and PE, PD 
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Figure 6.3 Estimated Market Level Bubbles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Comparisons among Three Models in the Firm Level Estimation:  
Average Values of Bubbles in A Sector 
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Figure 6.5 Stock Prices, Fundamental Values and Bubbles: Average Values in 
A Sector58 
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Figure 6.6 Bubbles in A Sector and Their Market Average Value: the UK and 
the US Markets59 
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 The estimated bubble used is estimated from model A. 
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Chapter 7  Application of the Value Frontier Methodology III: 
Estimation of Firm Level Bubbles in an Emerging Market (China) 
 
In the last chapter, our estimation is made on the basis of developed markets. Thus, 
one may raise a question that the estimation for developed markets may not be 
applicable for emerging markets. In order to address this concern, in this chapter, the 
value frontier model is applied to a typical emerging market - the Chinese stock 
market. Moreover, another motive to study the bubbles of China is to discover how 
bubbles behave in this closed market. When compared with open markets, such as 
the U.K. and the U.S, are bubbles higher or lower in this closed emerging market? 
Some studies, such as Su and Fleisher (1998), Zhang and Zhao (2004), Green (2003), 
Xu and Wang (1999) and Zhou and Sornette (2006), demonstrate that, in the Chinese 
stock market, there is an excessive volatility caused by the political risk, a high PE 
ratio resulted from an extensive speculation, and an earning-insensitive anticipation 
made by investors’ short-term investment horizon. These findings imply a high level 
of bubbles in the Chinese stock market since irrationalities and government shocks 
are expected to be more serious in the Chinese stock market than a developed market. 
But an opposite argument for lower bubbles in the Chinese stock market can also be 
made with the following two reasons. 
 
First, we are concerned that bubbles in a less mature market are not necessarily 
higher than the ones in a mature market. The less orderly market doesn’t mean that 
the investors acting in it are naïve. Bubbles in emerging markets may be moving 
below the level of mature markets due to the lesser fundamental value of their 
economies as long as their investors are prudent enough. The evidence for this 
argument can be found by jointly observing the average return on equity (ROE) of 
sample companies in three countries – the U.S., the U.K. and China. In Table 7.1, 
Chinese listed companies are obviously weaker than U.S. companies in terms of 
profitability. If the accounting manipulation is taken into account, the Chinese 
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numbers in Table 7.1 may be further lower than the U.K. Certainly, the poor 
profitability can hardly sustain a high level of the stock market boom.  
 
 [Table 7.1 is about here] 
 
Secondly, in the Chinese stock market, investors show a higher risk aversion when 
compared with developed open markets, which restrains the growth of bubbles. This 
negative attitude towards risk is caused by two reasons. First, the Chinese stock 
market is a “policy-driven market” (Heilmann, 2002).60 There are so many unstable 
elements coming from government reforms in this developing market, which 
increases its uncertainty. If the game of stock investment is not one short, these 
elements can make investors learn from the past, which eventually results in lower 
confidence on future returns and so have higher risk aversion. Second, since the less 
international investors there are, the less risk can be diversified, investors in a closed 
stock market feel less secure than in a completely opened market which means that 
they bear a relatively more conservative expectation to this market. Therefore, 
bubbles in the Chinese stock market should be expected at a lower level than 
developed markets such as the U.S. or the U.K. market. 
 
With the motive to verify the arguments above, in the study of this chapter, we will 
estimate stock bubbles in the Chinese stock market by applying the value frontier 
estimation to this market with some further extension to take into account the 
particular conditions of the market. Thus, this chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 7.1 focuses on the background of the Chinese stock market which has only 
15 years’ history; Section 7.2 is devoted to the empirical work in which some new 
elements are added into the firm level model concerning the special pattern in this 
                                                       
60
 Heilmann (2002) gave rise to three characters for the policy-driven market of China: 1. political calculations, 
policy missions and administrative interference are more important than the dynamics of market competition for 
determining price fluctuations; 2. State-owned shares and legal person shares are excluded from trading so as to 
perpetuate state control; 3. the most powerful political and economic actors try to benefit from their control over 
state assets.  
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market; Section 7.3 is designed to examine the econometric and analysis results, in 
which several findings are addressed. Section 7.4 deals with the summary and 
conclusion of this chapter. 
 
7.1 Background of the Chinese Stock Market 
 
7.1.1 Characteristics of the Chinese Stock Market - A Closed Emerging 
Market 
 
With the progress of an opening-up policy in the Chinese economy, the Chinese 
stock market has been also rapidly developed since the beginning of the 1990s. Since 
then, it has attracted considerable interest from foreign investors (Green, 2003). Ma 
(2003) summarised the development of the Chinese stock market into three stages.  
 
The first stage is over the period of 1978 to 1990, the so-called “infancy stage”. In 
this stage, although stocks were issued to the public, there was no formal public 
trading market. Therefore, the liquidity of stocks in this stage was very poor.  
 
The second stage is from 1991 to 1996, which is the “growing stage”. During this 
period of time, two stock exchanges - the Shanghai stock exchange and the Shenzhen 
stock exchange - were established in 1990 and 1991 respectively. Since then, 
significant growth has been achieved both for the size of the market and the number 
of shareholders. The value of equities issued increased from RMB 3 billion (0.8 
billion US dollar) in 1989 to RMB 30 billion (5.2 billion US dollar) in 1993. The 
number of stocks listed on both exchanges increased from 15 in 1991 to 381 by the 
end of 1995. By the end of 1994, the number of shareholders in both exchanges is 15 
million with an estimated growth of 10,000 new shareholders a day (Mookerjee and 
Yu, 1999). However, during this period of time, the Chinese stock market was highly 
- 251 - 
protected and disorganised, in that the government restricted the quantum of the 
stock issue, and controlled the issuing price. In fact, there were no systematic stock 
market regulations restricting investors’ behaviours at that time. Thus, this 
environment provided a huge chance of manipulation (Ma, 2003). 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that the Chinese stock market reached a milestone in 
its development in 1996 when many regulations were implemented by the 
government, clearly marking the transition of the market from its “growing stage” to 
the “stage of approaching maturity”. After 1996, although the government still plays 
a big role in this immature market, with the establishment of relevant regulations, the 
market manipulation has been reduced and the listed companies lose the chance to 
deceptively report their performances (Ma, 2003). Since 2000, China has been 
rapidly progressing in terms of improving its capital market (Jingu, 2002). Green 
(2004) demonstrated that the Chinese state appeared to be significantly better 
coordinated in 2003 in financial policy than at any time since 1986. 
 
However, behind the rapid growth, the Chinese stock market is suffering several fatal 
problems: low regulatory quality, frequent shocks from the government reform, the 
poor performance of listed companies caused by the structure of ownership, and the 
limitations of foreign ownership on stocks. These four issues have been broadly 
documented by existing studies on the Chinese stock market. 
 
First, Pistor and Xu (2004) concluded that the Chinese stock market under-performed 
with regards to the quality of the law on the books and actual law enforcement. 
Although major efforts have been made by the Chinese government to develop a 
formal legal framework over the past twenty five years, the regulatory quality is still 
poor since it started from a very low level. According to the World Bank database, 
the average number of “regulatory quality” for all transition economics is 62.13 and 
China’s score is only 57.  
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Secondly, since China has been undergoing economic reforms since the 1980s, the 
uncertainty of government policy is another problem affecting the stock market. 
Government shocks drive the stock market fluctuating from the bull to the bear. Su 
and Fleisher (1998) found that the government’s market intervention policies have 
affected stock market volatility in China. Zhang and Zhao (2004) also demonstrated 
that the political risk of China is an important component of the country-specific risk 
in the Chinese stock market so as to play a critical role in the stock valuation. The 
political risk was mainly caused by the stock market governance reform and the 
reform of releasing the state ownership of listed companies. Green (2004) identified 
the development of the stock market governance structure with three periods between 
1984 and 2003. With the push-forward stock market policy of the first period 
(1990-1992), the stock market was accordingly feverish. However, the restructure of 
the governance scheme caused several crises in the second period of 1992-1996. 
Hence, after a set of sound coordinated financial policies took effect in the third 
period, this gave rise to a “worthwhile cost” to produce a more rational stock market 
afterwards. Another significant shock to the stock market was privatisation. The 
Chinese government has been concerned with selling part of its state ownership in 
the stock market since 1999, and officially implemented this reform in 2001. This 
new policy was soon suspended due to the big crash caused in the stock market. 
However, the government’s intention of proceeding this reform wasn’t reduced by 
the chaos. Thus, since then, this issue has become the major concern influencing the 
investors’ attitude towards the risk. 
 
The poor performance of listed companies and their structure of ownership is the 
third concern. According to the result reported by Jefferson et al (2000) while SOEs 
performed badly, shareholding firms (all listed firms fall into this category) did even 
worse, suffering an annual 8% decline in their total factor productivity (TFP). Green 
(2003) concluded that the listed companies in the Chinese stock market became 
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progressively less efficient in using resources, which is a signal that they were 
wasting the resources available to them. The poor performance of Chinese listed 
companies has been commonly considered as a result of the weakness of corporate 
governance, which is in turn caused by the problems of the share ownership (Bajona 
and Chu, 2004). In the Chinese stock market, the listed companies are mostly 
originated from state-owned enterprises, and their shares are only partially put into 
public and most of them are non-tradable which are owned by the state, the so-called 
state shares, or other SOEs, the so-called legal person (LP) shares.61 These two types 
of non-tradable shares cannot be listed and traded on the stock exchanges, though 
they can be exchanged at auction or by one-to-one deals (Green, 2003). In September 
2005, among 757.4 billion total shares, only 280 billion shares are traded in public, 
and over half the amount of shares are not tradable in the stock exchanges.62 This 
ownership structure protects the listed companies from exposing themselves to the 
discipline of the market, since the major share ownership is not liquid in the public 
market and controlled by the government. Chen et al (2002b) found that the 
profitability and efficiency in Chinese listed companies declined over the period of 
1991 to 1997 and attributed this to the ownership structure. They addressed the fact 
that the government influences management in order to achieve political and social 
objectives through its majority share ownership that may be detrimental to corporate 
profitability.     
 
Finally, compared with the opening speed of the real economy, the Chinese stock 
market seems to be a specially protected corner preventing foreign investors to 
participate in this market. Since China currently maintains total control over its 
monetary policy in a closed capital market, the Chinese stock market is a closed 
market and the majorities of participators in this market are Chinese citizens. Like 
many other emerging stock markets, such as Brazil, Indian, Mexico and Philippines, 
                                                       
61
 Chen et al (2002b) named them as legal entities shares.  
62
 Source: statistic data of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange www..sse.com.cn, www.szse.cn. 
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the Chinese government imposes restrictions on the foreign ownership of domestic 
equity to ensure domestic control of local firms (Ma, 1996). The stocks traded in the 
Chinese stock market are classified into two parts, namely A- and B-share.63 The 
trading of A-share had been localised only on Chinese citizens until July 2004 when 
the QFII (qualified foreign institutional investor) implemented by the Chinese 
government. Before that, the foreign investors were only allowed to hold B-shares. 
B-share exists with the purpose of raising foreign capitals, which is denominated 
with the U.S. dollar in the Shanghai stock exchange and with the Hong Kong dollar 
in the Shenzhen stock exchange respectively, 64 while A-share is priced with local 
currency - RMB Yuan. The market segmentation contributes to the highly speculative 
tenor of the market and needs to be corrected (Jingu, 2002). Meanwhile, limitations 
on foreign ownership of domestic equity show that the Chinese stock market is still a 
closed market, at least for the time being.  
 
Due to the four problems discussed above, it is easy to see that although an 
opening-up policy contributes to China’s economic boom, the Chinese stock market 
is still far from maturity and complete opening. 
 
7.1.2 Performances of the Chinese Stock Market  
 
Having examined the characteristics of the Chinese stock market, we turn to study 
the stock price performance in this market. Existing investigations in the Chinese 
stock market are diversified and the results are not clear-cut. Some of the studies 
tried to verify the heavy speculation and irregularity of the Chinese stock market, 
while others raised the opposite opinions by showing the sound development in this 
young market.  
 
                                                       
63
 Stocks issued by Chinese listed companies are normally classified into three parts: A, B and H share. However, 
H-shares are listed in Hong Kong market not in the mainland of China.  
64
 There are two stock exchanges in China located in Shanghai and Shenzhen respectively. 
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The Chinese stock market is generally considered as a market with extensive 
speculation which marks the share prices at high levels. Green (2003) concluded that, 
when compared with Western markets, the share prices in the Chinese stock market 
are at high levels since the PE ratios for much of the 1990s in this market are double 
that of the Western markets. Ma and Barnes (2001), Darrat and Zhong (2000) and 
Seddighi and Nian (2004) failed to prove the efficient hypothesis in the case of the 
Chinese stock market. Su (2003) found that A-share prices do not react to changes in 
earnings per share, i.e. investors do not correctly anticipate the changes in earnings 
so as to fail to make adjustment in accordance with the new earnings information, 
since most of A-share holders are individuals with short-term investment horizon. 
The average period for which individual investors hold shares is just one to two 
months in the Chinese stock market, which shows the speculative nature when 
compared with 18 months in the U.S. (Xu and Wang, 1999). Zhou and Sornette 
(2006) described the Chinese stock market as immature, which seems to attract 
short-term investors more interested in fast gains than in long-term investments, thus 
promoting speculative herding. Under this circumstance, the expectation distortion is 
formed by the heavy speculation and meanwhile it is also likely to cause the positive 
feedback trading, so as to inflate the stock bubble.65 This positive feedback trading 
behaviour in the Chinese stock market is ascertained by Yeh et al (2002) who 
documented that in emerging markets, such as the Chinese stock market, stock prices 
may be generally affected by the positive feedback trading. The speculative activities 
in the Chinese stock market were also pointed out by the central bank of China in 
1995, which viewed stock prices as being excessively volatile in the sense that they 
do not reflect the economic fundamentals of listed firms (Laurenceson, 2002). 
However, in the meantime, Laurenceson (2002) also shows a declined trend of share 
volatility in the Chinese stock market in the most recent years by examining the 
                                                       
65
 When rational speculators receive good (bad) news, they will buy (sell) more shares today than the 
fundamental news warrants, in anticipating buying (selling) behaviours by the positive feedback traders tomorrow. 
The buying (selling) of positive feedback traders will help push prices above (below) fundamentals even as 
rational speculators are selling out (purchasing) and stabilising prices (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldmann,1990). 
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standard deviation of the price index between the period of 1994 and 1998. 
 
Like Laurenceson (2002)’s argument, many researchers have raised a positive 
outlook on the stock market performance of China. Los and Yu (2005) reported that, 
although the Chinese stock market was infamous for its high turnover rate, the 
volatility levels in this market have been gradually declining and it has become more 
efficient since 2003. They attribute this improvement of the Chinese stock market to 
the initial government interventions and the increased participation of many hedging 
noise traders who trade around the market mean but fewer powerful institutional 
investors who are used to take a few large “speculative buy-and-hold positions away 
from the market mean”. Fernald and Rogers (1998) found that investors in the 
Chinese stock market are very well-informed about the price differences and so could 
each take a tiny position against mispricing. By studying stock returns and 
accounting data of Chinese listed companies between 1994 and 1997, Chen et al 
(2002a) and Haw et al (1999) also verified that although the Chinese stock market is 
very young and investors have limited knowledge and experience, the stock market 
does appear to incorporate earnings information in share prices, which means that the 
information of earnings influences investors in valuation decisions. Moreover, Wu 
(1996) and Laurence et al (1997) verified that the Chinese stock market is 
“weak-form efficient”. They also found a strong causal effect from the U.S. stock 
market to the Chinese stock market and concluded that the Chinese stock market is 
becoming more integrated to the global economy. 
 
Obviously, research in the area of the Chinese stock market is still in a rudimentary 
stage, since this market only has 15 years’ history and its speciality gives rise to 
several difficulties in the study. Given the characteristics of the Chinese stock market 
which has been under rapid development, it is expected that the market would 
behave very differently at different stages of development. It is inappropriate to 
conclude on the market on the basis of a phenomenon that appeared in a particular 
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stage of development, since it changes over time. This further implies that stock 
bubbles in China cannot simply be expected to be at a similar level to the US and the 
UK markets, since the effect of development plays a more important role in forming 
bubbles in emerging markets than in a developed market. This argument will be 
shown by our following analysis.  
 
7.2 Estimation of Firm Level Bubbles in the Chinese Stock Market  
 
7.2.1 Models 
 
Since the stock bubble is a phenomenon of stocks traded in stock markets, the focus 
of our bubble study should be stocks traded in the stock exchange. Thus, 
non-tradable shares shall be in theory excluded from the bubble estimation. However, 
in the stock market, the fundamental value of a share determined by fundamental 
variables, such as the book value of equity and earnings, is related to the value of all 
shares including the non-tradable part. Existing studies on the Chinese stock market, 
such as those by Spencer (1995), Yao (1998) and Laurenceson (2002), documented 
that when only a small proportion of a company’s total shares are available for 
trading, share prices cannot reflect the market’s view of the fundamental value of a 
listed firm. Therefore, the existence of non-tradable shares is the major concern in 
the bubble modelling for the Chinese stock market. To take into account this concern, 
following Chen et al (2005), a variable, tradable ratio (LR), is added into the model, 
which may be defined as the ratio of tradable shares to total shares:66 
 
 
N
N
LR l=
                (7.1) 
 
                                                       
66
 Chen et al (2005) utilised a variable TrdSha to measure the effect of non-tradable shares on price limits. 
TrdSha is defined as the ratio of the number of tradable shares to the total number of shares outstanding. 
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where lN  is the amount of tradable shares, and N  represents the total number of 
shares composed of tradable and non-tradable ones. 
 
The fundamental value fp of a tradable share is accordingly adjusted by a tradable 
ratio as the market price only demonstrates the price of tradable shares, not total 
shares. The function of the fundamental value can then be rewritten as: 
 
LRxfP fit ⋅= )(               (7.2) 
 
where x  is the set of fundamental variables.  
 
Thus, the transformed firm level value frontier model can be structured as: 
 
)exp()()exp( ititititfitit BILRxfBIPP νν β ⋅⋅⋅=××=      (7.3) 
 with )exp( itit bBI =  
 
The estimation model is specified in a logarithmic form with the time (Y) and firm 
dummies (A): 
 
Model I. 
ititittiit bLRxfYAP νβα ++++++= ln)(lnln       (7.4) 
with )ln( itit BIb =  
 
One might ask: does the adjustment achieved by the tradable ratio really affect the 
final bubble results? To answer this question, the estimation without the variable LR 
is also considered in Model II. 
 
 Model II. 
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ititttit bxfYAP να ′+′++++= )(lnln          (7.5) 
 with )ln( itit IBb ′=′   
  
where BI  is named the adjusted bubble index, and accordingly IB ′  is called the 
non-adjusted bubble index. 
 
To calculate the proxy of )(xf , three models, which are deliberated in Chapter 6, are 
once again employed as follows:67 
 
Model A:  
itititittiit KKTDP ςγγγα +∆+Π++++= −1321              
with 1321)( −∆+Π+=′ itititit KKxf γγγ   ititit B ες +=     (7.6) 
 
Model B: 
itititititittiit KKKTDP ςβγγγγα ++∆+Π++++= −− 141321        
with 141321)( −− +∆+Π+=′ itititititit KKKxf βγγγγ  ititit B ες +=   (7.7) 
 
Model C: 
ititititittiit KKTDP ςβγγγγα ++∆+Π++++= − 41321            
with ititititit KKxf βγγγγ 41321)( +∆+Π+=′ −   ititit B ες +=   (7.8) 
 
where K is book value of equity per share, П is earnings per share and β is beta 
value. D and T represent firm and time dummies. itς  contains both bubbles itB  
and the statistic noise itε . We don’t break down itς  into two components at stage 
one of estimations.  
 
                                                       
67
 The detailed derivation of models can be found in Chapter 6. 
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7.2.2 Data and Estimations 
 
The data source in this chapter is from the SINOFIN China stock data produced by 
China Centre for Economic Research (CCER).68 We employ the data with two 
considerations. One is about the two classes of shares- A and B share. As already 
mentioned in Section 7.1, the trading of these two kinds of shares are running in two 
separate markets. Thus, it seems that giving rise to their respective concerns should 
proceed in the study of Chinese stock bubbles. However, at the present research, we 
assuredly concentrate the estimation particularly on A-shares as it is the main body of 
the Chinese stock market with the market value of 1,006.8 billion Yuan which is 
more than 94% of the total market value. Until September 2005, there are 1,381 
listed companies in the Chinese stock market, but only 109 of them are listed with 
B-shares. B-shares floating in this stock market are merely around 10% of 
A-shares.69 Table 7.2 also shows that A-share companies dominate the Chinese stock 
market. Another consideration is that, as introduced in Section 7.1, the market was 
highly disorganised during the time of its infancy. Thus, the attention in this chapter 
is only placed on data after 1996.  
 
 [Table 7.2 is about here] 
 
Therefore, the dataset employed in this chapter is an unbalanced panel pooled by all 
A-share listed companies in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1996 
to 2003. Annual data of book value of equity per share (K), earnings per share (П) 
and beta value (β) are provided by the data, in which the beta value is calculated 
based on Scholes and Williams (1977), and K and П are computed by accounting 
numbers of equity and net profit over the total number of shares respectively. In 
                                                       
68
 China Centre for Economic Research (CCER) is a leading research institution of economics and finance in 
China. 
69
 Source: statistic data of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange www.sse.com.cn and www.szse.cn. 
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addition, following the study by Chen et al (2001) in which the percentage of public 
holdings are defined by the percentage of public share holdings over total shares 
outstanding, the tradable ratio (LR), which is computed by the number of tradable 
shares (Nl) and the number of total shares (N) is used for the purpose of controlling 
the non-tradable element in the estimation (the definition of data can be found in 
Appendix 7.1.).  
 
The two-stage estimation introduced in Chapter 6 is again employed in this chapter. 
Three models, models A, B and C (7.6, 7.7 and 7.8) are applied in the first stage of 
estimations respectively, and accordingly values of )(xf ′  are generated. The first 
stage statistics (Table 7.3) show that the fixed effect panel regression conduces to the 
problems of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, which could result in biased 
estimation. As explained in Chapter 6, the accuracy of the prediction in the first stage 
estimation is the key concern. Therefore, AR(1) and heteroskedasticity are controlled 
by running the GLS regressions with the assumption of AR(1) and the estimated 
results are shown in Table 7.3.  
 
 [Table 7.3 is about here] 
 
In the second stage, similar to Chapter 6, in order to control firm-specific effects and 
the market impact, a frontier estimation program is applied with inclusion of time 
and firm dummies. Three groups of values of )(xf ′  acquired respectively in the 
first stage are applied to models I and II (Eq.7.4 and Eq.7.5) which gives rise to six 
estimations. For convenience of explanation, these six estimations are labeled as I-A, 
I-B, I-C, and II-A, II-B, II-C, as shown in Table 7.4. 
 
 [Table 7.4 is about here] 
 
After the two-stage estimation, the analysis based on the estimated bubbles is 
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provided. The plot of bubble movements is conducted by averaging the values of the 
estimated bubble (BI) year by year. First of all, a robust bubble path is expected by 
jointly plotting the values of the adjusted bubble from three estimations (I-A, I-B and 
I-C). Thereafter, the adjusted bubble index and the unadjusted bubble index are 
examined together in order to check the influences of non-tradable shares on the 
investors’ decision.  
 
7.3 Results and Interpretations 
 
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 show that the results are intriguing. First, the likelihood ratio 
test significantly rejects the null hypothesis of zero standard deviation of b, which 
means that bubbles (b) do exist over the time period of our study. This provides 
further evidence for Ahmed, Li and Jr.’s (2000) argument for the possible existence 
of bubbles during the 1990s. Second, the statistics of λ  in Table 7.4 look extremely 
high when compared with the U.K. and the U.S., which coincides with an intuition of 
relatively stronger bubble volatility in the emerging market. Finally, the coefficients 
of variables in six estimations appear to be robust. In Table 7.3, the coefficient of 
earnings П is higher than the book value of equity K, which is consistent with Chen 
et al (2002a)’s conclusion that the earning signal has a stronger impact on stock 
prices than other accounting information in the Chinese stock market. This result is 
similar with the U.S. market where the coefficient of earnings appears higher than 
the book value, and is different from the U.K. market with the almost equivalent 
influence of earnings and book values on prices. Moreover, compared with the 
estimations in the U.K. and the U.S. market, lower coefficients of fPln  for China 
in Table 7.4 imply a relatively weak effect of fundamental values on China’s stock 
market. In other words, in the Chinese stock market overall, investors are less 
responsive to fundamental values than those investing in more developed markets. 
This finding is consistent with the short-term behaviour of investors who hold shares 
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just one to two months on average in the Chinese stock market, which is far shorter 
than 18 months in the US market (Xu and Wang, 1999). 
 
In addition, the significant coefficients and the negative sign of LRln  demonstrate 
a negative relationship between the market value and the tradable ratio of A-shares, 
which implies that investors prefer the firms with high proportion of non-tradable 
shares. This conclusion is coincident with Qi et al’s (2000) report that shares have 
higher returns on equity if the non-tradable share ownership is high. Fernald and 
Rogers (1998) also verified that investors tend to pay higher prices for small firms 
with larger state ownership which is not tradable in stock exchanges. Meanwhile, to 
some extent, the significant effect of tradable ratio on the price verifies Chen et al’s 
(2005) finding that stocks with a high ratio of tradable shares tend to hit their price 
limits more frequently,70 i.e. stocks with a high ratio of non-tradable shares appear 
less volatile, which means the issue of tradable ratio does affect investors’ decision 
and so in turn do influence stock prices.  
 
Having discussed estimated results, our attention turns to three major issues. The first 
issue is the average bubble movement in the Chinese stock market over the sample 
period of 1996 to 2003. This bubble movement will be explained based on the 
Chinese economic and financial reform implemented during this period. Investors’ 
behaviours in the Chinese stock market are our second issue, since stock bubbles are 
formed by investors’ decisions. We will discuss the question “Are investors in the 
Chinese stock market as naïve as this market is?” This in turn gives a fresh look to 
the question raised at the beginning of this chapter: “Are bubbles higher or lower in 
the Chinese stock market than the U.K. and U.S. markets?” A comparison between 
opened markets (the U.K. and the U.S.) and a closed market (China) is conducted. 
The firm level estimation also provides us with an opportunity to see this market in 
                                                       
70
 On December, 1996, the Chinese government restored the price limit policy in order to reduce the effects of 
speculative activities. Before, the price limit was withdrawn between 1992 and 1996 with the purpose of 
stimulating the trading in the Chinese stock market. 
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detail, which enriches the stock performance profile when the stock market is 
analysed. Thus, our final issue is how to show bubbles in individual industrial sectors. 
Nine industrial sectors are studied respectively by comparing their bubble levels with 
the mean of the market.71 
 
7.3.1 A Descending Path of Bubbles in the Chinese Stock Market 
 
The bubble movement in the Chinese stock market over the period of 1996 to 2003 is 
demonstrated in figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. Figure 7.2 presents three similar paths 
which eventually reveal the robust results, though there is a slight inconsistency 
shown between the results of estimation I-B and I-C over the period of 2001 to 
2002.72 In addition, Figure 7.3 shows that bubbles do not follow the trend of stock 
prices. Between 1996 and 2000, the ascending price accompanies the downward 
bubble movement, which was caused by the significant improvement of fundamental 
values of Chinese listed companies during this period. Ahmed, Li and Jr. (2000) 
verified that the considerable volatility in the Chinese stock market represents the 
persistence of bubbles during the 1990s. They predicted, however, that bubbles in 
this market will not exhibit quite as much volatility as they did in the 1990s with a 
further development of the Chinese stock market. 
 
 [Figure 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 are about here] 
 
In addition, despite a co-moving tendency indicated in figure 7.1, the non-adjusted 
bubbles move above the adjusted ones only before year 2001, cross through in 2001 
and are slightly lower afterwards, which reveals that before 2001, the stock price can 
be explained more with the consideration of the tradable ratio. This finding implies 
that the concern of the tradable ratio governs investors inconsistently, i.e. before 
2001, investors gave stronger concerns about the tradable ratio than after 2001. The 
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 The sector classification is cited from the SINOFIN database. 
72
 The inconsistency is considered as the result of losing observations in model C. 
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explanation is obvious if one attends to Chinese government policies. Since the 
non-tradable shares are mostly dominated by the government, the partial liquidity 
was beneficial to the stability of the stock market from the viewpoint of investors. 
However, in 1999, the Chinese government promoted a reform aiming to sell a part 
of the non-tradable shares and formally implemented it in 2001, which caused a big 
loss to investors because the market was not grand enough to contain a sudden bulk 
buy. Even though the reform paused at the end of 2001 so as to relieve the chaos, 
since then the attention of investors to the tradable ratio has eased in valuating stocks, 
with the Chinese government having shown a clear sign of relaxing non-tradable 
shares to the stock trading market. No doubt, this event has been the major issue 
significantly driving the Chinese stock market between 1999 and 2001, which is 
considered as a reason that the bubble dropped sharply between 1999 and 2001, 
lowered its speed in 2002 and gradually recovered afterwards.  
 
It is worth mentioning that, in this firm level study of the Chinese stock market, the 
market average movement of bubbles is slightly different from the figure in the 
market level estimation (figure 4.2-1). From figure 7.1 and 7.2, the average bubble 
movement of the A-share market shows a downward tendency over the period of 
1996 and 2001; however, in the market level result (figure 4.2-1), bubbles of the 
A-share market move up between 1996 and 1997 as well as between 1999 and 2000, 
while they decline most of the time over the period of observation. The slight 
divergence between figure 7.1 and 4.2-1 may be explained as a result of model 
transformation and the different size of samples. First, the fundamental valuation 
structure in the firm level estimation embraces several accounting variables and a 
risk element while the only fundamental variable, dividend, is used in the market 
level estimation. The model transformation from a single fundamental variable to a 
set of accounting variables may lead to the results being partly divergent. Second, in 
the firm level estimation, more than one thousand Chinese listed companies are 
employed in the sample; however, there are only four hundred sample companies 
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chosen to constitute the Datastream Chinese A-share market index. It is highly 
possible that the results from a smaller sample exhibit a bias from the larger sample 
estimates. It is thought that the firm level bubble estimation may produce more 
precise results than the market level estimation because of its more detailed 
fundamental structure and the larger sample size. 
 
7.3.2 Immature Market and Mature Investors 
 
The primary discovery in the last section is a tremendous change in the Chinese 
stock market from the mania of the 1990s to a reasonably low bubble position. This 
downward movement can be interpreted as a result of changes in investors’ 
expectations of stock values.  
 
In Figure 7.4, according to the movement of estimated bubbles, we divide the period 
between 1996 and 2003 into three parts (1996-1999, 1999-2001 and 2001-2003), and 
then two different bubble trends appear respectively before and after the shadow 
period (1999-2001). These three periods are named as: adjustment, government 
shock and the recovery period.  
 
 [Figure 7.4 is about here] 
 
It is no more than a repetition if the attention is focused on explaining why the level 
of bubbles is far higher than the other two mature markets in the adjustment period. 
As documented in Section 7.1, before 1996 the weak governance and the thin 
capitalisation of the Chinese stock market provided a huge chance of manipulation 
(Ma, 2003). In addition, as is commonly recognised, a newly-born market is most 
likely to stimulate investors’ fantasies.  
 
However, after 1996, bubbles appear in a significant downward tendency. Three 
- 267 - 
implications of this declining movement are argued. First, the period of adjustment 
has its name due to an apparent downward tendency which reveals that investors in 
this developing market had been already conscious of the fictitious exuberance in 
that period. Secondly, the open economy brings along the consideration of worldwide 
shocks, which, between 1998 and 1999, posits the bubble just below the level of the 
U.S. after a strong reaction to the global financial crisis of 1997 to 1998. Third, the 
decline of bubbles can be also interpreted as a result of the information flowing from 
the B-share market where foreign institutional investors make their decision using 
the valuation technique applied simultaneously in developed stock markets. Sjoo and 
Zhang (2000) raised an idea that the presence of foreign investors can be a buying 
signal for the relatively uninformed domestic investors, since the major participants 
of the B-share market, foreign institutional investors, excel domestic investors in 
terms of three points: being more experienced, having better means of obtaining 
information, and having access to more advanced technology to analyse data. Similar 
opinions are also documented by Chui and Kwok (1998), Lin and Wu (2003), and 
Yang (2003). 
 
The sharp drop between 1999 and 2001 is attributed to the government reform of the 
dual-class share system. This was also demonstrated by Zhou and Sornette (2006) 
who identified an anti-bubble in the Chinese stock market which started in 2001. 
Jingu (2002) documented that the plan to reduce the quantity of state-owned shares 
caused a sharp decline in stock prices in the Chinese stock market. This reform has 
been regarded as a bomb by both investors and researchers that blew down the 
market expectation of future values. However, our argument for the effect of this 
government shock on bubbles is that it truly forces investors to change their 
investment behaviours from over-speculative to less speculative; by which, Chinese 
stock bubbles are dragged to a low level. The proposed reform created a high risk 
aversion which resulted in a lower bubble level at the beginning of the 2000s. Being 
aware of the uncertainty with the higher risk aversion, investors produced a lower 
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level of bubbles in China than in both the U.S. and the U.K. market, which shows 
evidence that more rationalities have been taken by Chinese investors in their 
decision-making. This is consistent with the findings of Ahmed, Li and Jr. (2000) 
who verified that the considerable volatility in the Chinese stock market represents 
the persistence of bubbles during the 1990s, and further predicted that bubbles in this 
market will not exhibit quite as much volatility as they did in the 1990s, with a 
further development of the Chinese stock market. 
 
The last sample period called recovery time is undoubtedly more proof to our 
argument for rational investors. In these three years, Chinese stock bubbles move 
below but consistently with the ones in the U.S. and the U.K. market, which shows 
clear evidence for Laurence et al’s (1997) argument that the Chinese stock market is 
becoming more integrated into the global economy. This implies that investors in the 
Chinese stock market have already taken global information into account and kept 
bubbles at a healthy state between 2001 and 2003. The similar finding was also 
documented by Copeland and Zhang (2003). They detected spectacularly absolute 
returns characterising the early post-deregulation period, but showing the familiar 
properties with typical western stock markets in recent years. 
 
Evidence also can be found in the sector study. Figure 7.5 shows the bubble levels of 
nine sectors respectively.73 Over the adjustment period of 1996 to 1999, the bubble 
figure declines in every sector except the sector of telecommunication. The unique 
rise in the telecommunication sector over the adjustment period is commonly 
understood as a result of the influence of the American dot-com fad. This 
phenomenon becomes the first sign of touching the outside world. This finding 
indicates that international shocks can still affect Chinese investors’ decision even in 
a stock market that is closed to the West. Undoubtedly, an open economy can bring 
                                                       
73
 Since the bubbles calculated from three models are identically moving, it would be nothing more than a 
repetition if all of these three groups of results were plotted. Thus, only the result from model A is examined. 
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the “infection” from the international market to its own protected stock market.  
 
 [Figure 7.5 is about here] 
 
A more striking finding is that, after 1998, Chinese stock bubbles in all sectors have 
moved synchronously with bubbles in the U.S. market. In particular, some sectors, 
such as energy and utility, technology and telecommunication and industry, have 
already shown this trend earlier than that (see Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5 B). This 
implies that the integration of China’s economy with the US has been shown by 
co-movement of Chinese and US investors in response to the industrial performance 
and shocks since the late 1990s.  
 
 [Table 7.5 is about here] 
 
In summary, although China is still struggling to pave a shortcut to catch up with the 
developed markets, investors in this closed emerging market have learnt from their 
experience in the past. As a result, when the game is repeated, Chinese investors 
become more rational than before, which is reflected by a declining trend in the 
bubble movement.  
 
7.3.3 Chinese Stock Performances at the Industry Level: the Domestic and 
the International Analysis  
 
In this section, an industry level study of bubbles is carried out. Since diversified 
classifications for sub-sectors are respectively used in the U.S., the U.K. and the 
Chinese markets, all firms are reorganised into six sectors so as to make the industry 
level comparison feasible. 
 
Figure 7.5-A shows the bubble movement of each industry in comparison with the 
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domestic average. It shows that the average level of bubbles reveals the average 
expectation of investors for the overall economy, which is called the “moderate 
bubble”. Bubbles of a sector in excess of the average level represent an excessive 
expectation of this sector, the so-called “excess bubble”. In contrast, bubbles of a 
sector below the average level which signal an under-expectation of this sector, is 
called the “under-average bubble”. Thus, in the 1990s, there were excess bubbles in 
the area of finance, consumer staples and information technology. However, their 
bubbles were moderate and were falling below the average at the beginning of the 
2000s. In contrast, bubbles in the sectors of energy and utility became higher after 
2002. In fact, the bubbles in the energy sector reached an even higher level than the 
level of bubbles in the telecommunication sector in 1999. To some extent, this figure 
rings a bubble alarm to the energy share fanatics. The figures also draw one’s 
attention to three sectors: industrials, consumer discretionary product and materials, 
which are currently important for the Chinese economy. However, one striking issue 
appears in Figure 7.5-A that bubble levels in these three sectors are not obviously 
higher than the domestic average level in recent years.  
 
In Figure 7.5-B, if the U.S. market is treated as a benchmark (in fact, it is the 
benchmark of the Chinese stock market, which can be easily revealed from the 
figures), it shows that, after two years’ descending of bubbles, most sectors started to 
show their rational patterns. As mentioned above, the reasonable bubble level in the 
Chinese market is deemed to be lower than the U.S. and the U.K. market due to its 
lesser fundamental value of the economy and the heavy political risk. Bearing in 
mind this principle to observe the recent bubble trends, one may easily notice a “red 
light” in the sector of energy and utility, where the bubble level is far beyond the 
ones in the U.S. and the U.K. markets in 2003. The dangerous signal is also thrown 
to the sector of industry, where bubbles almost move to the same level with the other 
two markets. In contrast, there is a big distance between the U.S. and the Chinese 
bubble lines in the healthcare sector. It seems too early to draw a conclusion that 
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there is an opportunity to invest healthcare in the Chinese stock market, because one 
may be suspicious of a healthcare fad in the U.S. market as it also runs too far from 
the U.K. market.  
 
Combining the domestic and international analyses together, one may draw a 
conclusion that bubbles in the sector of energy and utility is extremely active in the 
Chinese stock market, and the new investment to this sector risks a large probability 
of a bubble burst. The industry sector is the second danger. Despite an optimistic 
result for this sector shown in the domestic analysis figure, the international 
comparison brings the reconsideration to this positive opinion.   
 
It is easy to see that the estimated bubbles can provide us with a quantitative signal to 
detect if the price is overheated for a particular company or sector. Given the 
estimated bubbles, a careful comparison of bubbles between the domestic and the 
international market is still required for assessing the extent of any overheated 
investment on stocks. 
 
7.4 Summary and Conclusion 
 
By applying the firm level value frontier model to Chinese listed companies, we can 
estimate Chinese bubbles at the firm level or the industrial level and compare them 
with bubbles in other stock markets. The comparison of estimated bubbles between 
different markets reveals that first, over the period of 1996 to 2003, bubbles in the 
Chinese stock market performed a decreasing tendency, and with the result of the 
great deal of uncertainty in the Chinese market and the expectation for lower 
profitability of listed companies, Chinese stock bubbles are conceived to move below 
the U.S. and U.K. bubble levels, particularly after year 2000; second, in recent years, 
among the Chinese, the U.S. and the U.K. markets, it shows a clear tendency for 
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Chinese stock bubbles to co-move with the bubble paths in the other two open 
markets, especially the U.S. market; third, the Chinese stock market is still 
under-developed and closed with continuous reforms, but Chinese investors seem to 
behave more rationally in recent times than we expect. Finally, estimated bubbles in 
the Chinese stock market offer us evidence in support of an argument that even in a 
closed stock market in terms of capital flow, its investors can still improve their 
investment behaviours towards rationality by learning not only from the experience 
in the past but also from other opened markets. Indeed, the significant decreasing 
trend of Chinese bubbles shows that behaviours of Chinese investors have been 
converging to those in opened markets. 
 
Withstanding the above significant findings, however, the bubble study for the 
Chinese stock market is not completed, since the B-share and the H-share markets 
are not taken into account in this chapter. The anticipated bubble comparisons 
between the A-share market and the B-share (or H-share) market may enable us to 
gain an insight into the discrepant behaviours of the Chinese investors in the 
segmented markets. This in turn brings us an interesting question: Are the 
fundamental values the same for a dully listed company in the A-share market and 
the B-share (or H-share) market? This question is acute in the bubble study for the 
Chinese stock market, since there is an identical payoff structure but there are also 
divergent price movements in these two markets. Explicitly, from the supply 
perspective, the fundamental values of a dully listed stock in A and B (or H) share 
markets should be the same, since we define the fundamental value as the present 
value of future dividends stream. However, in our firm level model, we have 
introduced a risk element into the model. Therefore, from the demand perspective, 
the fundamental value could be perceived differently since investors’ opinions on the 
market risk could be regarded differently for different markets. This expectation 
needs to be tested against observations of the real world. As a result, this raises an 
interesting question for future research: how are risks perceived differently in 
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different markets? 
 
Apparently, the market segmentation in the Chinese stock market brings us a very 
interesting picture that if the fundamental value of A and B (or H) share is justified to 
be the same, the divergent prices in these two markets can be solely explained as a 
result of different levels of optimism effects and speculative effect. Implicitly, this 
may also solve a question: Why does segmented trading cause segmented markets?74 
The answer would not only be the asymmetric information but could also be found in 
the further study of bubble formation or investors’ behaviours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
74
 Segmented trading does not always result in segmented markets because cross-market informational links or 
arbitrage can work. (Yang, 2003) 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 7.1 Data Definition 
 
Book Value Per Share represents the book value of equity (total ownership divided 
by total number of shares) at the end of calendar year. 
 
Earnings Per Share represents the earnings for the 12months ended at the calendar 
year. It is the net profit divided by the total number of ordinary shares.  
 
Annual Share Prices represents share prices at the end of the calendar year. It is the 
last trading day’s total market value of a company’s tradable A-shares divided by its 
quantity. 
 
Tradable Ratio represents the ratio of the amount of tradable A-shares to the number 
of total shares excluding B-shares and H-shares. The total shares include both 
preference and ordinary shares. 
 
Beta Value represents the relative risk of every individual share to the total market 
risk. The calculation formula is based on Myron Scholes and Joseph Williams 
(1977)75. 
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 ‘Earnings Betas from Nonsynchronous Data’ Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 5, 1977, 309-327. The beta 
value data is directly downloaded from SINOFIN Database. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 7.1 Average Return On Equity (ROE) of Sample Firms 
 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
China 0.09096 0.09198 0.08656 0.09045 0.07852 0.06183 0.05379 0.05845 
U.K. 0.10635 0.11752 0.09213 0.08686 0.06295 0.03810 0.05026 0.06954 
U.S. 0.12529 0.12310 0.11519 0.12537 0.12857 0.08716 0.09752 0.11808 
 
ROE=Earning÷Shareholder’s Equity; Data sources: Datastream and SINOFIN Data Service China 
 
 
Table 7.2 Statistics of the Chinese Stock Market (1996-2003) 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total No. of A-share 
Firms 
514 720 825 923 1060 1133 1201 1262 
Total No. of A and 
B-share Firms 
530 745 851 949 1088 1160 1224 1287 
No. of A-shares 
(Million shares) 
26732 44268 60803 81318 107816 132387 150908 171460 
Total No. of Tradable 
Shares 
42985 67144 86194 107964 135426 183047 204160 226758 
Total No. of Shares 121954 194267 252679 308895 379171 525106 587546 642846 
 
Data sources:  Chen et al. (2005)  
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Table 7.3 the First Stage Estimation of Bubbles in the Chinese Market  
 
Dependent Var.    P  Model A Model B Model C 
Independent Var.    
Intercept 10.9485 
(6.20) 
11.4967 
(6.68) 
12.7364 
(24.65) 
Vit 2.3912 
(14.12) 
2.1400 
(12.42) 
2.2952 
(13.51) 
Kit 0.4725 
(5.88) 
0.5920 
(7.29) 
0.4792 
(6.00) 
∆Kit-1 2.57 
(2.57) 
1.1847 
(6.18) 
0.4474 
(2.57) 
βit Kit-1  - -0.5530 
(-9.16) 
- 
βit -  -1.7043 
(-9.28) 
Statistics of Estimations 
 
Numbers of Obv. 5331 5310 5309 
2R  within 
between 
overall 
0.4945 
0.9937 
0.7022 
0.5087 
0.9944 
0.7109 
0.5087 
0.9944 
0.7109 
Wald Test 2χ   6710.77 
[0.0000] 
7006.03 
[0.0000] 
7002.78 
[0.0000] 
AR1 0.4087 0.3948 0.3956 
eσ
 3.1047 3.0763 3.0759 
Hausman Test 2χ  
H0: Random Effects 
152.17 
[0.0000] 
88.79 
[0.0000] 
75.03 
[0.0000] 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
Test for Heteroskedasticity 2χ  
H0: Constant Variance 
9400.78 
[0.0000] 
9503.00 
[0.0000] 
9180.05 
[0.0000] 
Modified Bhargava DW 1.2531 1.2755 1.2926 
Baltagi-Wu LBI 1.6970 1.7096 1.7236 
 
Note: 1. t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets; 
2. 2R  values reported in the table are correlations squared which are from the second –round regression 
itit pp
∧
= γ  ; 
3. All the statistical tests proceed from the estimation before controlling autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.; 
 4. Time and firm dummies are included.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.4 the Second Stage Estimation of Bubbles in the Chinese Market 
Dependent Var. 
 
itit Pp ln=  
Estimation 
I-A 
Estimation 
II-A 
Estimation 
I-B 
Estimation 
II-B 
Estimation 
I-C 
Estimation 
II-C 
Independent Var. 
Intercept 1.6645 
(73.64) 
1.8340 
(97.30) 
1.6912 
(67.77) 
1.8242 
(85.04) 
2.1093 
(65.66) 
2.2881 
(107.68) 
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Note:  t ratios are in parentheses, and p values are in square brackets. 
Time and firm dummies are included.
∧∧
= itit Pp ln  0.2214 (21.91) 
0.2083 
(20.46) 
0.2112 
(131.83) 
0.2092 
(20.67) 
0.1180 
(17.79) 
0.1173 
(23.79) 
itit LRlr ln=  
-0.2991 
(-15.95) - 
-0.3152 
(-9.53) - 
-0.3392 
(-7.87) - 
1997T  0.1190 
(72.98) 
0.1087 
(4.89) 
0.0949 
(3.70) 
0.1124 
(4.39) 
0.0402 
(65.66) 
0.0401 
(55.96) 
1998T  0.2319 
(15.12) 
0.2097 
(10.00) 
0.2223 
(10.58) 
0.2343 
(11.13) 
0.1146 
(5.49) 
0.0984 
(4.45) 
1999T  0.3354 (20.48) 
0.3013 
(16.60) 
0.2905 
(13.85) 
0.2881 
(13.72) 
0.1052 
(5.05) 
0.0815 
(3.88) 
2000T  0.8093 
(45.28) 
0.7457 
(41.34) 
0.7643 
(36.33) 
0.7376 
(34.92) 
0.5572 
(23.76) 
0.4911 
(24.29) 
2001T  0.5100 (28.46) 
0.4509 
(25.01) 
0.4732 
(22.42) 
0.4354 
(19.39) 
0.2878 
(11.51) 
0.2043 
(9.87) 
2002T  0.2390 (15.46) 
0.1769 
(9.78) 
0.2139 
(9.21) 
0.1584 
(7.09) 
0.0346 
(1.35) 
-0.0655 
(-3.19) 
2003T  -0.0296 (-1.77) 
-0.0903 
(-4.58) 
-0.0530 
(-2.40) 
-0.1071 
(-5.08) 
-0.1522 
(-5.92) 
-0.2518 
(-11.98) 
Statistics        
Number of Obsv. 4416 5018 4202 4202 2748 2748 
υσσλ /b=  4.37×108 3.95×108 4.06×108 5.99×108 2.61×108 2.36×108 
bσ  0.3541 0.3646 0.3513 0.3557 0.3195 0.3240 
υσ  8.1×10-10 9.22×10-10 8.66×10-10 5.93×10-10 1.23×10-10 1.37×10-9 
2σ  0.1254 0.1329 0.1234 0.1265 0.1021 0.1050 
Log Likelihood 1379.2381 1421.0224 1345.7846 1294.1648 1140.965 1102.9585 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
H0: 0=bσ  
1900 
[0.000] 
2100 
[0.000] 
1700 
[0.000] 
1700 
[0.000] 
1200 
[0.000] 
1200 
[0.000] 
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Table 7.5 Integration of Bubbles in Three Sectors between US and China  
year Technology and Telecommunication Energy and Utility Industry 
 
US China US China US China 
1996 1.472508 1.320992 1.38724 1.53855 1.392403 1.56355 
1997 1.411178 1.44514 1.34616 1.60273 1.441377 1.40764 
1998 1.483556 1.516349 1.31951 1.40251 1.405751 1.25772 
1999 1.773224 1.667804 1.28079 1.25962 1.422747 1.40553 
2000 2.29298 1.521345 1.36456 1.18104 1.432372 1.26018 
2001 1.536797 1.27684 1.37947 1.2207 1.359915 1.25007 
2002 1.380606 1.238778 1.32091 1.28003 1.39269 1.23841 
2003 1.371009 1.238048 1.32979 1.69774 1.360339 1.31026 
 
Figure 7.1 Comparison of Adjusted and Unadjusted Bubbles  
(From Estimation I-A and II-A) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Comparisons of Bubbles among Estimation I-A, I-B and I-C  
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Figure 7.3 Stock Prices, Fundamental Values and Bubbles: Market Average 
Values  (From Estimation II-A) 
 
Figure 7.4 Comparisons of Bubbles among Three Markets76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Bubbles in A Sector: Domestic and International Comparisons 
 
A. Domestic Comparison 
                                                        
76
 Bubbles are estimated from Model A. 
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International Comparison 
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Chapter 8  Conclusions and Further Research 
 
The EMH, which was once at the forefront of financial economics, is now accepted 
as being outdated. More and more researchers, such as Shiller (1981), Campbell and 
Kyle (1993), Kahneman and Riepe (1998), Shleifer (2000), and Thaler (1999, 2005) 
believe that the intricate plot in capital markets can hardly be explained by the 
traditional paradigm of the efficient market. Instead, the new studies of security 
prices, such as rational bubbles and behavioral finance, theoretically and empirically 
lead us to consider the financial market to be inefficient. Furthermore, it is argued 
that systematic and significant deviations from efficiency in stock markets are 
expected to persist for long periods of time (Shleifer, 2000). With this in mind, it is 
considered that the ongoing new area of research in market inefficiency is a 
remarkable alternative to the EMH for providing fresh explanations to the 
progressively capricious behaviours of stock markets. Thus, the study of an 
inefficient market is expected to embrace three layers of topics relative to market 
inefficiency: how to verify it, how to measure it, and what causes it. Remarkably, the 
research for the first and the third topics have been broadly documented. In fact, the 
third question is the central topic of behavioural finance which has already set itself 
as “open-minded finance” combining twin disciplines of psychology and finance 
(Thaler, 1993; Belsky and Gilovich, 1999). However, the second question is still a 
blank area. Our study of stock market bubbles in this thesis aims to develop a new 
methodology, the value-frontier estimation method, to measure both market level and 
firm level stock bubbles which will facilitate the second layer of research to take off. 
 
8.1 The Advantages of the Value Frontier Methodology 
 
In our work, the value frontier methodology excels as a first attempt to measure stock 
bubbles. It is born with a belief that a stock market is inefficient due to the 
heterogeneity of investors. Especially, it is known that people in general and 
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investors in particular, are not fully rational (Shleifer, 2000). The advantages of the 
value-frontier methodology can be summarized as follows.   
 
First, it regards EMH as an idealistic situation of equilibrium, which is consistent 
with the discipline of rational bubbles (for example, Shiller, 1981; Blanchard and 
Watson, 1982) and behavioural finance (for example, Thaler, 2005). Moreover, 
unlike both the schools of rational bubbles confining bubbles in a rational framework, 
and behavioural researchers mainly focusing on the psychological evidence of 
irrationalities, the value-frontier theory gives rise to a new approach to estimating 
bubbles combining both the rationality and the irrationality together, which extends 
the concept of bubbles to a broader horizon.   
 
Second, it is apparent that the magnitude of fundamental values are hardly ever 
calculated since they depend on the values produced in the future which cannot be 
truly perceived by people at present, as portrayed by a Greek poet (1863-1933)77: 
“men know what is happening now; the gods know the things of the future.” To 
overcome this problem, a value frontier, which is modelled by several fundamental 
variables, acts as a proxy of fundamental values so that a bubble index defined by 
actual stock prices over the value frontier is estimated by applying the cost frontier 
estimation technique. For the model, it is unnecessary to devise a forecast procedure 
to calculate the fundamental values, and fundamental variables in the model can be 
adjusted according to any particularities.  
 
Third, in the models of rational bubbles, various assumptions about the bubble 
moving path or the probability of collapsing have been applied (for example, 
Blanchard and Watson, 1982; West, 1987; Diba and Grossman, 1988b; and Fukuta, 
1998 etc.). Compared to the various hypothesis tests in rational bubble research, 
value frontier modelling is more parsimonious in that no assumption about the 
                                                       
77
 Source: http://introduction.behaviouralfinance.net/Schm02.pdf 
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bubble moving path is required in the model.  
 
Finally, the existing tests of bubbles are mostly done in time-series data and results 
are diversified. Summers (1986) attributes the failure of finding contradictory 
evidence of EMH to the low power tests of the time series. He illustrates that it takes 
a lot of data and perhaps a better theoretical idea of what to look for before 
researchers can find persuasive evidence. In the value frontier estimation of panel 
data, the likelihood ratio test on the existence of inefficiency is then applied to the 
sample. This test rejects consistently the non-existence of bubbles across different 
samples, which provides us with a legitimate condition to estimate bubbles. Thus, it 
is argued that using the panel-data approach to test bubbles is more powerful than 
using conventional time-series-data-based tests which could result in a failure in 
verifying bubbles.  
 
In summary, due to the above advantages of the value frontier methodology, the 
innovative ideas of the value frontier estimation will create a new approach to the 
research of market inefficiency. Moreover, the estimated bubble will undoubtedly 
provide us with critical information for the future research of financial economics. 
 
8.2 The Relevance of the Estimated Bubbles 
 
The major contribution of this work is to produce an estimated bubble (or bubble 
index) which represents the magnitudes of stock bubbles. While manifesting the 
success of the measurement, it is also worth emphasising the roles of estimated 
bubbles in the fields of both the academia and the practice so as to highlight the 
significance of this research. 
 
8.2.1 The Further Relevance of the Estimated Bubbles in Academia 
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Obviously, the academic and practical uses of the estimated bubble are extensive as it 
has been the only variable purely reflecting bubbles until now. The conventional 
variables representing stock market performances, such as the price index, stock 
returns, and the share price volatility, do not serve well to present bubbles as they all 
inextricably contain the fundamental factor of stocks. The doubts are also cast on 
some “market fever” variables, such as the price earning ratio, the price dividend 
ratio, and the price book value ratio, which are not able to embrace more than one 
fundamental variable at the same time. Instead, the estimated bubble is assigned to 
play a unique role superior to those conventional variables, in that it purely 
represents the bubble without commingling with any fundamental elements. Any 
“impurities” can be weeded out by improving the value frontier modelling.  
 
In academia, the estimated bubble can potentially improve researches in two broad 
areas: research on stock market inefficiency; research on the relationship between a 
stock market and an economy.  
 
The major contribution of this work is certainly to enhance the research of the 
inefficient market. As introduced at the beginning of this chapter, among three layers 
of research in the inefficient market (verification, measurement and explanation), the 
second layer of research which is “how to measure the market inefficiency” is still 
blank, while the other two are not sufficient to replace the efficient market theory due 
to the scanty evidence. As Shleifer (2000) mentioned, “although we may reject the 
null hypothesis of market efficiency with more confidence than before, we still know 
relatively little about such key determinants of prices as expectations about 
fundamentals, discount rates and simple movements of demand.” To some extent, the 
crux of understanding the determinants of stock prices is to explain bubbles. If the 
variable of estimated bubbles takes a proxy of stock bubbles, the effect of 
explanatory factors on stock bubbles can be revealed more easily. Obviously, the 
measurement of bubbles in our work will not only fulfil the gap of the second layer 
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of research, but also empirically improve studies in the other two layers in obtaining 
more evidence in support of market inefficiency, especially the behavioural research 
which is the most potential area leading the future of the financial research.  
 
This brings out another benefit of the estimated bubbles. With the variable of 
estimated bubbles, many topics about the interaction between the stock market 
exuberance and real economic behaviours can be further explored (for example, the 
topic of share price-inflation relationship which is studied in Chapter 5). Moreover, 
while believing the real economy is the cause to soar or suppress stock bubbles 
through investors’ perception, the reverse investigations, for example, how the stock 
market bubble gives rise to the instability of an economy, is also liable to be obtained 
using the estimated bubbles. In this case, the value frontier estimation explores a path 
leading to the future research on the effects of bubbles on the real world economic 
performance. For example, Binswanger (1999) argues that stock bubbles persist since 
they are not reproducible assets and their fundamental values are obscure. He also 
highlights remarkable roles of a sustainable bubble in the interaction between a stock 
market and a real economy. In this view, the extraordinary exuberance is not the only 
sign of bubbles. Instead, bubbles persist in stock markets due to the expectation 
distortion in existence commonly, and a sustainable bubble is expected to facilitate 
real economic activities. Our work is in support of Binswanger’s (1999) argument of 
persistent bubbles by developing a new methodology to estimate the magnitude of 
persistent bubbles. This new development helps to verify and improve the argument 
of Binswanger (1999). 
 
8.2.2 The Relevance of the Estimated Bubbles in the Real World 
  
The academic use of the estimated bubbles is remarkable, and the applications of it in 
practice are also highly valuable. The estimated bubbles (or the “bubble index”) are 
like a thermometer persistently inspecting the “fever” of a stock market. The bubble 
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is no longer invisible and stealthily inflated until a crash. It can always be detected 
even when there are no any signs of heavy irrationalities and a collapse. This can be 
achieved from both macro and micro horizons. The macro bubble index represents 
market level bubbles which measure the overpricing level for a stock market at a 
point of time. A stock market can get self-supervised by checking its bubble 
movements in time or comparing its bubbles with other stock markets around the 
world at a point in time. The firm level bubble index can reveal the degree of 
overvaluation for each single stock, which is expected to reduce the mania and 
irrationalities in a stock market. Being aware of the bubble accumulation of a 
particular stock, the confidence in this stock may be diminished with the bubble 
inflating. This will help to reduce both the irrationality and the expectation distortion 
in stock markets tremendously, since investors can be conscious of the mania by 
checking the bubble index of a stock or an industrial sector. In addition, a domestic 
and international analysis of stock bubbles obtained by the firm level bubble index 
will be extremely helpful in enhancing the professional’s horizon in stock analysis.         
 
8.3 Is the Market Efficient? 
 
In EMH, the efficiency of a stock market is concerned in accordance with the 
disclosure of information. Fama (1970, 1991) defined that a market in which prices 
always fully reflect available information is called “efficient”. Jensen (1978) further 
stated that a market is efficient with respect to an information set if it is impossible to 
make economic profits by trading on the basis of the information set. The degree of 
efficiency is then classified into three categories with respect to information revealed 
to all participants: the weak form efficiency (the information set includes only the 
history of prices), semi-strong form efficiency (the publicly available information is 
known to all market participants), and strong form efficiency (all information 
including private information is known to any market participants). A crucial 
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assumption of this argument is that all investors act according to the rational 
expectation model (Shiller, 1989).  
 
The challenge can be raised to the EMH from two perspectives. First, the rational 
expectation of investors doesn’t mean that investors must locate stock prices on their 
fundamental values. There could be a rational deviation from the fundamental value 
which is called “rational bubbles” (Blanchard and Watson, 1982 etc.). Second, with 
development of an idea of heterogeneous expectations, the assumption of rational 
expectations has been called into question by many researchers (for example, Shiller 
1989). In other words, investors are not homogeneous but heterogeneous and their 
expectations are not fully rational.  
 
Therefore, the study of market efficiency should be extended from a test of 
information revealing efficiency to a broader horizon of investors’ efficiency in 
responding to given information. In contrast with the EMH, our study tests and 
measures the information-responsive inefficiency with an assumption that 
information is identical to all market participants and stock valuation technique is a 
common knowledge in a market. The finding of this study is that stock bubbles 
caused by the information-responsive inefficiency persist in stock markets, in which 
this can be shown by the world-wide average market level bubbles remaining at 12% 
above the fundamental values. This finding brings us a further question: Is it right to 
call a stock market with a stable movement of bubbles inefficient? If not, how should 
one define the responsive efficiency or inefficiency? To answer these questions, the 
view of “sustainable bubbles” from Binswanger (1999) is employed in our argument. 
He argued that stock bubbles exist persistently since fundamental values of stocks 
are uncertain. A “sustainable bubble” can positively facilitate the growth of an 
economy, and a bubble is “sustainable” in the long run only if its movements are 
consistent with real economic activities.  
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Following the above argument of Binswanger (1999), we claim that a market without 
bubbles is completely efficient from the perspective of investors’ responsiveness to 
given information; a market with “sustainable bubbles” (bubbles that co-move with 
the economy), which results from rational responses to economic conditions, is in the 
strong form of information-responsive efficiency; a market with “non-sustainable 
bubbles”, i.e. the bubble changes are not linked closely with economic foundations, 
is in the weak form of information-responsive efficiency.  
 
Thus, on the basis of the findings from our empirical work, we conclude that the 
world-wide stock market is the weak form of the information-responsive efficiency 
with a relatively stable bubble at 12% above the fundamental value. Out of the UK, 
the US and Chinese stock market, the UK market is weakly responsively efficient in 
reacting to information. The US has been in the weak form of the 
information-responsive efficiency most of the time but it appeared to be inefficient in 
terms of information responsiveness over the period of 1999 to 2000, due to an 
“irrational exuberance” that resulted in a collapse. The Chinese stock market was 
responsively inefficient in the 1990s, but has moved towards to the weak form of the 
information-responsive efficiency over the period of 2001 to 2003.  
 
8.4 Discrepancies and Further Research 
 
The value frontier methodology developed by this thesis creates a new approach in 
financial research. However, like any ideas in their infancy, the contributions of this 
work are more appreciated as its freshly invented concepts than the results obtained. 
Certainly, some discrepancies in this work leave a gap waiting to be filled in. More 
delicate work is expected to be conducted to overcome the current problems in the 
value frontier estimation.  
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First, the theoretical analysis on the value frontier framework is mostly based on the 
form-analogy between the cost frontier model and the stock price model (i.e. price 
equals fundamental value plus bubble). The arguments concerning fundamental 
valuation and bubble formation are brief and descriptive in this work, and there is no 
thorough mathematical modeling to further explain the causes of bubbles. Apparently, 
the major attention in the future work could be paid to enriching the theoretical bases 
so that the value frontier framework becomes not only a methodology but a work 
containing the full complex of both theory and empirical estimation.  
 
Secondly, the model demonstrated in this work is merely at a conceptual phase. The 
model can be improved by further enriching the fundamental variables. In the market 
level estimation, only one fundamental variable, dividends, is in the model to capture 
fundamental values. In the firm level estimation, only the basic framework of the 
F-O model is utilized. No doubt, a more ample model, which embraces a more 
comprehensive account of fundamental valuation, can considerably improve the 
accuracy of the estimated bubble. In this case, it is expected that in future research, 
more detailed fundamental factors will be added to the market level model and some 
selective research contributions about companies’ valuation, for example, the 
economic value-added (EVA) model, may be employed in the firm level model. In 
addition, the derivation from the theoretical model to the empirical model in the 
rational bubble study is borrowed to our work which shows a significant weakness in 
the empirical modeling, since the theoretical model is an ex ante framework but the 
empirical model becomes a deterministic structure. It is suggested that some proxies 
of uncertainty may be taken into account in the future research as long as this new 
model can be well justified.  
 
Thirdly, a key assumption, that a negative bubble could exist in a spot price or a very 
short run price but not in the medium or the long run, is employed for the value 
frontier theory. However, the annual price data used in our estimation are the last 
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trading prices of a year, in which we assume that it represents a long-run valuation of 
a stock. This assumption needs to be tested in using the long-run price of a stock, for 
example, an average price of a month or a year, since the spot price might be 
undervalued below the fundamental at a spot time. Thus, looking for more 
appropriate data to take a proxy of the long-run price movement is another further 
project in the future.  
 
Finally, from an information perspective, bubbles specified by the value-frontier 
approach are more informative than rational bubbles, since the 
value-frontier-specified bubbles are caused by the interaction of rationality and 
irrationality. This obscurity may cause a problem for the behavioural analysis in that 
it explains the market by some psychological phenomena which are mainly within 
the irrational scope. The work of identifying rationality/irrationality is a challenging 
topic. A rough idea of setting up a basket of rational benchmark variables to test the 
rationality of bubbles will be further explored in our future research. 
 
8.5 Summary 
 
All the efforts on the bubble research are conducted with a promising goal that will 
eventually build up a comprehensive theory of inefficient markets. Clearly, this final 
goal cannot be achieved only with partial advancement. The theoretical and empirical 
endeavors must be made to embody three sub-research areas: the company 
performance valuation, the bubble measurement and the investors’ behaviours, which 
are able to jointly explain the price fluctuation and the inefficiency of a stock market. 
Obviously, our work of measuring bubbles, the area of which is neglected at present, 
takes a big step forward to the final agenda of the research, which illuminates a very 
promising way of proving empirically the inefficiency of a stock market.  
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However, just like other studies in the stock market inefficiency, our work in this 
thesis is just a start in terms of measuring stock bubbles, and nothing have been 
concluded. This view can be better presented by the comment of Thaler (2005) on 
behavioural finance that “this is a lot of accomplishment in a short period of time, 
but we are still much closer to the beginning of the research agenda than we are to 
the end.” We all know that every good race begins with one step, and though this step 
may be shaky at the first, it is undoubtedly the foundation for greater things to come.  
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